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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Healing the Effects of Medical Errors:
A Vision of Justice as Wholeness
by
Christiane Schubert
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Social Policy and Social Research
Toma Linda University, September 2008
Dr. Gerald Winslow, Chairperson

Medical errors cannot be avoided completely even when employing the greatest
care and applying the most sophisticated medical technologies. They occur when
organizational, human, technical, or environmental factors lead to unintentional failures
which result in recognizable physical, mental, spiritual, or social harm to patients. Until
recently, the medical profession has responded with silence while patients remained
uncompensated or resorted to the legal system. Professional distancing undermines
transparency and patient safety while medical malpractice litigation ruptures the fragile
relationships between patients and healthcare providers in whom patients trust.
Philosophically, these responses draw on the framework of deontological liberalism,
promoting notions of just deserts and conceptions of freedom that, either when regarded
from a Kantian perspective of autonomy or considered as freedom from non-interference,
highlight individualism. Metaphors of this paradigm are expressed in a language of
rights, which have limited potential to restore personal and social well-being. Drawing on
both, the biblical tradition and republican political theory, this dissertation develops a
culturally situated principled consequentialist approach, called justice as wholeness.
Justice as wholeness responds to the multidimensional effects of medical errors by

xm

promoting wholeness as the theory of value. Deeply rooted in the biblical notion of
human dignity, it distinguishes between the eschatological meaning of wholeness as a
vision and its relative experience in a broken world. The function of justice is to restore
the relative experience of the physical, mental, spiritual, and social dimensions of
wholeness. A mixed approach to normative ethics, justice as wholeness has two
principles that exclude unjust pursuits of its value-goal: a civic republican
conceptualization of freedom and a biblical notion of equality. Justice as wholeness is a
comprehensive and integrative framework that serves as a philosophical foundation for
medical error policies and processes that resonate with the mission and values of faithbased hospitals. Loma Linda University Medical Center serves as a test case for
incorporating the vision into policy. Justice as wholeness informs mission integration, the
disclosure of medical errors to patients, and processes of restoration while encouraging
transparent autonomy in peer review and compassion in hospital culture.

xiv

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Seven years ago, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) unleashed an unprecedented
response to the problem of medical error.1 In its well known report To Err is Human
(Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999), the Institute revealed that the number of deaths
related to medical errors may range from 44,000 to 98,000 each year (p. 1). The report
points out that, even when using the lower estimate, errors in medicine are the eighth
leading cause of death in the United States. This implies that more people die as a result
of mistakes than of breast cancer, car accidents, or AIDS. The frequent occurrence of
medical errors raised national and international concern. Following the publication of the
report, healthcare organizations, research institutions, and policymakers began to develop
research agendas and programs that aim to prevent medical errors and increase patient
safety. However, where modern medicine allows for highly sophisticated diagnostic
technology and treatment, some mistakes are difficult to prevent because of the
complexity of medical knowledge, the uncertainty of clinical predictions, time pressure,
communication and other factors (see Mazor, et al, 2004; Liang, 2004; Paget, 1988). It is
the handling of the effects of those errors that have not been prevented and which harm
patients and their families—those that leave healthcare providers in distress and which
challenge hospitals to think of fair ways to “making things right”—that this dissertation
addresses.
In this dissertation the words error, mistakes, and mishaps are used interchangeably. However, Chapter
Two clarifies that the meaning of each term varies according to its context.
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In order to highlight the intersecting realities of patients and physicians who are
affected by medical error and to illustrate the complex dynamics that unfold when
organizations are put to the task to respond to harm, the discussion begins with an outline
of three cases. These cases establish the need to develop a relevant theory of justice that
takes into consideration the physical, mental, spiritual, and social effects of medical
mistakes. The first case concerns the experiences of one family who used the tedious
processes of the formal legal system to press for compensation for an error that left their
child permanently disabled. The second case is one that I encountered while conducting
field research at Loma Linda University Medical Center, a faith-based hospital and
trauma center in California. Chapter Six outlines a brief methodology and report of
selected results of this larger project. This specific case involves a medical error resulting
in the traumatic loss of a medical student’s finger. At the time of the interviews with key
informants of the organization, the claim was discussed in various departments of the
hospital. It serves to illustrate the challenges that healthcare organizations face when
attempting to address the complex needs of harmed patients, their families, and
healthcare providers. The third case is a classic case of a physician’s stunning openness
about a tremendous error that he committed and which resulted in the wrongful abortion
of a fetus. Although the incident occurred over 23 years ago, the case illustrates the
ambiguity of medical decision-making and demonstrates rather vividly the feelings of
physicians when their mistakes cause significant harm to patients. Clearly, where
technology and its safeguards have advanced, the inner world of physicians and their
patients have changed relatively little.
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A Journey through the Legal System
On June 22, 2006 at a hearing before the U.S Senate Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Committee, Susan Sheridan, co-founder and President of a non-profit
organization called “Consumers Advancing Patient Safety” shared her personal story of
medical error and how it affected her family (U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Committee, 2006). Sheridan, a “mother and a widow,” describes the devastating
impact of a medical failure that will remain in her memory forever2. The story of her son
Cal unfolded when physicians failed to test the child for newborn jaundice, thus missing
the timely treatment of his condition. As a result of this oversight, Cal fell ill to
kemicterus3, a preventable disease. According to his mother’s testimony, the
consequences of this oversight were tremendous as the child continues to suffer from
severe disabilities including cerebral palsy. Although Cal experiences no mental
challenges and is a “bright, creative boy with both great potential and an extraordinary
challenging future,” his predicted healthcare costs are staggering, prompting the family to
take their case to court. “In Cal’s case we sued because we believed in the legal system . .
and because we had no other choice but to seek compensation.” According to the events
that followed, the family’s trust in the legal system was soon overshadowed by the
dynamics of the adversarial process; the alienating, intimidating, and time-consuming
trial strategies employed by opposing lawyers battling in a court of law.

2 Ms. Sheridan describes two medical errors in her testimony, one that concerned her son Cal, which is
illustrated for the purpose of highlighting the shortfalls of the legal system. The other incident, equally
tragic, cost the life of her husband but will be omitted in this study.
3 Kemicterus is a certain type of brain damage that results from elevated bilimbin levels in the baby’s
blood. Because in newborns the blood-brain barrier has not fully formed, bilimbin can enter the brain and
may cause severe complications. These include athetoid cerebral palsy, hearing loss, vision, and dental
problems, and sometimes even mental retardation. The disease is preventable ifjaundice is diagnosed early in
newborns and is being treated timely (see Center for Disease Control, 2008).
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Attorneys working for the hospital in which Cal was a patient and its doctors
employed a “two-part strategy.” First, they tried to “vilify” Ms. Sheridan and her husband
by arguing that Cal did not suffer from kemicterus. Moreover, they accused the couple of
having only one goal in mind: to get rich of their child’s medical condition. Thus, as in
every other trial, experts were recruited to mount evidence against the family’s claims.
One of the defense witnesses testified that “he was only 49% sure that Cal had
kemicterus”; another expert stated that there might have been a virus that was transferred
through the mother’s placenta to the child. After a seven-week trial, the jury decided in
favor of the defense, a verdict that was indeed shattering for the family who felt
abandoned by both the medical system and the legal system.
However, to the relief of the family, Cal’s story did not end here. The trial judge
who presided over their case expressed doubts about the proceedings with expert
testimonies on both sides reminding him of a competition. Particularly dubious for the
judge was the defense expert’s statement that he was only 49% sure that Cal had
kemicterus while at the same time being unable to make any inferences about other
conditions that might have been responsible for his severe symptoms. The charge for the
expert’s testimony was $34,000. Lamenting the tendency of many expert witnesses who
are hired in medical malpractice cases to “bend their testimony” in favor of the party who
recruited them, the judge set aside the jury verdict. To nobody’s surprise, the judgment
was appealed, reviewed by the state supreme court and remanded for a new trial.
Interestingly, the consequence for the expert witness who was only 49% sure that Cal
suffered from kemicterus consisted of a peer review process conducted by his specialty
board. The result: no actions were taken against him.
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During the discovery period preceding the second trial, lawyers for the hospital
and its staff changed their defense strategy. Ms. Sheridan explains that “they no longer
challenged the diagnosis; the theory this time was that Cal had kemicterus, but it was
completely his pediatrician’s fault.” The case finally settled out of court after a process
that took a stunning eight years, draining the family’s finances to a point of concern about
whether the settlement will pay for their attorneys as well as for their child’s future
medical expenses. It is noteworthy that one condition of the settlement was for the family
to sign a confidentiality agreement, which they rejected. Because of the continuous
efforts of Ms. Sheridan to raise awareness among public health leaders about the
conditions that lead to Cal’s disease history, an activity that is extremely important to her,
she agreed only to withhold the name of the hospital and the amount of the settlement.
Nevertheless, she retained the right to talk about other aspects of her case.

Early Offers
Tim is a fourth year medical student at Loma Linda University Medical Center.4
In order to be able to pay his tuition he also works part-time as a phlebotomist, mostly
during nights. He just finished his rotation in pediatric surgery and it was clear to him
that pediatrics is specialty that he would join. He likes surgery, but even more so he loves
to work with children. After mailing his application materials for residency, Tim decided
to take off for a weekend to join a local group of sea kayakers who planned to paddle
along the coast. There was a lot of wind that day and the paddlers had difficulties staying
on course. Tim’s kayak was old and from previous trips the strings holding some of his

4 The names of the participants as well as the circumstances of the case have been substituted with fictional
names and details in order to protect confidentiality.
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storage items in place were tied together by make-shift metal rings. Catching the next
wave at an angle, Tim’s boat began to tip as he tried to hold the rings in place. His
memory about the next moments is blurred. He remembers the waves caving in over his
head and reports that he suddenly felt a sharp pain radiating from his right index finger
into his shoulder. Luckily, his safety vest pulled him up rather quickly and as he gasped
for air, he was surrounded by concerned members of the group; all starring at his right
hand. The subsequent visit to urgent care was long and painful. The finger that was
caught in one of the boat’s rings, and in which he felt the sudden pain, required numerous
stitches; however, the plastic surgery resident on-call assured Tim that he would be fine
by the time he would be notified about which residency program he might be joining. He
told Tim to return in four days so that the bandage and dressing could be removed.
Additionally, he wrote him a note for a month leave from his work in the clinical lab.
Two days after the incident and while studying in the library with a colleague,
Tim felt an increasing dull pain in his finger and as the hours went by a pounding heat
began to slowly crawl up his arm. He asked his friend, a medical student who planned on
becoming a radiologist, whether he could take off the bandage to take a quick look. No,
this was not a good idea, his friend said, because if there were something wrong Tim’s
health insurance would not pay if they “doctored” on it themselves. Subsequently, Tim
was driven to the hospital emergency department only to make a shocking discovery; one
that changed his life forever and rushed him right into plastic surgery. The plastic surgery
team who took care of him at urgent care forgot to take the tourniquet off his index
finger. Having had no blood supply, the finger had to be amputated immediately. For a
medical student who was just about to embark on a residency in pediatrics this certainly
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meant the worst nightmare coming true; not to mention the implications that would come
up in regards to his current work as a phlebotomist, a job that paid the bills.
The events that followed were intense. There were lots of heart-felt “sorrys.” As
the attending physician of Plastic Surgery was called to see Tim, he apologized
immediately for what he saw. Prior to the surgery, the resident who was responsible for
the mistake also came and apologized, asking Tim whether he was all right with him
attending the surgery. Still in a state of shock and disbelief, Tim agreed, but revealed
after the fact that he did not appreciate the resident’s active role during the surgery. It
upset him. The resident also apologized to Tim’s parents who immediately had flown in
from Texas to be by their son’s side. According to Tim, the apology to his parents “is a
good indication of character” as “apology goes a long way.” However, an apology was
not enough; he needed “something more . . . something in writing.”
Tim was clear that he would not use the letter to blame anyone. Rather, it was
between the two of them. According to Tim, a letter would have made him feel better and
helped him with his own resolve. Occasionally, there was this feeling of “fault” creeping
into his thoughts; was he the one to blame? As a “professional,” should he have noticed
much earlier that something was not right? Specifically, Tim expresses his concern that if
he were to practice in his chosen specialty, pediatrics, the children would certainly think
it was his fault that he had lost his finger. And, as a pediatrician and experienced health
care provider, how could he explain having only nine fingers! This should not have
happened to him. At least with the letter he could have shown them that it was not his
fault. But he never did get a letter nor was he able to stay in contact with the resident.
Communication had stopped.

7

The months that followed were difficult for the expert kayaker and future
pediatrician. He was on leave from school and on paid sick-leave from his work in the
clinical lab. He had talked with Risk Management, the CEO of the hospital had called
him, and the administration sent him chocolates; everybody “handled it really well.” Yet,
Tim explains that there was not only physical trauma, but that the emotional pain was
excruciating, and still is today. Due to his employment he was able to take advantage of
the services offered by the Employee Assistance Program as well as the hospital’s
Employee Spiritual Care program, the latter of which he found to be extremely valuable
and “human.” What proved to be rather difficult for Tim was his triple role as a patient
thinking about malpractice and a student and employee who highly values the hospital
and its mission. However, he explains that he became fairly nervous as lawyers became
involved on both sides following his hesitancy to accept an early settlement offer by Risk
Management. After all, he felt that money could not replace his finger. According to Tim,
such an offer “diminishes” something that can not be quantified: “the loss of future;”
especially his future, working with children who will have to look at his disfigured hand.
Subsequently, the “lump-sum” settlement offer seemed neither fair to him nor
appropriate. According to Tim, things can not be made right by check and then being
forgotten about later.
Instead, for Tim it is more important that what happened to him is being widely
acknowledged, that people would talk with him about it, and that he would be able to
share his story openly and with “everybody.” Working in the medical profession, it is
particularly crucial to know that this mistake would never again occur in other patients’
care. In this light, he reports that it came as a relief to him to hear that the hospital had
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established an “action plan” to work out proper procedures for the use of tourniquets.
Additionally, Tim remarks that he would like to see a reduction in the hours residents are
required to work. Although he considers himself quite sturdy from long hours in the
library and from his night job in the Clinical Lab, he is acutely aware of the fact that the
lack of sleep is the cause of “sloppy work.” However, during the interview, Tim appears
less sturdy in being able to cope with the loss of his finger due to a medical mistake. In
regards to the offer made by the hospital’s Risk Management Department, he remains
upset and certainly needs more time—time to heal his emotional wounds and time to
consult with his lawyer about the financial consequences of the error.

Confessions of a Physician
Published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1984, Dr. David Hilfiker
provides one of the first narratives about the emotional struggle of a physician who
harmed his patient unintentionally and the difficulties that he experienced talking about
the event and in finding his own resolve. The story begins with a description of his
responsibility of taking care of his friend Barb’s second pregnancy. Dr. Hilfiker knew his
patient and her husband well as he delivered the couple’s first child. The first pregnancy
was uneventful and the delivery was easy. The second pregnancy, however, began
seemingly problematic. On every exam the pregnancy test turned out negative despite the
patient’s uterus being enlarged along with her assurance that she “felt pregnant.” He
could have ordered an ultrasound to confirm his suspicion that the fetus may have died,
but he decided against doing the test. First, the test was far away and second, he knew of
the family’s financial challenges. Since there was no miscarriage that would confirm the
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sad news that the fetus had died in the mother’s womb the physician concluded that it
would be best to surgically intervene.
During the surgery it seemed to Dr. Hilfiker that the uterus was even bigger than
two days ago; however, he knew from the negative pregnancy tests that it “could not have
grown.” Or did he know? There was also more blood than usual and the tissue parts that
were removed did not look as if they had been dead for any longer amount of time.
“These were body parts that were recently alive!” He suppressed the “rising panic,”
which must have felt like a surge of adrenalin suddenly numbing his body and sensitizing
every neuron in his brain. After the surgery the physician describes that all he was able to
do was to tell the husband that his wife was fine, “but that there were some problems with
the procedure.” Over the days that followed, he stayed in touch with the family until the
details of his mistake fully unfolded in the pathology report.
My consultation with Barb and Russ later in the week is one the hardest things I
have done. Fortunately, their scientific sophistication allows me to describe in
some detail what I have done and what my rationale was. But nothing can obscure
the hard reality: I have killed their baby. (p. 119)
Although the physician was completely open with the family and discussed his
mistakes with colleagues, he notes that he was never able to address his own emotional
and spiritual suffering. First, discussions with peers usually involve the scientific aspects
of medical mistakes in order to derive “corrective measures.” “I spent hours in such a
review. But it is inadequate if it does not address our own emotional and spiritual
experience of the events.” Second, in his discussions with Barb and her husband he
never shared “the agony” that he experienced after making the mistake; he never asked
them for forgiveness. “I felt somehow that they had enough sorrow without having to
hear my burden as well.” As a result, he felt that it was his responsibility to deal with his
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“guilt” alone, a consequence that many physicians see themselves drawing. Oftentimes
the effects of medical errors are far reaching; regretfully they are rarely talked about.
Because of this and the fact that restoration is a difficult if not an impossible undertaking,
physicians face challenges dealing with their errors in “healthy ways.” With the negative
outlook that there is hardly anything to offer in regards to restitution along with the
difficulties in restoring the effects of harm by other means than money, Dr. Hilfiker sadly
expresses the realization that in his profession, alcoholism, drug addiction, and suicide
are commop responses.

The Nature and Rightness of “Things”
Indeed, medical errors can have complex and often heartbreaking consequences
for patients and their families as well as the healthcare professionals who are instrumental
in their care. Cases like the ones described are also not uncommon and “setting things
right” as it is often said can be a challenging task. In the first example, we saw that
through the legal system the Sheridans were able to “be heard” and to resolve their claim
in settlement. However, the process took eight years and, due to contingency fees and
other costs, left a substantial financial burden on the family. Studdert et al. (2006) point
out that the average trial time for medical malpractice claims is about six years, with
overall trial costs that are “exorbitant” (p. 2031). Where a successful trial or settlement
awards compensation to those who are injured or otherwise affected by medical mistakes,
other issues than compensation, such as emotional, spiritual and relational impacts
remain unaddressed, are diverted or come about only as time goes by. In Cal’s case, the
crucial dialog that addresses the past, the present and the future, transitions that are
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imperative for reconciliation and without which forgiveness rarely rises above the
darkness of personal and relational trauma, were missing. It follows that despite
“winning” their case, the Sheridans experienced the resolve of the mistake that harmed
their child as traumatic. In their story, “justice” barely deserves its understanding as
something “fair,” and if it does, it assumes the rather narrow view that fairness can be
achieved by addressing financial concerns only.
Tim’s case provides another perspective on the challenges that arise when
medical errors harm patients. In his case, healthcare professionals and hospital
management immediately took ownership of the mistake. Specifically, the resident who
made the error apologized to him and to his parents, thus accepting full responsibility.
Additionally, as a half-time employee in the clinical lab, Tim was able to take advantage
of services provided by the hospital’s Employee Assistance Program and Employee
Spiritual Care thus receiving emotional and spiritual support. According to one of the
hospital’s risk managers who I interviewed, Tim contacted his department immediately
after his finger was amputated.
But this patient. . . within a day after his procedure, after the discovery of this,
did contact our office and from the beginning we already knew that we had a
significant problem. We knew that there was a high probability that this was the
result of negligence and so we told the patient, “you know, please give us an
opportunity to look into this, at this point we don’t have all the facts, but we will
be in touch with you. And in the meantime, if you have any issues and needs that
you need us to assist you with, counseling.” Because it was an employee we made
arrangements for this person to be basically paid sick-leave that did not come out
of their sick bank, so we were doing everything we could to take care of them and
to make sure that they did not suffer any ill-effects financially from this event.

As a result of Tim’s early approach to Risk Management and the hospital’s willingness to
“make it right with the patient,” an investigation was initiated and an offer was presented
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to him within 30 days of the incident. According to the risk manager, this was rather
unusual because under other circumstances they are “very reluctant to approach someone
who is in a claimant situation prematurely.” This is primarily out of respect for the patient
or the family because it might be too early in their grieving process to have an insurance
company talk about “dollars and cents.” In addition to a speedy process, the risk manager
stated that he believed the offer was appropriate as “it was very consistent with the
maximum value that this person is going to get in a jury verdict.” Yet, despite the efforts
of hospital management who truly attempted to address the needs of their injured patient,
Tim was dissatisfied, disappointed, and according to the risk manager, quite angry.
Perhaps the reader is as puzzled as the risk manager who felt good about how the
hospital handled Tim’s case:
Looking back on this case there is nothing I could think of, absolutely nothing I
could think of, that we could possibly have done to reach out to this person more
than we did. Every care giver involved apologized immediately, everybody from
the CEO down took responsibility, we made him whole financially with time off
at work, we offered resources that he might have needed, and we investigated and
made a settlement offer within 30 days of the day he got hurt, which is very
remarkable. The insurance industry does not move that quickly. And so, we did
all the right things and we still got sued.
The question then arises why Tim remains so angry and what else might it be that he
would need. Understandably, the risk manager is justified thinking that the hospital did
all that could be done to accommodate him, yet the patient is rather dissatisfied. “This
person really wants to be taken care of, has high expectations. . he has not worked his
way through the whole thing, it is really emotional,” he explains to me. On the surface
this is true; however, Tim’s case calls for a deeper understanding of the particularity of
the nature and rightness of things. From Tim’s narrative it becomes clear that several
responses and corrective actions are rather important to him. One is that the resident
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acknowledged his error in a letter, in fact, during the interview Tim mentions this several
times. He could show this letter to his future pediatric patients or perhaps his own
children to prove that losing a finger was not his fault; it could happen even to doctors
themselves.
Another important issue is his need for open and continuous dialog about the
incident as it unfolded. Manser and Staender (2005) note that even after disclosure and
apology have been provided patients need continuous support and dialog to help them
deal with the physical, psychological, social and financial consequences of failure. And
as indicated, Tim wanted “everybody” to know. Lastly, and this is true for nearly all
patients who are harmed, Tim felt strongly about the development and implementation of
changes so that future patients would not be hurt by similar mistakes (for example,
Manser & Staender, 2005; Wears & Wu, 2002). In his case, statements about future
intentions concerned the crafting of a protocol for the use of tourniquets as well as a
revision of policies that regulate residents’ working hours.
Where the Department of Risk Management primarily focused on financial
concerns, Tim’s immediate and mid-range needs were emotional and social. For instance,
his persistent request of a letter from the resident who made the error seems strange at
first; however, when situating it into the context of his general need for acknowledgement
along with his concerns about his self-image, it begins to make sense. The letter is an
important symbol that represents an ongoing statement to others about the legitimacy of
his lost finger. It verifies his identity against the one perceived by others. Where the
hospital clearly responded to some of his multidimensional needs, this case is reminder of
the powerful and long-lasting emotional and social aspects of harm that often escape the
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response patterns of healthcare organizations. I suggest that it was the relational aspects
of his case that upset Tim, particularly the fact that the conversation between him and the
person making the error discontinued rather quickly, just as quickly as Risk Management
made a settlement offer. Berlinger (2003) calls the discontinuation of such crucial
conversations “broken stories” (p. 230). Moreover, the case illustrates the uniqueness of
every patient’s responses and needs in situations that are often informed by one general
understanding of justice. This understanding of “right” highlights compensation and
prioritizes financial well-being over other aspects of a person’s wholeness.
A last but not less important point is that the information I obtained of Tim’s case
does not reveal the impact of the medical error on the person who made it, the resident.
One of the counselors from Employee Spiritual Care who was familiar with Tim’s case
expressed her regret about not having been able to provide care to him:
I would have loved to respond to the physician in some way, but I don’t have
permission to do that! I don’t believe there is anything being done in a redemptive
or grace-filled way. You know, I don’t know if the physician is still here. I don’t
know any of that, but I can only imagine what that person went through! And I
would hope that there would be some kind of forum for that person to be able to
talk and process and I don’t think that we have it!
We will probably never know exactly how the resident felt or whether he received
support from other services. An administrator informed me that he had moved to take a
position at a different hospital. Like the employee from Spiritual Care suggested, one can
guess that he was upset and distressed; upset with himself regretting the moment in which
his mind wandered and distressed about the possibility to be named in a lawsuit or settled
claim. Perhaps he never wrote the letter because he wanted to forget his mistake and
move on with his career. As a young resident he had his whole professional life in front
of him, a life that might not look as promising as it did before Tim became his patient.
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Where Tim’s story left these issues open, Dr. Hilfiker’s (1984) narrative offers
more insights into the emotional world of those who err. Physicians’ experiences of
medical errors can be just as painful as their patients’, in fact, doctors often become the
“second victim” (Wu, 2000; Leape, 2006). The most striking aspect in Dr. Hilfiker’s
testimony is his emotional loneliness. Where he continued an open dialog with his patient
and shared the analysis of his error with colleagues, both conversations focused on
scientific facts excluding the feelings that arose from his own suffering. As described in
the next chapter, several studies indicate that it is rather common for physicians to avoid
dealing with their emotional issues. Where some seek comfort in speaking with close
colleagues about their feelings, others find it threatening or unhelpful thus limiting their
conversations to the technical aspects of the error event. Some physicians address their
struggles with close friends, spouses or even their dogs, as we will see.
Perhaps adding to his emotional loneliness was the fact that Dr. Hilfiker worked
in a private practice, thus he did not have access to organizational programs that would
offer support. But even in hospitals that do offer support, relevant services might be not
known about, not considered or are otherwise underutilized. Manser and Staender (2005)
note that health care providers are often not sure where to seek support and suggest a
team debriefing approach after adverse events to discuss issues of disclosure and to
provide information about the availability of support services. Traditionally, the focus has
been on patients who have been harmed, not on physicians, and even less on the structure
of organizational support systems that help sustain doctor-patient relationships after a
medical error occurred. And as Dr. Hilfiker describes and participants in the
organizational case study corroborate, the emotional and relational toll is tremendous
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even for those who have years of experience. An attending physician states, “it is one of
those things that really makes you feel isolated and alone and worthless and the whole
host of other negative things.”

Justice
Medical errors are unintended. They are the result of cognitive processes or
misguided intentional actions that lead to unintended and unpredicted outcomes. As the
three cases show, their impact can be hurtful in a variety of ways and to a number of
people. As complex as the events that lead to harm are the possibilities that aim at
repairing, or better, “restoring” that which has been broken. Spelman (2002) begins her
book Repair with the observation that the human being is essentially a “repairing animal”
(p. 1). We constantly engage in attempts to “patch things up” in order to “reweave what
we revealingly call the social fabric.” The desire of “homo reparans” to “repair, restore,
rehabilitate, renovate, reconcile, redeem, heal, fix and mend” (p. 4) is certainly not any
different when we think about dealing with effects of medical errors. The traditional way
of going about this is by compensating patients for what they have lost or for the pain
they have suffered. As Spelman (2002) also points out there is a fundamental difference
between repairing something and restoring it. In Tim’s case, it is impossible to give him
back his finger. Consequently, Risk Management offers compensation as a form of
reparation. This basis, which one may call “forced entitlement” by the courts, is justice
narrowly construed. What is needed is a more comprehensive understanding of harm and
a much broader vision of justice, a vision that I shall argue aims to restore to the fullest
possible the wholeness of all affected persons.
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The need for change has been recognized even before the release of the IOM’s
report (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999). For the past seven years, however, calls for
a paradigm shift have intensified in the pubic sector and the policy arena. Following the
lead of organizations such as the Veterans Hospital Administration (VHA), Catholic
Healthcare West (CHW), COPIC5 Insurance, John’s Hopkins University and the Harvard
Hospitals, hospitals have installed policies that promote the open disclosure of mistakes
to patients. Some policies include an offer of apology and, like COPIC, a promise of fair
compensation. While these represent remarkable changes, I nevertheless raise concerns
about whether regulatory efforts are sufficient to change some of the more deeply-rooted
everyday practices of medical culture. Sharing similar concerns, Woods (2007) suggests
that many medical error programs are attempts to control risk rather than aiming at
finding the “right things to do” (p. 37). As such they run the risk of manipulating the
provider-patient relationship for the hospital’s advantage and thus ought not to be
pursued as the reason for disclosing mistake or offering apology. Moreover, the author
argues that risk management policies that micromanage relationships and which control
communication between patients and healthcare providers drive a wedge between people
when honesty, respect and transparency, and apology are most needed.
In order to effect change, the discussion about how to address medical harm
should focus on values that are shared by members of society and which resonate with
the foundations of hospital ethics. In this light, Catholic Healthcare West (CHW) is one
of the few organizations that specifically articulate their medical error policy in terms of

5 COPIC is a physician-owned liability insurance company that offers immediate payment for claims and
provides out-of pocket costs for harmed patients without involving the legal system. The payments are not
reportable to the NPD. The 3R’s program was launched in 2002.
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the faith-based values and philosophy stated in their mission (Catholic Healthcare West,
2003). The application, then, of post-medical error justice should draw on the moral
compass of a hospital. This means that efforts should expand beyond orchestrating
corporate risk strategies to include something that is dear to peoples’ hearts: the
restoration of social and relational well-being of patients as well as members of the
hospital community.
Understanding the multiple dimensions of justice or of what Cahn (1975)
describes as the “sense of injustice,” is of course not easy. It draws on spiritual and
cultural reference points and has both individual and social implications. Our
understanding of justice and what it demands follows an internal moral compass that may
point in different directions under different circumstances. For instance, Wu, Cavanaugh,
McPhee, To, and Micco (1997) argue that justice would require that people are given
what is “due” to them (p. 772). On a similar note, Leape (2006) feels strongly about
patients having a “right” to know what went wrong (p. 16). Berlinger (2005) argues that
“justice demands that physicians and institutions go backward, not to blame and shame,
but to determine what this patient and this family need, today and going forward, as the
result of what happened to them” (p. 66). The three statements reflect fundamental
differences between the authors’ conceptions of justice. The first perspective places
justice into a framework of what a patient may deserve. It is the kind that Mill (1957)
argues to be “the clearest and most empathic form in which the idea of justice is
conceived by the general mind” (p. 55). The second, quite common understanding of
justice, particularly from the standpoint of the political philosophy of liberalism is
expressed in the language of moral rights. The third perspective focuses on justice as a
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contextually grounded assessment of immediate and future need. Desert, right, and need
are certainly not the same nor would they result in identical outcomes.
The basic question that one may wish to pose concerns the kind of ethical
structure or guiding principles that ought to be applied when making decisions about how
to handle medical errors. Should we always disclose medical errors to patients according
to principle or are we to grant permission for exceptions? In other words, what do we do
if love and truth conflict? Moreover, what kind of conception of justice would be
comprehensive enough to include concerns about the restoration of the patient, her
family, healthcare providers, and the organization after a harmful mistake occurred? In
fact, why would justice require giving anything and what is it exactly that is due, one
may have a right to, or what is needed? There is consensus about the value of telling the
truth, saying sorry, and at least financially compensating harmed patients. Perhaps some
may argue that this is what justice “requires.” But even if it does in theory, the practice of
honesty, apology, and making right or good are shaped by organizational policy and
cultural practice.
It needs to be kept in mind that personal ethics and organizational ethics are not
always in alignment despite the fact that hospitals’ mission statements often spell out
their focus on honesty, accountability, and justice. Douglas (1986) argues that, “The most
profound decisions about justice are not made by individuals as such, but by individuals
thinking within and on behalf of their institutions”6 (p. 124). In this regard, two

6 Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler and Tipton (1992) also cite this quote to highlight the power of
institutions to shape our moral thinking. The authors describe the difference between an organization and
an institution. Using the corporation in America as an institution as an example, the authors argue that “as
an institution it is a particular pattern of right and duties, of powers and responsibilities that make it a major
force in our lives. Individual corporations are organizations [such as a university medical center] that
operate within the legal and other patterns that define what a corporation [or university medical center] is”
(p. 11). This dissertation discusses medical errors in the context of this distinction.
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observations about the events following medical mistakes can be made: first, they rarely
involve an analysis that distinguishes between the rightness of actions, policies or rules as
determined in reference to principles and their moral value as evaluated in light of the
good they produce. Second, a discernment of such values hardly ever occurs in the
context of organizational culture and policy. The aim of this dissertation, then, is to
engage in a conversation about these concerns and to provide answers to the following
research question: May the concept of justice be developed into its fullest transformative
and restorative sense so that faith-based hospitals can incorporate the emerging principles
into their medical error policies to lay the foundation for a mission-oriented restorative
hospital culture?
In order to develop a culturally sensitive normative theory in ethics, one that
resonates with the mission of faith-based hospitals, this dissertation proposes a notion of
justice deeply rooted in Western cultural traditions. These I locate in the biblical tradition
which situates the concept of justice in the reality of God’s Kingdom. Moreover, I draw
on perspectives of freedom and citizenship held in ancient Greece and the early Roman
Empire.7 In the hierarchy of ethical reasoning, my theoretical engagement with justice
and medical errors is situated between the levels of basic principles and worldview (Edge
& Groves, 1999, pp. 40-41). On the landscape of justice theory, justice as wholeness
shares elements with an orientation called restorative justice. 8

7 The specific political philosophy I refer to in this work is often called “civic republicanism” (for example,
Honohan, 2002) and will be named as such in the remainder of the dissertation.
8 The groundwork of restorative justice in criminal justice has been done by scholars such as Braithwaite
(1989; 2002) and Zehr (1990), who coined the term. It has many roots: for instance, Yazzie and Zion
(1996) offer a Navajo perspective on peacemaking. Hadley (2001) explores the notion of restorative justice
in the major religious traditions. Although primarily associated with criminal victim-offender relationships,
restorative justice principles have recently found application in school discipline (for example, Claassen,
Roxanne, 2004), social work (for example, Burford and Adams, 2004), sustainable development (for
example, Braithwaite, 2002), and other fields (see Schubert, 2008).
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Central to restorative justice is the notion that justice is an experience between
people (for example, Zehr, 1990). It is a highly contextualized understanding of justice
in which all affected parties participate in “finding a mutually acceptable way forward”
(Hopkins, 2002, p. 144). In this paradigm of restoration and healing, harm is directly
addressed by those who are involved, their specific needs and obligations are collectively
identified and future intentions are clearly stated in order to prevent similar harms from
reoccurring. Claassen (2003) identifies these steps as “confession, atonement, and
repentance” (p. 18). In his biblical model of peacemaking, a restorative justice dialog
takes place in an environment in which agape-love is expressed, stimulating processes of
forgiveness and reconciliation. Central to scholars such as Zehr (1990), Claassen (2003),
and Wolterstorff (1999), who were influential to my own thinking about justice, is the
biblical understanding of restoring “right relationships,” or shalom.9 Biblical conceptions
of restorative justice have also been proposed by Van Ness (1986), Lampman and
Shattuck (1999), Marshall (2001), De Gruchy (2002), Burnside (2007) and others.
Unlike Claassen’s (2003) peacemaking model and the work of these scholars and
sharply distinguishing itself from theories of justice that draw on principles held dear by
deontological liberalism—for example, injustices automatically are right-invoking—
justice as wholeness is a principled consequentialist theory. It is a mixed approach to just
decision-making that highlights the importance of both final values and principles. The
aim of justice is to bring back the balance between the physical, mental, spiritual and

9 Following the tradition of Yoder (1987) shalom is often expressed as a concept of peace, or more broadly
construed, as relational integrity. See Zoughbie, 1994 for study of the differences between various
conceptions of shalom.
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social dimensions of wholeness.10 Specifically, I espouse a vision of justice that is
consistent with elements of the prophetic imagination and the civic republican tradition.
Charged with this task, justice as wholeness is forward-looking toward a conception of
wholeness that is transcendent and absolute. Justice articulated in eschatological terms is
transformative', it signals God’s final judgment followed by salvation of those entering a
life of complete multi-dimensional integrity. Informed by this vision, justice as
wholeness unfolds within the limitations of a sinful world and takes into account the
forces of current social and political realities. The return to wholeness by ways of
restorative ]\is\acq occurs in light of its relative experience. The conception of justice that
so emerges is situational and “from the point of view.” Consequently, when pursuing the
restoration of wholeness it ought to be of utmost concern that the freedom and equality of
individuals are weighed against self-interest. It is at this junction that justice as wholeness
brings to bear moral imperatives that are rooted in biblical metaphors while at the same
time engaging political themes of freedom and citizenship.
My thesis, then, is that the effects of medical errors ought to be addressed by a
vision of justice that is deeply rooted in the Christian notions of human dignity and
integrity and which restores the personal and relational aspects of the relative experience
of wholeness while honoring the principles of civic freedom and equality as equal
consideration.

10 Injustice as wholeness, the notion of wholeness places specific emphasis on its physical, mental, social
and spiritual dimensions as they unfold in a healing perspective of wholeness (for example, Tillich, 1967;
Rice, 2006; Cowling, 2000).
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Chapter Outline
The dissertation is organized into three parts. The first part provides a background
of medical error. Chapter Two develops a model and a definition of the conceptually
challenging notion of medical error. The discussion takes place by describing four
important characteristics of everyday medical work that make a distinct definition of the
concept difficult: The uncertainty of medicine, its increasing complexity, the conceptual
ambiguity of the error concept, well as the link of failure to blame. These particular
themes were chosen based on field research and a review of the literature. From the
medical error context I develop a framework that is based on four considerations that
determine whether an error should invoke a restorative justice process. These include the
notion of intent and intentional action, etiology, peer review of the medical error context
as well as the specific nature of the outcome. The resulting model is primarily practical
and provides guidance for the development of hospital policies that distinguish errors that
cause harm to patients from those that do not. The subsequent definition can be applied
across a wide range of healthcare settings, yet it defines error narrowly and in terms of
specific outcomes.
Chapter Three reviews some of the literature on the effects of medical errors and
their consequences for the purpose of setting the stage for developing a vision of justice
that takes into account the social, professional and institutional realities of our times. It
looks at patients’ and physicians’ experiences and describes common responses and
coping strategies. What follows is a critique of traditional approaches to addressing harm
via professional self-regulation and the medical malpractice system. When the medical
profession was given full discretion over handling medical mistakes and was trusted to do
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so with the well-being of patients and doctors in mind it formed a culture that promoted
individual autonomy and created an environment in which professional expertise was
often disconnected from its ethical implications. Until more recent developments on the
policy level and in professional organizations, the medical malpractice system, a rival
institution, was the only way for patients to submit their claims. The legal
conceptualization of justice as compensation for the patient and deterrent punishment for
those deemed guilty of committing harmful errors strengthened many of the barriers to
professional transparency. This chapter moves towards the development of a concept of
autonomy that a vision of justice as wholeness would promote.
The second part contrasts two notions of justice, those that are based on liberal
political discourses and a vision of justice as wholeness. Chapter Four concerns the first
vision of justice. It outlines the particular conception that supports civil litigation, the
philosophy that backs the efforts of the medical malpractice system to give to people their
deserts. It is, as I will show, unsatisfactory in terms of the restoration of our multi
dimensional well-being. Strongly connected to the idea that fairness is achieved when
desert is met is the notion that we may have a moral “right” to hear the truth and to get
what we deserve, one that is absolute. The language of rights is embedded in the liberal
political philosophy that emphasizes individual freedom. However, a freedom that
highlights individualism undermines transparency in healthcare culture. This chapter
argues that the conceptualization of justice as that which is deserved, and the
subordination of teleological conceptions of the good to a preference of right by
principle, is indeed a journey of the individual incompatible with both Christian ethics
and civic republican political philosophy.
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Chapter Five develops the second kind of justice, the vision of justice as
wholeness. The chapter begins with a search for a new vision. It describes the theory’s
characteristic as being rooted in the biblical and civic republican American traditions.
The foundation ofjustice as wholeness is based on the notion that humans are created in
God’s image which alone is the reason for “deserving” to being made whole.
Structurally, justice as wholeness represents the specific consequentialist approach that I
refer to as “principled consequentialism.” The theory of value considers wholeness, both
in terms of its eschatological meaning and as a relative experience, as the non-moral
good. The theory of obligation embraces justice as the aim to restore social balance and
harmony, a goal in classic Greece and the early Roman Empire. It is also the call of the
Eighth Century BCE prophets who proclaim God’s special concern for those who are
hurting. In the prophetic imagination, justice unfolds in the context of social
relationships and a participating God; it is fully realized in the life of Jesus Christ and His
ministry of reconciliation. The chapter then describes the two constraining principles,
freedom and equality, which are elements of the theory of obligation and place limits on
the pursuit of wholeness.
Part three suggests how such a vision of justice as wholeness may find application
in resolving medical errors. Chapter Six, the final chapter, begins with an outline of its
theoretical and policy implications as a comprehensive and integrative theory
highlighting three policy areas: Mission integration, disclosure and restoration. Using
Loma Linda University Medical Center, a Seventh-day Adventist tertiary healthcare
institution in Southern California as a test case, I illustrate how justice as wholeness may
be integrated into a hospital’s mission and medical error policy to guide wholeness-
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promoting ways of managing medical mistakes on a systems level. The alignment of
mission, policy and action can only be achieved if a vision of justice as wholeness
resonates with hospital moral community and patients and if parallel efforts are launched
to change its culture. The chapter concludes with a case vignette that tests the policy and
the propositions of justice as wholeness.
In sum, this dissertation makes a theoretical contribution by developing a
principled consequentialist vision of justice that is restorative and that takes into
consideration the multidimensional aspects of medical harm as affecting wholeness. This
notion of justice combines the interests and needs of those who make errors, their
patients, and the organization in which care takes place while honoring constraints to the
pursuit of individual and organizational wholeness. The policy contribution of this work
is the development of a context and outcome-oriented model of medical error that
together with the theoretical discourse on justice serves as a foundation for a missionfocused medical error policy for a faith-based hospital.
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CHAPTER TWO
DEFINING MEDICAL ERROR

Introduction
Sooner or later every physician, medical student, nurse, or hospital administrator
arrives at the question of what exactly is a medical error. Articles that discuss such errors
often begin with a discussion of the variety of definitions and the difficulty finding
workable concepts (for example, Bosk, 1986; Smith & Forster, 2000; Kalra, 2004;
Crigger, 2004; Grober & Bohnen, 2005; Rosenthal, Cornett, Sutcliffe, & Lewton, 2005).
More than a mere “semantic quibble” and an “essentially contested concept” the
determination of that which “lies between the two extremes of blame-free accident and
deliberate harm” profoundly affects medical care (Quick, 2006, p. 24-25). In fact, what
counts in the decision-making arena as medical error by virtue of definition or
classification determines important aspects of how medical errors are handled. Aspects of
handling medical errors include disclosure to patients, reporting of mistakes to hospital
management, claims investigation, patient compensation, and improvements in patient
safety. In other words, the degree of inclusiveness of a definition potentially affects all of
medical care and conceptual clarity is of utmost concern. Although a few works in the
literature respond to the unease by offering universal definitions (for example, Grober &
Bohnen, 2005; Banja, 2005), in the real world of physicians, nurses, and doctors-intraining, a practical definition is difficult to find.
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In their research on the extent and mode of residents’ acknowledgement of
mistakes, Rosenthal et al. (2005) discovered that residents’ definitions of “medical
mishaps” largely reflect the range of definitions and the lack of consensus that exists in
the medical profession. Respondents articulated their perception of medical mishaps
either in terms of a bad outcome for the patient or in terms of process-related errors
independent from the outcome. Where most residents offered a simple definition, some
provided more nuanced descriptions. The authors conclude that “lawyers agree on
terminology but physicians do not” (p. 405).
Why do we have difficulties defining medical errors? A possible explanation is
that there might not be enough common ground to agree on a “universal definition,” one
that is clear about whether or not to include near-misses, nicked nerves and other
accidents of high risk procedures, late-night decisions made in overcrowded emergency
departments, or mistakes that become evident only as time goes by. Indeed, it is not the
wrong-side surgery that unleashes conceptual trouble, but the subtle nuances of medical
decisions, communications, and procedures as they are situated in the complex
environments in which modern medical practice takes place. Theoretical conceptions of
error include complex elements such as intent, human behavioral factors, systems and
environmental factors, failure modes, as well as notions of justice that elevate the
problem into moral dimensions as this study is proposing.

Characteristics of Medical Care
Prior to developing a conceptual framework for medical error from which to
derive a definition, I address four characteristics of medical care that provide a context in
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which the discussion will take place. These include (1) uncertainty in medicine, (2) the
increasing complexity of medical care systems, (3) the confusion and fusion of concepts
and contexts, and (4) linking medical errors with blame.

Uncertainty in Medicine
Medical practice is technologically sophisticated yet characterized by uncertainty.
Paget (1988) argues that medicine is essentially an “error-ridden-activity”; it is “a process
of discovery and response, of risked action and error” (p. 7). Between diagnosis and cure
often lies an array of decision-making processes, of success and disappointment;
moments of despair, patience and hope. In this shared emotional space, professional
experience and patient expectations meet to embark on a mutual path forward. Gorovitz
and MacIntyre (1976) eloquently describe that medicine, just as science, is to some
degree experimental and that patients and the public have to learn to acknowledge the
“necessary fallibility” (p. 64) of individual physicians:
Since the effect of a given therapeutic intervention on a given patient is always to
some extend uncertain no matter how much is known about the general
characteristics of interventions of that type, every therapeutic intervention is an
experiment in regard to the well-being of that individual patient, (p. 64)
The authors seem to suggest that therapeutic interventions, just as medical research and
science, aim at progress while risking failures. Medicine is a risk-taking business. It is
also creative as the German expression for medical practice, “die aertzliche Kunst,”
indicates.
The German expression for medical work and its associated errors certainly adds
another interesting perspective to the dialog. Rather than attributing to medicine certain
scientific characteristics, the old German expression still used in popular language
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captures its creative or artistic nature. In a broad sense, “aerztliche” stands for
“physicians’” and “Kunst” means “art.” It follows that the practice of medicine, or more
specifically the work of a physician, is described metaphorically as “physicians’ art.” Or,
less directly translated, “the art of the medical profession.” The German terminology for
medical error is “aertzlicher Kunstfehler,” a mistake in the doctor’s art. Both the artistic
analogy of medical work and the scientific one as alluded to by Gorowitz and Mclntrye
(1976) signal purposeful progression under uncertainty, yet the measuring stick for art is
creativity, whereas for science it is rules or laws. Medicine is even more complex as it is
characterized by both creativity and rules that govern processes aimed at improving a
patient’s condition and maximize her well-being.
As improved technology promises greater precision in diagnosis and treatment,
patients enter the medical arena with an expectation of perfection. As a result, physicians
feel obligated to live up to this perfect image. However, a study conducted by Friedman
et al. (2005) reveals that this implied certainty and confidence is by no means shared by
all physicians. In their research the authors explore the relationship between physicians’
confidence in their diagnosis and their correctness as it relates to their clinical experience.
What was discovered was a fairly weak correlation between the two. Even experienced
physicians are often unaware of the correctness of their diagnoses. In their comparison of
medical students, senior residents, and faculty, the researchers observed that, in general,
medical students and physicians appear to be under-confident in the correctness of their
diagnoses. However, when comparing the three groups in cases in which they erred.
residents were more certain about their diagnoses than faculty followed by students.
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In this same vein, Hilfiker (1988) addresses the uncertainty of medical diagnosis
by noting that errors are always possible in the “midst of the humdrum routine of daily
care. ... Was that baby with diarrhea more dehydrated than he looked, and should we
have hospitalized him? Will that nine-year-old with stomach cramps whose mother I just
lectured about psychosomatic illness end up on the operating room table tomorrow with a
ruptured appendix?” (p. 63). These and other questions prompt Hilfiker to question his
competence as a physician. But as he considers his outstanding credentials from medical
school, his over-average exams scores noted on the diploma of the National Board of
Medical Examiners, and his reputation as a good physician indicated by “townspeople”
and colleagues, he realizes that it is not competence that is the problem. Accepting the
inherent uncertainty of medical predictions, the author simply concludes that “I have to
learn to live with my mistakes” (p. 63).
Errors exist. Many of them become apparent over a period of time. Indeed, it is
often only in retrospect that something can be identified as an error. Medications are
given in increasing or decreasing increments until the condition of a patient is stabilized
or the problem has been solved. In many cases it is extremely difficult to find the point in
time at which something has become an error. A senior administrator interviewed in this
present study comments about the difficulties in developing an exact definition for
medical error and notes that
we’re going to have to eliminate a large range of untoward medical outcomes
because in a sense every treatment for a patient is a kind of experiment. We know
statistically how it will work for patients, but we don’t know it will work in that
patient. And so we have to be careful not to say that everything that departs from
a perfect outcome is an error, obviously, because many things that are done
superbly well by current standards in medicine don’t work out well so that
observation has to be made first.
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We must remember that a human being is multidimensional and complex. As such,
physical, emotional, spiritual, and social factors may interact in shaping a person’s course
of illness and intersect in the patient’s response to treatment modalities.
How far can actions be pushed in order to achieve perfection? An attending
physician in internal medicine reiterates her doubt about something being considered an
error when she orders a medication at 9 A.M., which is then administered by a nurse 30
minutes later. Perhaps this is a timing error? Or, suppose she performs a procedure on a
patient, trying to put a needle into a vessel and misses it because it is located slightly out
of the ordinary yet within the range of normal anatomic variation. Would she have made
a mistake? A definition of medical error needs to be able to deal with patients’ varying
physiology, inconsistent timing in treatment plans, and the effect of minute anatomic
differences on the preciseness of invasive procedures. Standards that aid the
determination of whether an error had in fact occurred, or if the unexpected outcome may
fall in the realm of predictable risk, have to be chosen wisely.
The medical profession deals with the problem of uncertainty and risk by creating
such standards in various ways. Even those may fall short. They are subject to
interpretation, particularly if they lack contextual grounding. At the most basic level, and
the most valid when considering the contexts of medical errors, physicians develop their
own standards of practice. In a recent conversation with an orthopedic surgeon, I learned
that this well-experienced clinician evaluates the mistakes he made in reference to his
own standards by meticulously keeping up with his fast changing specialty. From his
perspective, “a medical error is something when I say ‘Gee, I should not have done
this!”’
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Moving a small notch up in generality from a physician’s personal judgment
about whether failure is due to error is that of her medical peers. Smith and Foster (2000)
propose that a medical error determined by this mechanism is “an action that would have
been judged wrong by skilled and knowledgeable peers at the time it occurred” (p. 38).
The standard in this case is not the state of medical advancement as perceived by a
physician in her medical specialty, but the assessment of a physician’s immediate peers.
Similarly, Howe (1997) believes that consensus about a standard of care can
determine whether or not a medical error has occurred. He describes a situation where an
x-ray clearly indicates that a patient had cancer. Unfortunately, the cancerous lesion was
missed on an x-ray of the similar location that was taken six months earlier. Did the
healthcare provider who did not see the spot on the earlier x-ray act “within the standard
of care?” Howe offers three solutions. First, if colleagues having “similar training” would
also have missed the cancer, missing it would be within the author’s conception of a
standard of care. Second, if the same practitioners would have detected the spot while the
previous healthcare provider clearly has not, her missing it would fall “outside the
standard of care, and be a mistake.” Third, if similarly trained professionals were not able
to reach consensus about the missed spot being within or outside the standard, missing it
would be what Howe calls a “possible mistake” (p. 323). The main point is that an action
or judgment is only considered a medical error, or a mistake, when a group of similar
specialists determines that it would fall outside what they consider to be the standard of
care in their field.
On the organizational level, hospitals create their own standards by which to
judge medical errors. In their “Event Reporting and Management” policy and procedures
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manual, Catholic Healthcare West (2003) states an “event” to be “any unanticipated
occurrence that is not consistent with the routine care of a particular patient and/or the
routine operation of the facility'' (emphasis added). In this definition, an “event” is an
inclusive category that contains outcomes that are due to error or due to other factors.
However, both, outcomes that are due to error and those that come about because of
others factors are evaluated with reference to the “routine care of a patient” and/or the
“routine operation of the facility.” This particular standard is rooted in the treatment plan
itself as well as in hospital-specific practices and culture. Whereas these standards and
criteria are limited to the review of medical professionals, other outside entities such as
insurance companies, managers and lawyers, who also have an interest in medical error,
“apply different rules of thumb” (Bosk, 1986, p. 462).
Creating a legal rule of thumb, the legal system developed its own set of guiding
principles for the definition and treatment of medical errors. The standard by which
medical errors are measured and liability is determined in the United States civil law
system is the “standard of care” criterion. Mirroring the geographic settings of small town
communities of the late 19th century, the standard reflected the state of medical
knowledge and practice of a particular location or community. The question in these
cases was whether the physician complied with “medical custom” (Struve, 2006, p. 175).
The so-called “locality rule” has been challenged since the latter part of the 20th century
as conferences and journals reached even the most remote doctor’s office. Questions have
also been raised about the meaningfulness of “relevant community,” particularly the lack
of criteria that determine what kind of community is “relevant.” In many jurisdictions the
standard of care has become a consideration of national significance, a “national standard
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of care” (Boumil, Elias, & Moes, 2003, p. 32) so to speak. Some critics contend that
differences between geographic locations remain where doctors practice under more or
less favorable conditions drawing on a different knowledge base (Boumil, Elias, & Moes,
2003). Most often, however, geographic location is a consideration for the jury to ponder
and is not used to determine whether or not a particular treatment decision or act was a
medical error as legally defined. Boumil, Elias and Moes (2003) point out that for
physicians who work in highly specialized fields in which the update of information
drawn from national and international sources is fundamental, the locality rule is
certainly outdated. For such specialties, the “best judgment rule” (p. 35) is applied, which
elevates the practice of the expert-physician above the “average qualified practitioner” (p.
25), the standard used for most general practice.
The attempts to determine medical error objectively, particularly with the
application of standards outside of the medical profession, have been criticized by the
medical profession (e.g., Marjoribanks, Good, Lawthers, & Peterson, 1996). The reality
of medical practice is complex; medical errors often “unfold in time” as Paget (1988)
notes, and they occur in the intersecting social realities of a diverse set of people:
patients, families, doctors, nurses, hospital administrators, and the legal community.
Hilfiker (1988) describes the decision intensive requirements of seriously ill, hospitalized
patients and notes that, “although in most cases no single mistake is obvious, there
always seem to be things that could have been done differently or better: administering
more of this medication, starting that treatment a little sooner” (p. 61). Arguably, the only
certainty is guaranteed by the autopsy—that is, if physicians and the public are prepared
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to accept the shocking revelation that approximately 40% of autopsies show that a major
misdiagnosis lead to patients’ deaths (Gawande, 2002).

The Increasing Complexity of Medical Care Systems
A second challenge to defining medical error is the fact that medicine is complex
and multidisciplinary in nature. Its practice is carried out through a network of highly
specialized medical professionals and changing front line actors. Sutcliffe, Lewton, and
Rosenthal (2004) describe this complex environment, pointing out that acutely sick
patients have shorter stays in hospitals today than they used to. Moreover, the
organizational structure of clinical medicine involves multiple handoffs with several
intersections where critical information is communicated between individuals who are
situated in the “horizontal differentiation of labor” and “vertical divisions of hierarchy
and power” (p. 187). In their study of how communication failures contribute to medical
“mishaps,” the authors discovered that communication-related problems are not merely
the function of faulty transmission or information exchange. Instead, they are deeply
rooted in hierarchical differences between communicators. Professional distance is
particularly pronounced in communication patterns between residents and attending
physicians, medicine residents and other specialties, and between residents and nurses.
Adding another layer of complexity to the findings of Sutcliffe et al. (2004), an
attending Emergency Department physician in this present study describes that due to the
structure of a teaching hospital, attending physicians see their patients through the eyes of
their residents who “present” patients to them. Thus, in those hospitals that have
residents, organizationally shaped communication patterns between residents and
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attending physicians certainly need to be considered as possible sources for medical
error. Sutcliffe et al. (2004) indicate that it is also important to be aware of their finding
that communication failures emerge in situations of “role conflict and ambiguity” mostly
between hospital and community physicians.
A nurse whom I interviewed highlighted the difficulties with communication that
exist in a complex care department such as oncology. She advises that “some errors occur
because some communication fell in the cracks, people were really busy or distracted and
stuff like that and of course errors can happen in that context too.” As she is thinking
more about what constitutes an error, she immediately qualifies communication related
errors and notes that
even though they are errors too, I can’t see why they can maybe be justified, and
I am not sure if they legally can be justified but. . . usually people will tell you an
error is an error is an error. And it is kind of sad; I think there should be
differentiations between errors, and I am sure legally there are.
In this same vein, an example from the Emergency Department reveals the
difficulty in defining what a medical error is when two specialties read the same x-ray
and disagree. In this case, an attending physician explains:
For instance, we also track when x-rays are over-read the next day by the
radiology attending; if there has been a change from what we have listed, that gets
tracked in the book too [a report book logging such event]. But it is a form of
error because it is a misinterpretation. I consider that not an error in a sense that
we did not quite see it, but it might have been difficult to pick up because we are
not radiologists; we have not spent four years of training to read those. That is a
little bit different. [Emphasis in original]
The realities of the modem medical care environment make it extremely difficult to
detect, to record and to measure medical errors. Specifically, challenges emerge when
errors cause direct harm to patients as conversations are carried out between patients,
healthcare staff, and hospital representatives that require utmost conceptual clarity. In
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many medical settings, the threat of legal repercussions makes conversations difficult
when things go wrong and magnify the challenge of extracting concepts from contexts.

The Confusion and Fusion of Concepts and Contexts
The third complicating factor when developing a definition of medical error is the
variety of concepts that attempt to capture the essence of medical error (Hofer, Kerr, &
Hayward, 2000; Quick, 2006). The literature is filled with terms such as the following:
adverse events (Veterans Hospital Administration, 2003), negligent adverse events
(Veterans Hospital Administration, 2003), preventable adverse events (Kohn, Corrigan,
& Donaldson, 1999), inadvertent occurrences (Liang, 2004), unintended events (Liang
2004), unintended acts (Leape, 1994), mistakes (Liang, 2004), medical mishaps
(Rosenthal et al., 2005), possible mistakes (Howe, 1997), and unwarranted failures
(Banja, 2005). One of the dangers of this diverse menu is that its terms might be used
interchangeably regardless of their differences as to cause, process, and outcome. Errors
and mistakes are not the same as Reason (1990) so eloquently describes; a distinction that
often goes unnoticed.
Reason (1990), whose work on human error offers the most cited model of
medical error, distinguishes two basic categories: mistakes, and slips and lapses. Mistakes
are “planning failures.” With a mistake, the intended action proceeds without failure, but
the anticipated outcome is not achieved. For example, a physician orders 500 mg
Penicillin for a patient suffering from an infection. The correct order is administered, but
the patient experiences a systemic allergic reaction that requires an immediate injection
of epinephrine, followed by a series of Prednisone. Unfortunately, the chart entry
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advising heath care staff of the patient’s allergy was not read. Slips and lapses, the second
sort of error, are “execution failures,” or intentional acts that fail to proceed as planned. If
we modified the example, the physician correctly prescribes a Penicillin derivative, but
the nursing staff confuses the patient’s prescriptions and administers Penicillin
nevertheless.
Reason’s (1990) distinction between the terms can be used to clarify Liang’s
(2004) definition of medical error and his particular use of language. According to Liang
(2004), a medical error is “a mistake, inadvertent occurrence, or unintended event in
healthcare delivery which may, or may not result in patient injury” (p.6). In other words,
Liang includes errors in judgment (for example, prescribing the wrong medication or
wrong dosage), slips (for example, accidentally perforating the colon while performing a
complex surgery for an aortic aneurysm), and lapses (for example, not remembering two
patients and switching their medications). Liang’s choice of concepts to describe medical
error is independent from a language that focuses on outcome; other definitions include
such outcome-centered concepts. While his definition certainly carries meaning for those
involved in the discussion about a definition of medical error, for others, including policy
makers and even members of the medical community, his distinctions between terms
seem vague.
One way to understand the specific choice of words in language—one might call
it medical errorism—is to consider Wittgenstein’s discourse on the structure and
meaning of language. In The Blue and Brown Books (1958) and Philosophical
Investigations (1967), Wittgenstein develops a complex analysis of how the words and
concepts that make up language are used to create meaning. In the beginning of
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Philosophical Investigations (1967), his major work, Wittgenstein critiques the
commonly simplified conception of language by illustrating the limitations of St.
Augustine’s approach, which he uses as an entrance into the discussion:
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards
something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called the sound they
uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily
movements, as it were the natural language of all people: the expression of the
face, the play of the eyes, the movements of other parts of the body, and the tone
of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or
avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places
in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified.
(Augustine, I, 8, cited in Wittgenstein, 1967, p 1, §1).
It seems to Wittgenstein that in Augustine’s definition of language individual words are
used to name objects which then combine to form sentences. In Augustine’s
correspondence theory, every word is correlated with the meaning of a specific object.
Language forms by means of pointing to objects. Yet, rather then describing the
formation and use of language, Augustine offers an explanation of a “system of
communication” (p. 3, §3), or a “complete primitive language” (p. 3, §2). Critiquing
Augustine’s analysis and offering an alternative understanding of language, Wittgenstein
argues that the meaning of words in sentences that constitute a language system is much
more complex than pointing to and naming objects.
According to Wittgenstein (1967), there are more “kinds of word” (p 2, §1) than
nouns and names given to objects or people. Moreover, words have different functions as
they are employed in language and can be interpreted in various ways. To illustrate the
diverse functions of words, Wittgenstein often employs analogies such as “tools in a tool
box” (p. 6, §11) and “[language] is like looking into a cabin of a locomotive” with similar
looking handles that perform very distinct functions (p. 7. §12). Our language and its
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concepts are “instruments” (p. 152, §569). The similarity between toolboxes, locomotive
cabins, and instruments is that they are categories of items from which specific words are
chosen to fit particular purposes, just as the words mistake and error are chosen to
accommodate definitions for medical errors. Taking a word from the toolbox and putting
it into a sentence and into a context gives the word meaning. It follows that the meaning
of a word is not an object in itself but emerges from “its use in the language”
(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 20, §43.) The dynamic process that determines how words are
used in a language system is the result of participation in what Wittgenstein refers to as
“language-games.”
The participation in language-games is a social process, one in which members
who relate to each other with a common understanding of their worlds create stories and
texts. Perhaps similar to Blumer’s (1969) notion of the social nature of objects that are
created by interacting individuals, Wittgenstein argues that “speaking of language is part
of an activity, or a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 11, §23). Thus, when we engage
in everyday life, we do this by participating in language-games in which words create
meaning that is familiar to those who are familiar with the language-game. Confusion
emerges when concepts are used that don’t fit into a particular language-game or when
individuals are unfamiliar with the setting. Consequently, caution is warranted when
specialized medical error language is used to fit research agendas or provides the
foundation of a policy. However, if one investigates a particular language-game, one can
obtain an insight into how society in general, or groups or professions in particular.
understand and dialog about certain issues such as medical errors.
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Where the literature places great emphasis on conceptual clarity, practitioners in
the health care field tend to articulate medical errors with concepts that are contextually
grounded in their professional experience, rather than choosing more abstract categories.
In this present study, particularly the Emergency Department physicians draw on shared
experiences of their fast-paced environment while hesitantly responding to the notion of
“definition.” The rapid turn-over of patients, the short period of time that physicians
spend with patients, unknown medical histories, the evaluation of information as seen
through the eyes of their residents, and the lack of beds for referrals to the units make
their work difficult, thus running the risk of errors. According to the following statement
made by an attending physician working night shifts on the pediatric side, medical errors,
if defined as such, become a function of the environment rather than being a matter that
should be discussed in abstract terms:
I think the work load if they decrease it probably will have less mistakes. That is
what I see most with my colleagues and they are very good physicians. One of the
best people that I know. We can scan the person by looking at them what is wrong
with them. It is how you can prove it that they are fine. If you can’t get it, that is
where the problem happens. Why people die on the adult side is because that they
can not get them to the cath lab, or they are not seen because you are holding 40
patients out in the ER because the floors are full, backdoor is closed. They use us
as, you know, babysitters. That is where the mistakes happen. You are working on
four beds and you are trying to get them in and out and in and out so you see more
people and taking in more people. That is where the mistakes happen. Hillside
University has not done anything to open the backdoor. They always say you are
not seeing them fast enough. How can we see them fast enough or treat them fast
enough if they don’t come in?
Is it a medical error if a patient dies on the “adult side” because she can not be seen fast
enough? A subsequent comment made by this same physician who also hints about the
issue of blaming indicates that, yes, as the attending physician he would indeed be legally
responsible for her death.
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Another important fact that complicates defining medical errors is the
environment, or place, in which they occur. The example that follows, taken from the
third world, serves well to illustrate two important points. First, errors can not be
divorced from the context in which they occur. More often than not they are embedded in
a myriad of factors giving rise to a variety of social and economic issues that reach far
beyond the immediate case. Second, a definition needs to hold up when conditions are far
less than optimal in places where different concerns and expectations shape everyday
medical decisions. The following is an example from Africa, where the quality of
medical practice is a reflection of the most challenging circumstances.
Amexo, Tolhurst, Bamish, and Bates’ (2004) report that there is a high incidence
of misdiagnosed malaria cases in Africa. In many areas, misdiagnosis disproportionately
affects poor and vulnerable populations. Targeting these high-risk settings where death
due to malaria is on the rise, international organizations developed policies that
encourage the treatment of all childhood fevers as if they were caused by malaria. The
problem, however, is that 70% of malaria cases are diagnosed and managed at home.
Only if traditional medicine fails do patients present in satellite facilities that lack the
necessary resources and personnel needed to diagnose correctly. The authors report that
even in better equipped district hospitals, microscopic testing for malaria is rare. As a
result, a significant number of cases are misdiagnosed as positives and patients are over
treated with medications they can not afford. In those households, the depletion of
resources magnifies the challenges dealing with unnecessary side effects of the treatment.
Obviously, an assessment of “medical error” in these cases is more a question of
international policy and ethics than a matter of definitional exactness.
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The availability of resources and access to them should not only be a concern
reserved for conditions abroad; even in this country we encounter over-crowded and
under-funded hospitals in neighborhoods in which healthcare is among the lowest
priorities. In those poor neighborhoods one can raise similar questions such as, “is it a
medical error when a physician orders a test or treatment which a patient without health
insurance under the age of 65 can not afford?” A senior administrator who is leading
medical efforts in such environments throughout the world as well as in San Bernardino
County, California focuses on this particular aspect when providing a definition for
medical error:
A medical error, I suppose, to me is a mistake caused by any human or
technological aspect of a healthcare system. How’s that? In other words, to me
medical errors can be a combination of a computer malfunction or misprinted,
most of them are human errors that cause one kind or another, but in my world
view, I would think it’s a very broad sort of thing. Let me give you an example
that I am struggling with right now: when you step into a resource-depleted
environment and try to provide healthcare where patients can’t afford tests, you’re
having to make much more judgment calls of diagnoses and treatment plans than
you would in a resource-rich environment. Now when you miss a diagnosis in a
resource-depleted environment is that a medical error? And who’s to blame for
that? Is that the doctor’s blame or is that the patient’s blame because he couldn’t
pay for it? It’s that country’s blame because they didn’t insure him. I guess what
I’m saying is my concept of medical error is far beyond just a doctor failing to do
some particular thing, but as it would be that broader view. And I’m taking that
beyond to say how hard do I ethically push a patient who can’t afford medicine to
buy what he needs, and if he can’t or I don’t push hard enough, then is that a
medical error. There’s ethical edges of this thing that’s incredible. The public’s
mindset would be a medical error in that we made a mistake, but I’m saying there
is a whole lot of other sorts of things where it isn’t over a mistake; it’s just the
way the world runs.

An interesting perspective on medical error, one which may warrant the inclusion
of environmental factors in a definition, emerges when the boundaries between concept
and context become even more blurred than when situating medical errors in a particular
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hospital department or socio-economic class. Consider if the hospital environment itself
is a medical error. One of the medical school administrators interviewed in this study,
who had been a gynecologist for many years prior to his current profession in medical
education, carries the opinion that the failure of providing an environment that
contributes to the healing of patients can be considered a medical error:
I elect the metaphor of the hospital circle at least in our institution, as being the
holy place, which should be reverence, quiet,. . . [but] if you have a CPR going
in, then all bets are off and you have to do what you have to do. Call for what you
need, but all other factors being equal, that ought to be a very quiet, whispering
kind of atmosphere. When you go into the patient’s room, that in my view is most
holy place because living and dying and healing occur there or not, and that is
where you would really, literally meet your maker. One way or another. And so
that whole area, if it is not conducive to the healing process, then I think an error
has occurred.
Even if medical judgment and diagnoses are correct and specific medical procedures are
carried out without failure the atmosphere of the unit in which a patient is bedded may be
counterproductive to recovery and improvement. In these circumstances, the question
becomes the following: can environmental factors such as noise, unnecessary traffic in
patient areas, disrespectful conversations, and neglect of patients’ need to rest lead to the
unintended failure to provide a setting in which the sick can heal? I recently encountered
a sign at Kaiser Permanente, which advises visitors and healthcare staff to walk and talk
quietly because “patients are healing.” Placing a similar focus on the importance of
creating a healing environment, a senior administrator of Loma Linda University Medical
Center informed me that his hospital is currently instituting quiet periods called “SHHH,”
or “silence helps healing here.”
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Linking Medical Errors with Blame
Where it is often difficult to pinpoint a single source or find a specific person who
is to blame in the environmental contexts just described, the notion of fault is more
attractive in settings in which the error pathway is narrower. In those conditions, blame is
an easily unleashed co-notation of error even if blaming someone does little in regards to
preventing future errors or healing their effects. In fact, blame and the medical error
discourse are intimately connected. Paget (1988) points out the important difference
between “what a mistake denotes and what a mistake connotes.” Where a mistake
denotes that something has gone wrong, it connotes “being blameworthy or at fault” (p.
6). In this same vein, Grober and Bohnen (2005) note that the term error is “excessively
negative and antagonistic,” eliciting feelings of guilt, anger, inadequacy, and depression.
These factors, the authors argue, “perpetuate the culture of blame” (p. 42). In the present
study, all three Emergency Department physicians provided a definition of medical error
that is associated with fault and blame. Although she does not explicitly mention fault,
one ER attending exclusively focuses on errors made by nursing staff, rather than seeing
herself playing a role in the error creating process: “For me, my definition of a medical
error is when something has been done to a patient that has not been done the way it has
been ordered. Or that has been misinterpreted.” She continues the dialog with proving
two examples of nursing errors:
I actually have had several medical errors [happen] by virtue of nurses not
carrying out the orders as I have written [for] them. So, I can give you two
examples that come to me off the top of my head. The first one was I had ordered
a medication for a patient to be given orally and the nurse gave it IV. So for me, I
considered that a medical error because clearly in my orders it stated that my
medication needed to be given orally and yet the nurse gave it IV not looking at
how my orders where written and the order was very legible. So, and no harm was
done because the medication can be given orally and IV at the dosage that I had
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ordered, but I still consider it an error because of that. The second one was an IV
medication that had been ordered for a patient where the order had been clearly
and legibly been written to be given as a drip and the nurse accidentally setting
the pump up to give the same medication as a bolus. What the patient had
received was well within the limits, of the acceptable limits of that drug and
would not have cause any harm but because of the patient’s condition, it needed
to be dripped over time versus being given in a bolus form. So that was another
error that happened to me. I can’t think of errors that I made based on
interpretation. But, ehm ... I still consider that an integral part of medical errors.

It is interesting to note that only one nurse and two administrators made references to
blame when asked for their take on a definition of medical error. All other groups
including residents, medical students, and patient care staff did not mention fault or
blame as part of the definition, but instead discussed these notions in other contexts.
Acutely aware of the negative effects that are associated with connecting errors
and blame, the National Ethics Committee of the Veterans Hospital Administration
(VHA) (2003) made a particular effort in their policy recommendation to distinguish the
term medical errors from adverse events. The committee points out that the term error
indicates that “something was done wrong, that somebody made a mistake in the
provision of care” (p. 2). In contrast, an adverse event implies that “something bad had
happened, not that anybody did anything wrong” (p. 2). The VHA then chose the term
adverse events for their medical error policy.
Indeed, results of studies or policy implications are strongly dependent on how
broadly or how narrowly medical error is defined. Should a definition include or exclude
potential errors which reach the patient but which either do not cause any negative effects
or, by good luck, cause positive effects? Should near-misses, which are those acts or
events that almost reach the patient but do not, be included in definitions of medical
error? And by what standard should errors be judged to fall into the category of

48

unfortunate “things that just happen,” as one trauma surgeon described to me? In the
category of events that comprise preventable adverse events? The following section
outlines a conceptual framework for answering some of these questions.

A Medical Error Framework
Despite the difficulties with constructing a definition for medical error, many
attempts have been made. The most cited example is the definition offered by the
Institute of Medicine (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999, p. 28), which defines a
medical error as “the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended [an error of
execution] or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim [an error of planning].” In this
context, the broader term adverse event stands for any injury caused by medical
management. If the adverse event is due to an error, the Institute calls it a preventable
adverse event (p. 28). The IOM distinguishes preventable adverse events from negligent
adverse events for which the legal criteria for negligence apply. The IOM notes that only
a small subset of preventable adverse events fits this category.
Several observations about the IOM’s definition of medical error can be made:
First, the definition is process-oriented rather than emphasizing outcomes. Thus, medical
errors are recognized independently of whether they cause harm. Second, the definition is
vague in its articulation of intent; we are only being made aware of the fact that an error
can result if an “intended action” failed, not if the event or failure was unintended or
unwarranted. Consequently, it is missing the crucial moral dimension. Third, it does not
include a measuring stick, for instance a standard of care, peers’ judgment, or the action
of a reasonable healthcare professional. It follows that there is no mechanism that
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distinguishes between the kind of failures that lie within the boundaries of acceptable risk
inherent in a medical procedure and those that delineate a medical error. A failure of the
planned action to be completed as intended, or a failure in making a correct plan can
include nearly anything from giving a stool softener half an hour late to wrong side
surgery. Fourth, the IOM’s definition does not consider specific medical error contexts. A
definition constructed this way broadens the concept of medical error significantly.
This study contributes to the discourse on definitions by offering a conceptual
framework that provides a practical definition of medical error. In this model, mistakes
are placed into the patient safety and healthcare quality arena, such as hospital quality
management departments, to be analyzed and to serve as foundation for developing
preventive measures. Only that subset of those failures that cause significant harm to
patients are considered under a restorative justice policy (see Fig. 1, p. 66). The
conceptual framework and definition proposed in the next few paragraphs will have
immediate, practical application.
There are two premises that underlie the proposed framework. First, medical
errors cannot be eradicated completely; they occur even when great care is taken or the
most sophisticated technological designs are employed. Second, even though many errors
are deeply rooted in system complexities such as organizational factors and work
environment (Kalra, 2004), somebody is making a decision at some point along the way
and is taking responsibility, but not necessarily blame, when things have gone wrong.
But even if an error is not the result of any particular person’s mistake, someone is filling
the gap between systems and patient, between technological precision and suffering and
hope. And it is this person or persons who negotiate between their possibly conflicting
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beliefs about a just resolution of medical error situations, the patients’ needs and
perspectives, and the ethics and policies of the organization. Because of the tremendous
effects medical errors have on physicians, patients, hospitals, and society, great care
needs to be exercised when developing a definition for medical error as it shapes patient
safety and provides a spring board for restorative solutions. In other words, a clear
definitional framework is as crucial to systems improvement as it is to the delicate
relationship between hospitals and patients, and between doctors and patients and their
families. Drawing on the four considerations discussed in earlier sections, the following
four elements are the signposts that will guide dialog and policy development in this
study: intent, etiology, context, and outcome (see Fig. 1, p. 66).

Intent
A common characteristic of medical errors of all kinds is that they are not made
on purpose, unless, of course, we venture into the criminal realm. However, the fact that
something has not been done on purpose does not suffice for its selection as a definitional
term. Any appraisal of medical error needs to start with a specific analysis of the state of
mind of the person who makes the mistake or is responsible for it. At least as far back as
Aristotle’s Ethics, philosophers have argued that an understanding of things gone wrong
depends on the mindset of those who are responsible. Aristotle (1976) points out that
when an injury occurs contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a “misadventure.” If it
occurs consistent with reasonable expectation but without malice, it is a “mistake” as
long as the agent himself is the one carrying responsibility for it. However, if the mistake
is not the person’s responsibility, it remains to be a “misadventure.” When an agent acts
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knowingly but without pre-meditation the result would be an “injury.” Relating error to
justice, Aristotle notes that all of these acts do not make the man unjust or wicked
because they were not done with malice. Moreover, he finds “pardonable” those mistakes
that happen in ignorance or as the result of ignorance (pp. 192-194).
When discussing medical errors in the context of justice, it is indeed important to
understand the state of mind of the person erring. The notion of intention and other
related yet different concepts such as foresight, prediction, intentional action and moral
responsibility ought to be given due consideration. The idea that someone does
something intentionally or that it is someone’s expressed intention to do doing something
is a challenging philosophical problem with tremendous practical consequences.
Anscombe (2000) has written extensively on the subject. In her major work Intention, she
explores three related notions of intention: the “expression of intention,” “an action as
intentional,” and “with what intention the thing was done” (p. 1, §1). She notes that in
order to understand intention, the differences between the three concepts and their
relationships to each other warrants careful consideration. In this light, it is important to
distinguish the expression of an intention to do something from the notion of prediction
(p. 1-5, §2). A key criterion that Anscombe carries into her discussion of intentional
action is the kind of justification one provides for an action towards an event in the
future. The justification for the expression of intention is grounded in an actor’s
reasoning why something in the future might be “useful” or “attractive” (p. 6, §3). She
later points out that intention, particularly the more explanatory intentions in acting, are
similar to “forward-looking motives” (p. 21, §13). Prediction, on the other hand, is based
on observational evidence, not reason. The role of reason in justification is fundamental
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to her explanation of intentional action, the most important of the three concepts and a
consideration which makes up the major part of her book.
According to Anscombe (2000), an action is intentional when it is the result of an
inner process, it is voluntary11 (either in terms of bodily movements or from inner
reflection), and when the question “why?” can be applied to it (see pp. 9-11, §5). But not
all answers to the question “why” classify an action as intentional, which is the case if an
answer states observational evidence or causality. This kind of knowledge, which stems
from the assessment of a present reality, is not rooted in intention. To this effect,
Anscombe points out that
Certainly in modem philosophy we have an incorrigibly contemplative
conception of knowledge. Knowledge must be something that is judged as such
by being in accordance with the facts. The facts, reality, are prior, and dictate
what is to be said, if it is knowledge. And this is the explanation of the utter
darkness in which we found ourselves, (p. 57, §32)
Instead, reasons for acting need to be based on “non-observational” knowledge. For
instance, the mention of a history of moral considerations play a role, the interpretation of
actions, or pointing to “something in the future;” are all valid answers to the requisite
question “Why?” (see p. 24, §16 for summary). But what does Anscombe mean by “nonobservational” knowledge?
Anscombe (2000) explains non-observational knowledge as “practical
knowledge.” This form of knowledge is rooted in the sort of calculated reasoning as the
ancient Greeks once described (p. 57, §33 et seq.). Drawing on Aquinas, she
11 Anscombe (2000) notes that intentional actions can also be described as involuntary when an actor does
not want to something but does it nevertheless. However, since the act is being performed indeed, I would
argue that the act is voluntary and thus intentional despite the perhaps involuntary antecedent event. On the
other hand, voluntary actions that are not intentional can be actions that constitute side effects of actions
that are intentional. This is best captured by the concept of the “double effect” as described in other
sections of this chapter.
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distinguishes practical knowledge from speculative knowledge and describes that
“practical knowledge is ‘the cause of what it understands,’ unlike ‘speculative’
knowledge, which ‘is derived from the objects shown’” (p. 87, §48). Since practical
knowledge does not emerge from a preconceived reality or from facts that are known to
us, we chose concepts that guide our investigations and interests (p. 84, §46). The
analogy of a project director whose task is to supervise the erection of a building without
being present at the building site represents Anscombe’s concept of practical knowledge.
Rather than relying on speculation, this person “must settle everything in a right order”
(p. 82, §45). The knowledge with which the director operates to erect the building is
guided by concepts known to him or her; it is practical knowledge that provides the
foundation for his intentional actions. Thus, Anscombe concludes that “‘Intentional
action’ always presupposes what might be called ‘knowing one’s way about’ the matters
described in the description under which an action can be called intentional, and this
knowledge is exercised in the action and is practical knowledge” (p. 89, §49). The
argument that she makes in regards to this kind of practical knowledge underlying the
notion of intent rather than observational knowledge or other kinds of evidential
knowledge distinguishes her work from others.
The requirement of intent in criminal prosecution is perhaps the most common
application of the term; the fine nuances that emerge when looking at intent in medical
error cases are less explored. Shaw (2006) claims that in ethics, intent is often discussed
in reference to the principle of “double effect.” In the Medallist’s Address, Anscombe
(2001) rejects the usefulness of the double effect as a decision tool. However, the
distinction of what is intended and what can be foreseen or predicted as possible results
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of an intended action is important and consistent with her work in Intention (2000),
particularly in her discussion of voluntary action (see footnote #1). The double effect
entails that “an agent may cause something or allow something bad as long as, first no
evil is intended as an end or a means and second, that the foreseen bad is not out of
proportion with the anticipated good” (p. 187). Interestingly, this statement has both
deontological constraints, which categorically rule out intended means and ends that are
“evil” or which I would call “harms-in-themselves,” and utilitarian criteria, that is,
choosing an action based on the consideration of the relative weight of the anticipated
good. In other words, actions or decisions that cause harm are acceptable, but only if they
do not also intend harm for its own sake, and only if the foreseen good consequences
outweigh the bad.
The principle of the double effect is also helpful for illustrating the importance of
intent as element in a definition of medical error. It clarifies that there are three kinds of
harms but only one corresponds to error. The overall intention is to improve the patient’s
condition with a certain medical approach or technology. Possible side effects are
considered and trade-offs evaluated. The “intentional action” that results is based on
“practical knowledge” grounded in calculated reason, as Anscombe (2000) describes. If
harm results because of the procedures, it is unintended even though it might have been
foreseen by a hunch or even predicted by observational evidence. For instance, a
physician may try a very risky procedure knowing that the odds of causing death are
high. Yet without performing the procedure death is certain. If the surgeon proceeds
while foreseeing the likelihood of her patient dying from the procedures, the patient’s
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death may still be fully unintended. If death results it need not be the consequence of a
medical error.
In contrast, if harm is inflicted for its own sake, it is caused intentionally. In this
case, the overall notion of intent has shifted from the good to the bad. The Hippocratic
tradition’s well known maxim “First, do no harm” could perhaps be re-phrased to read,
“first, do no intentional harm for the sake of harm itself and don’t risk any harm unless
there is a proportional greater good reasonably expected.” Both situations in which harm
is caused exclude a notion of a physician having “erred.”
If the overall intent is to improve the patient’s condition, what properties of the
principle of the double effect have to change so that a decision or an action becomes an
error? Either the process of “causing or allowing” something to happen must be flawed or
there is a failure to foresee or predict that the bad consequences outweigh the good. Or
perhaps foresight and skills are lacking altogether. What is important to reiterate is what
both Anscombe (2000) and Shaw (2006) state quite clearly, though not in reference to a
discussion about medical errors: intent is not the same as intentional action (causing or
allowing something to happen), and does not equate to foresight or prediction.
Suppose that a retinal surgeon intends to stop further deterioration of the patient’s
vision by sealing a retinal hemorrhage with 50 laser beams targeting the damaged
location. She foresees or expects that the patient will suffer from visual image distortion
radiating from this region of the eye as a result of scarring. The surgeon intends the
prevention of the patient’s condition getting worse by the means of performing a
procedure that harms the patient; however, the foreseeable good consequence which in
this case is slowing the progression of blindness outweighs the expected visual distortion.
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An error in this example could be two-fold; first, during the procedure the eye
surgeon misses the damaged spot several times which results in additional damage to the
patient’s peripheral vision. Second; the eye surgeon fails to foresee the negative
consequences of operating too close to the center of the eye and causes the patient to lose
most of her visual acuity. In either case, the intention of the physician to utilize laser
technology to stabilize the patient’s deteriorating condition has not changed12. However,
in the first instance, the surgeon missing the spot was an unintentional failure of an
intentional action. In the second case, the surgery also resulted in an unwarranted failure
but this time the surgeon did not foresee the negative consequences actually outweighing
the positive.
Closely related to the notion of intent is the relationship between moral
responsibility and failure. It is clear that intentional harms caused to patients incur moral
responsibility; however, such acts fall outside this discussion of medical error and are
rarely found in everyday medical practice. As the previous paragraphs explain, harms are
not intended when things go wrong in medicine whether they fall into the categories of
acceptable risk or foreseeable consequences or fit the notion of errors leading to failures.
Where the former instance does not incur moral responsibility, the latter raises specific

12 In this case, as in others, the notion of “motive” is irrelevant because it only gives information about the
character of the actor but not the morality of the act itself. Mill (1957) argues that “utilitarian moralists
have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the
action, though much with the worth of the agent (p. 23-24). For instance, the motive behind treating a
patient to improve her vision might be compassion, financial benefit, or professional duty. Yet it is what an
actor “wills do to” that is of moral significance in regards to the act itself. Kant agrees with Mill in such
that the end-result does not affect the moral worth of the actor. In his beautiful statement Kant holds that,
“even if, by a special disfavor of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will
should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose-if with its greatest efforts it would yet achieve
nothing and only the good will were left . . . then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something
that has its full worth in itself’ (Kant, 1997, p. 8). The difference between Mill and Kant however is that for
Kant the morality of the act itself also seems to depend on the motive of the actor. In other words, if
someone saves a patient from dying only to get paid Mill would find the act moral regardless of the motive
of the actor doing it for payment whereas Kant would not attribute the act moral worth.
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moral questions that are particularly relevant for restorative justice applications. For
example, the retinal surgeon missing the spot or failing to foresee negative side effects
are indeed unintended failures that invoke the expectation to accept moral responsibility
regardless of whether the overall intent was admirable. Moral responsibility, at least as
what concerns goal-oriented theories in ethics, is not dependent on motive but is linked to
the very consequences of an act and the obligation of an actor to respond. In order to
allow a restorative morality to unfold, it is imperative that hospitals create an
environment that encourages responsive actions and promotes restorative dialog.

Etiology
Considering the inherent uncertainty of medical work, the complexity of the
modem healthcare system, and particularly the variety of interactions that take place
within the various specialties, hospital departments and between healthcare providers and
patients, it is easy to accept the fact that there are plenty of intersecting opportunities for
failure. As already discussed, many failures result in adverse events, yet not all are due
to error. In order to identify specific causal factors in which errors are embedded and
which can be incorporated in a definition of medical error, this dissertation draws on
McNutt and Abrams’(2002) model of medical error to clarify and distill the possibilities.
The basic flow of causation and failure that these authors present serves as a foundation
of the proposed model in this study (Fig. 1, p. 66).
McNutt and Abrams’ (2002) report on the efforts of a patient safety committee of
Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center who, in response to the current “confusion” of
terms involving medical error and with a focus on both systems and human errors,
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developed a model of error that defines error “only at the deepest reaches of the medical
care system” (p. 24). The model represents the etiology of error on three levels that are
analogous to the dynamics of the disease process. In a model of disease, a patient
presents with certain symptoms that “come to our attention via disease” (p. 23). Going
further back, “diseases come to our attentions via myriad causes” (p. 23). Causal factors
include genetic and environmental factors. As an example, the authors offer the following
case: a patient visits a physician with fever (the symptom), which the physician treats by
bathing her in cool water and giving antipyretics. The fever disappears but the underlying
disease, in this case pneumonia (disease), remains. If the physician administers
antibiotics, it will be eliminated. However, the cause of the patient catching pneumonia
has not been addressed. Stepping back further, the patient did not have a pneumonia
vaccination (one of the causal factors) which made it more likely for her to get infected.
According to McNutt and Abrams (2002), a similar model can be used for
analyzing and researching adverse events. Similar to the disease process “adverse events
present via failure; and failure via errors” (p. 24). Helpful for this present study is the
authors’ clarification of the antecedent processes of adverse events and the necessary
separation of the terms error, failure, and adverse events (negative outcomes). As the
authors emphasize, failures are not synonymous with errors, and errors are not the same
as adverse events. Specifically, I adopt the authors’ proposition that errors are embedded
in human, organizational, and technical factors which, acting alone or in concert, are the
causes of failure. Keeping in mind informants’ comments and my own observational
research in two medical center departments, I add “environmental factors” as a fourth
category. These include above-average noise in patient care areas, unnecessary traffic,
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fluctuating room temperature, patient population, and appropriate lighting, all of which
may negatively affect patients. If such factors lead to clearly identifiable unintended
failures in a patient’s healing process causing significant harm, environmental conditions
such as the ones mentioned could indeed be considered error factors. And when
environmental error factors do not directly affect the patient’s healing process, they may
nevertheless present themselves as antecedents to other failures, such as decision or
process failures, which then could harm patients. Both of these considerations offer
grounds on which an inclusion of environmental factors in a model of medical error is
justified (see Fig. 1, p. 66). However, based on the definition of medical error that this
chapter develops, not every flaw in the hospital environment invokes notions of error
calling for a restorative justice process.
This multi-factorial part of the model highlights the reality that errors can be
linked to the decisions or actions of individuals; however, the model is also sensitive to
the possibility that human factors are more often than not strongly intertwined with
systems factors such as organizational policy, hospital setting, and technical design
complexities. With McNutt and Abrams’ (2002) model in mind and the determination
that human, organizational, technical and environmental factors bear errors leading to
failures, which may then present as adverse events, notions of justice ought to take into
consideration the complex nature of medical work. Certainly, a multi-factorial model
bodes for more comprehensive and integrative approaches to healing the effects of
medical errors than blaming and punishing individuals.
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Context
An important issue that comes to light specifically in the study of post- medical
error procedures and policies, one that speaks against universality, is the choice of
contextual reference points. One consideration of context has already been incorporated
into the definition of medical error: the presence and consideration of multiple factors
contributing to failure. Another, more crucial bridge between concept and context is the
standard against which medical errors are measured. Considering the inconvenient truth
that many medical errors are nearly inseparable from their contexts, a definition should
include a standard that is highly sensitive to the specific medical enviromnent (place,
healthcare team, treatment approach, state of technology, hospital policy) in which the
patient is treated. As illustrated by the emergency physicians in this study who
predominantly describe errors in light of their working conditions and the kinds of
information they rely on when treating patients, a definition of error needs to include a
measure that detects these particulars rather than relying on legally constructed categories
of place, hierarchy, and expertise.
In this light, a review of organizational, human, technical and environmental
factors as possible locations of error by “skilled and knowledgeable peers” who look at
all nuances of an event from the perspective at the time it happened, as Smith and Foster
(2000) suggest, responds to the particular context in which an adverse event occurred. A
responsive standard of this kind is preferable to a reliance on a more abstract standard of
care. In this same vein, an assessment of acceptable “risk” of a treatment or procedure
along with a patient’s written informed consent as to his or her understanding of such risk
is imperative. For instance, a surgeon performs a highly invasive procedure in which he
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nicks a nerve nearby the operating site. As a result, the patient suffers from prolonged leg
pain. Let’s say for the sake of argument that a nicked nerve in this location is well within
the acceptable risk of the procedure. Has the surgeon committed an error? Under
definitions that do not include an explicit standard, nicking the nerve would indeed be an
error. Thus, a peer review standard is beneficial for illuminating the subtle nuances that
emerge in situations in which error is the prime suspect.

Outcome
Today, few definitions of medical error focus specifically on patient outcomes or
adverse events (e.g., Veterans Hospital Administration, 2003; Grober & Bohnen, 2005).
For instance, Grober and Bohnen (2005) offer a definition in which outcome matters but
is not the distinguishing factor. According to the authors, a medical error is “an act of
omission or commission in planning or execution that contributes or could contribute to
an unintended result” (p. 42). The authors intend their definition to be “inclusive” and
“explicit,” referencing the “key domains of error causation” as well as the failed act that
caused or could have caused an unintended outcome. The nature of the outcomewhether it is harmful or potentially harmful—is left open; it is simply unintended.
Moreover, the failed act is contributory and not solely responsible for the possible
outcome.
The challenges of accepting a definition such as this are twofold; first, error is
assessed at the level of the failed action or planning process, not at the root cause level.
Second, as many other definitions also hold, the range of possible outcomes is nearly
infinite as the only requirement is for the result to be unintended. These problems are
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magnified in the absence of a standard. As a result, the definition captures nearly all
error-based failures. A Tylenol tablet given ten minutes late yet having no impact on the
patient could, by many definitions, technically be called an error, although common sense
excludes these cases for practical reasons. Those definitions that include a classification
of outcomes, such as actual versus potential harm, and definitions which have other
build-in standards are more discriminatory. As such, they would eliminate these cases.
Having no potential for serious harm, giving Tylenol ten minutes late is within the range
of acceptable risk inherent in any medical treatment and dos not present a deviation from
any standard of care.
In this study, the inclusion of outcome in a definitional concept is based on policy
rather than theoretical-technical considerations. Outcome calls for a distinction between
errors that are exclusively a matter of patient safety and those circumstances that evoke
notions of fairness when things have gone wrong. In the former category we find nearmisses, which are those instances in which error could have caused harm but
reconsideration or safeguards re-directed practical actions or cognitive processes before
missing the mark. For instance, a nurse double checks an order for 50 units insulin
suspecting this amount to be a mistake; the order should actually have read 5 units.
Similarly, an error that reached the patient but leaves no noticeable impact, though it
could have under different circumstances, is also a concern of patient safety and quality
improvement rather than a matter of restorative justice policy. An example would be
administering penicillin instead of a penicillin derivative to a patient who stated that she
was not doing well with it in the past.
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An important commonality of both kinds of errors, near misses and those that
reach the patient but have no noticeable effect, is that they have the potential to cause
harm to a patient. In the former case, giving the patient 50 units insulin could have easily
lead to a hypoglycemic shock; the latter incident could have caused a severe allergic
reaction if the statement of the patient would have proven to be correct. The focus on
potential harm reflects the important distinction that Hofer et al. (2000) make when
defining medical error in terms of “failed processes that have been rigorously
demonstrated to cause adverse outcomes” (p. 13). Without this potential, errors of these
categories might be less relevant for corrective action or policy considerations.
While acknowledging that errors occur without impacting the patient or her care,
it is this latter category that is of interest in this study: the category includes those errors
that cause actual, recognizable harm to a patient. These are the errors that Hofer et al.
(2000) describe as the “very small subset of errors that demand attention because its
existence undermines both the public’s and the profession’s confidence in the whole
system” (p. 11). In order to provide clarity about the kinds of harm that ought to be
addressed with patients and their families, the National Quality Forum (NQF) (2007)
suggests time and severity indicators13 which require physicians and hospitals to be open
about serious harms such as death, long-lasting disability or events that require the patient
to receive substantial additional care. Broadening the spectrum of harm, this dissertation
defends a view of human life that is based on the understanding that humans are
multidimensional beings. A perspective that focuses on wholeness highlights the notion

13 The National Quality Forum (2007) identifies three kinds of events that require disclosure to patients: (1)
sentinel events; (2) serious reportable events as defined by the California Department of Health and Human
Services and (3) any other unanticipated outcomes involving harm that requires the provision of substantial
additional care, that cause the loss of limb or function lasting longer than seven days (p. 77).
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that medical errors impact more than the physical well-being of patients; consequently,
harm represents a range of interdependent and interacting factors that comprise a
healthful human existence. These include physical, mental, spiritual, and social aspects.
Although my model does not rank harm on a severity or time scale, it does regard harm
as having a recognizable effect on one or more of these aspects resulting in the reduction
of patients’ personal and relational experience of wholeness. It presupposes that a
competent team of healthcare providers, by which I mean physicians, nurses,
psychologists, chaplains and other professionals, who are knowledgeable in the field of
the patient’s disease process and committed to healing in the framework of whole person
care, can render judgment about the effects of mistakes on a patient’s wholeness.
In his theology of healing, Rice (2006) conceptualizes healing as counteracting
illness or reducing its effects with the aim to restore the wholeness of human beings. If
our goal is to return to a state of relative wholeness by counteracting illness, then a
response to harm caused by medical errors should take place within the same framework.
By situating medical errors into Rice’s paradigm of healing, we should consider a vision
of justice that prompts ethical reflection and which serves as a guide for restoring a
persons or an organizations’ wholeness. A conception of outcomes as suggested places
high demands on a model of justice and it is with this particular understanding that
notions of medical error disclosure and restoration will be discussed.
A conceptual framework that explains concepts of intent, etiology, context, and
outcome is deeply rooted in the four considerations discussed at the beginning of this
chapter: the uncertainty in medicine, the complexity of modern medical care systems, the
fusion of concepts and contexts, and the link of medical errors with blame. The following
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is the representative model which includes both categories: errors that are a matter of
patient safety and errors that find additional consideration in theories of justice. The
proposed definition of medical error serves as the foundation for the development of a
restorative justice policy.
Intent
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Unintentional
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r
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of medical error (with accompanying definition).
Note. The model generates the following definition of medical error: An error occurs
when organizational, human, technical, or environmental factors lead to an unintentional
failure of an intended practical action or cognitive process which results in recognizable
physical, spiritual, mental, or social harm to a patient. The standard that determines
whether harm is due to error is the consensus of a competent, multidisciplinary group of
healthcare providers whose practice is concerned with treating a condition similar to the
patient’s and who, if they had the same information at the time the error unfolded, also
think that it would have come about but should not have.
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Conclusion
Any definition of medical error should be accepted with caution. Meanings are
embedded in concepts and language. As social products they are deeply intertwined with
the contexts in which they are situated. Converging on the treatment of a single patient is
a large network of human interactions that evolve around the use of highly sophisticated
technology. When developing a definition of error as part of hospital policies,
organizations struggle with addressing the complexities of the modem medical care
environment, as the boundaries between what constitutes a medical error and “things that
just happen” might not always be conveniently clear.
Yet medical errors need to be discussed in the healthcare setting and with patients.
In order to develop post-medical error policies, both for quality improvement and
restorative justice, we should release the subject from its semantic imprisonment and
embrace medicine’s complexity to bring into the forefront its human side. Medical
practice is as much a relational and ethical matter as it is a technical concern. It is the
ethics of medical errors that this dissertation addresses.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EXPERIENCE OF ERRORS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

Introduction
The previous chapter developed a model and definition of medical error that
highlights the multidimensional effects of medical mistakes as they impact the physical,
spiritual, mental, and social well-being of patients. While the model specifically focuses
on harm caused to patients to derive a workable definition, it does not exclude the
realization that healthcare providers, hospitals, and society as a whole are also affected by
medical mistakes. This chapter provides an individual, social, and institutional account of
medical error to serve as context for developing a vision of justice that is sensitive to
diverse experience of harm as unfolding loss of wholeness. It begins with illustrating the
differences and similarities of patients and physicians’ experiences of medical errors to
point out that mistakes and their effects are deeply personal and also profoundly
relational. Restoring the effects of harm caused by medical errors is as problematic as the
errors themselves. This is evidenced by the range of personal, professional, and
institutional interests and practices. In order to illustrate the emerging contours of a still
fragmented paradigm of restoration, I will briefly outline two major approaches to
dealing with harm.
First, I look at how medicine as a profession deals with errors. For a long time,
the public trusted the medical profession to control the quality of healthcare internally. As
trust declined and the interconnectedness of modem medicine increasingly called for
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managerial models in which traditional peer-review mechanisms and systems
improvement intersect, physicians’ regulatory freedom has decreased dramatically.
However, neither the old professionalism nor the new focus on quality control and
systems safety management addresses the multi-dimensional aspects of harm in a way
that would restore wholeness. As a result, patients often seek assistance from the legal
system to be heard and to respond to their needs.
What follows is a discussion of ways to address medical harm that are located
outside the institution of medicine: civil litigation and legal settlement. The increase in
medical malpractice litigation exacts a large toll on patients, the medical profession, and
society, undermining collaborative efforts to develop just resolutions and to increase
patient safety. From an institutional perspective, there are fundamental differences
between law and medicine including their goals, professional cultures, and discourse. In
essence, they are colliding institutions. Using a snapshot approach, the adversarial
process captures an instance in time to compensate financially a few harmed patients.
However, it rarely reaches beyond its narrow focus to respond to the true nature of
medical harm as it unfolds in the interconnected settings of hospitals affecting physical,
mental, spiritual and social dimensions of individuals’ lives. Moreover, litigation, or the
threat thereof, interferes with how the medical profession evaluates its own failures and
how it relates their work to patients. Consequently, a paradigm shift in which mistakes
are dealt with in a more restorative way, one in which professionalism is strong and
includes the patient even when things go wrong, is imperative.
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The Patient’s Experience
I’m extremely hurt just because I’m still having complications. I’m going to get
cut open again. . . . Just the fact that he has no idea what I am going through. And
he’s just moved on with his life and never called me. That really hurts. It really
bothers me. (Patient-respondent, Dulcos et al., 2005, p. 481)

Responding to Harm
Medical errors occur in nearly every setting. Many are caught in time, some reach
patients but leave no trace; others have detrimental consequences. Patients who are
harmed experience a wide range of feelings and emotions. For instance, learning from
focus groups of patients and physicians, Gallagher, Waterman, Ebers, Fraser, and
Levinson (2003) report that patients would feel sad, anxious, depressed, or traumatized
when they had learned that an error occurred. Empirical studies, such as the one by these
authors, rely on responses of patients who may or may not have experienced a medical
error. Fewer empirical studies are available that examine the narratives of patients who
actually found themselves tangled in the turbulent events immediately following its
discovery.
Duclos et al. (2005) conducted such a study and offer insights into these patients’
feelings and emotions. The objective of their qualitative approach was to explore the
patients “lived experience” of the events that unfolded after an error occurred. The study
particularly focused on patients’ perspectives of factors leading to the success or failure
of communication with their healthcare providers after the injury. Patients who agreed to
talk about their experience in focus groups participated in the COPIC program. Four
major themes stood out as a result of the study: the experience of trauma, worries,
frustration and the importance of communication.
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Participants in Dulcos et al. (2005) study experienced trauma that resulted either
from the event itself or from the manner in which medical errors were subsequently
handled. Trauma was classified into three categories and included physical, financial and
emotional trauma. Physical and financial trauma was common for all patients.
Participants felt particularly struck by financial trauma when “all them bills were rolling
in” (p. 481), a feeling that was magnified if the patients’ credit record was also affected.
The degree of emotional trauma depended on the quality of communication between
patients and healthcare providers. Good communication that highlighted respect, in which
active listening skills were applied, and during which patients felt cared for, reduced
emotional trauma. Dialog that lacked those particular patterns was experienced as hurtful.
As in many other instances, it seems as if compassion remains a key virtue in human
interaction.
Dulcos et al. (2005) report that during the interviews, patients frequently referred
to their progressing worries concerning the unfolding events and the future. For patients,
questions such as “what happened,” “what is next,” and “will I return into my former
self’ were in dire need of being answered. The authors also showed that the ability of
patients to cope with medical error was dependent on their level of frustration and
sometimes anger when they felt left alone, had trouble obtaining information, or
witnessed the inability of hospital staff to stand up for their mistakes or to apologize.
Communication was a significant factor that shaped patients’ perceptions of post-medical
error processes, determining whether they continued their relationship with their
healthcare provider. An apology, quick action for reassurance, and immediate and
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continuous support were perceived as instrumental for satisfactory management of
medical errors.
Anger, frustration, and loneliness are reactions that are bound to physical, mental,
and social-relational realities. There is also a strong spiritual aspect that is highly
intertwined with these expressions. Sulmasy (2006) points out that illness is a spiritual
concern, one that “grasps persons by the soul as well as by the body and disturbs both”
(p. 17). Illness invokes “troubling questions of a transcendent nature - questions about
meaning, value, and relationship” (p. 17). If we consider illness to be profoundly
spiritual, the impact of medical errors on those who are already vulnerable intensifies
concerns of a transcendental and relational nature.
For instance, the question “Will I return to my former self?” is pregnant with
meaning and implies a deep, relational concern about personal value for two reasons.
First, the question extends trust in the physician’s or nurse’s honesty and her expertise to
offer a profoundly important answer. Unfortunately, in cases of medical error this
relationship is frequently broken, thus deep felt spiritual considerations are re-shaped to
fit legal concerns. Second, the changing experience of “self,” the former self transitioning
to an alternative conception, is embedded in a string of relationships. These are personal,
social, and transcendental. The patient’s desire to return to her former condition is an
expression of her multi-dimensional past while at the same time grappling with the
conditions of the present. It suggests that the transition from illness to prolonged or
additional illness due to medical error may not only involve physical concerns but are of
spiritual significance. They occur in the context of a bigger reality, one that secures one’s
place in the universe. A search for meaning and an interpretation of reality is also
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embedded in the patient’s relationship to the person who unintentionally committed the
error. If, let’s say for the sake of argument, it was the physician who failed, and she is
sensitive to the spiritual needs of her patient, she might be able to interpret questions
about ultimate meaning herself The brokenness that so often results from medical
mistakes can be re-shaped if the situation is experienced together and interpreted in light
of a greater reality.

Coping
The literature as well as common (ethical) sense concur that injured patients need
to hear about what went wrong. The immediate provision of an explanation increases
trust and satisfaction in the healthcare system and its staff (e.g., Mazor et ah, 2005;
Mazor et al., 2004; Espin, Levinson, Regehr, Bake, & Lingard, 2006; Hobgood, Peck,
Gilbert, Chappell, & Zou, 2002; Wears & Wu, 2002). Witman, Park, and Hardin (1996)
report that 98% of the 149 internal medicine outpatient patients they surveyed desired the
disclosure of even minor errors. But it is not only truthfulness that is fundamental for any
process that engenders care and compassion. Particularly in the context of socialrelational aspects and spiritual interconnectedness, patients wish to hear that someone is
sorry for what had happened. They like to receive an apology besides being made aware
of the technical facets of their case as explained by their physician or staff (Wears & Wu,
2002; Gallagher et al., 2003). In fact, a heart-felt apology, one in which the healthcare
provider takes responsibility and shows remorse desiring to make amends is necessary for
a patient’s healing and ability to forgive (Leape, 2006).
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In her outstanding book After Harm, Berlinger (2005) emphasizes the importance
of providing an apology; however, she argues that apology should not be separated from
fair compensation. In fact, saying that you are sorry and offering an apology should occur
in the same conversation in which the error is disclosed to the patient. Thus, justice so
conceived is the result of an active engagement. It unfolds when telling the truth and
“saying you are sorry and giving the pen back” (p. 64). For compensation to be fair,
Berlinger notes that consideration should be given to the concrete needs of patients and
their families. Based on the notion of “reparations” rather than legally initiated
restitution, compensation does not only acknowledge and respond to the patients’
physical needs after harm but “symbolizes a willingness to repair the damaged
relationship between injured patients and providers” (p. 67). If I understand the author’s
remarks correctly, fairness is situational and dependent on “need.” It is not rooted in
abstract principles. However, if fair compensation is a “symbol” for the willingness to
repair a broken relationship, I wonder what exactly the symbol stands for?
Compensation is awarded in the form of money to cover the loss of earning
power, loss of work time, and expenses associated with prolonged care. Money is also
symbol for a variety of human attributes: it represents power and status but also
benevolence and gratitude. It is measured by how much we value something. Yet, I
would question whether money should be used as a symbol that represents “repair” in
cases that touch human lives as deeply as medical errors do? The notion of “fair”
compensation is extremely complex. Not surprisingly, when patients are asked about
what they would need if they were harmed, financial resources constitute an important
part of their response. The Mazor et al. (2004) study of health plan members in New
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England indicates that most patients desire the reduction of fees that are consequences of
medical errors and demand financial compensation. Only a few patients favored
compensation in the absence of harm. The authors suggest that financial issues should be
discussed with patients who were injured by medical errors. Yet, financial aspects of a
patient’s well-being are not all that count.
Even after disclosure and apology have been provided patients need continuous
support and dialog to deal with the physical, psychological, social and financial
consequences of a medical error (Manser & Staender, 2005). One theme that frequently
emerges from the literature and that the Sheridan case specifically highlights is that those
who are harmed wish to know what is being done to prevent similar occurrences from
happening to other patients. For instance, Manser and Staender (2005) note that “people
who have lost loved ones in accidents ruminate about its causes and possible prevention”
(p. 720) and need proof of efforts directed towards change. Wears and Wu (2002) suggest
that “for many, knowing that some good may come despite their tragedy helps mitigate
their suffering” (p, 354). Some patients or patients’ family members go even further,
such as the case of Ms. Sheridan described in Chapter One, and become advocates for
patient safety organizations working together with hospitals and policy makers.
The findings reported in the literature lead to important conclusions about what
patients expect from healthcare providers who made mistakes in their care. They need an
explanation of what happened, apology, compensation, and an indication of a hospital’s
intention to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Vincent, Young, and Philips (1994)
study of patients who took legal actions for medical injury confirms these factors, yet the
authors also point towards the importance of accountability; they wish that somebody is
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held accountable and disciplined. The authors discovered that the absence of one or a
combination of factors prompted these patients to pursue litigation. In this same vein, a
risk manager whom I interviewed laments that patients’ decision to sue may be mediated
by a practitioner’s personality and relational skills:
We had somebody testify once in court; and this is probably true. He was talking
about a surgeon and he said he had three appointments with the surgeon and he
said these three follow up appointments, he said not once did the doctor say a
word to him. He walked into the room, examined the patient, poked around and
left. He never introduced himself, never said hello; never said a word! He
examined the patient and left! Now knowing this particular doctor, it probably
happened because this doctor just had horrible communication skills and that
doctor was much more likely to be sued. But that doesn’t mean in terms of his
clinical skills; he had great clinical skills and so he would get sued and very often
we would defend the claim because he didn’t do anything wrong other than being
a poor communicator. He had no relationship with these people and so when
something went wrong, it was easy to sue him because you didn’t care about him;
you had no relationship with him. And he was kind of a jerk anyway. You didn’t
like the guy because he was so arrogant or at least perceived that way. So I do
believe that that sort of behavior makes it more likely that you’re going to be
sued.
Where the lack of communication and personality issues may encourage patients to sue,
the reverse may not always be the case, as the risk manager notes.
When real malpractice occurs and somebody really does something wrong and
you have a patient really injured, in my experience it’s unusual for that patient to
just walk away from the opportunity to be compensated and say “well because I
love this doctor” or “because I have such a great relationship I’m not going to sue
the physician.”
One very important aspect of the risk manager’s last comment is that he immediately
connects injury and litigation. I would argue, as Berlinger (2005) does, that the plan to
disclose error needs to be directly aligned with efforts to restore the patient and her
relationships. Restoration should be a response to the patient’s needs and desire for
wholeness. It can take the form of communication with hospital staff or management,
patient participation in root-cause analysis, monetary compensation, counseling, repeat

76

follow-ups or spiritual care. Open disclosure and the absence of a corresponding plan to
restore what has been damaged or broken will indeed lead to legal action because the
harmed patient is faced with few alternatives.
Both Vincent et al.’s (1994) and Berlinger’s (2005) observations underline the
important point that patients’ experiences of medical error need to be addressed from a
variety of different perspectives. As this present study emphasizes, they substantially bear
on the notion of wholeness. Moreover, those studies that aim to establish a link between
increased openness and decreased litigation, without considering the other factors, miss
the fine nuances that characterize patients’ experiences of medical errors and their
decision to sue. Specifically, they are not considering that any successful approach to
healing patients’ pain from medical error must come with a particular focus on the
situation and an emphasis on the immediate needs of patients who are situated in a
complex web of relationships.
Physicians largely agree with patients in that they would inform patients about
errors that harmed them, although there are certain circumstances in which physicians
would not disclose a mistake they made (Gallagher et al., 2003). Several articles point out
that healthcare providers have an “ethical duty” to be open with patients (Wu, 2000;
Garbutt et al., 2007; Bernstein & Brown, 2004; Goldberg, Kuhn, Andrew, & Thomas,
2002; Stokes, Wu, & Pronovost, 2006; Leape, 2006). However, as I will describe in more
detail later, what patients expect, physicians support and residents find difficult (Garbutt
et al., 2007) is often not what is offered to them due to institutional, professional, and
sometimes personal barriers. Behind these barriers, or “the wall of silence” as many call
it, physicians find themselves struck by emotional trauma. This makes medical failure not
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only a personal matter for the individual patient or physician, but a shared experience that
takes place within the parameters of a socially compromised trust-relationship.

The Physician’s Experience
Virtually every practitioner knows the sickening realization of making a bad
mistake. You feel singled out and exposed—seized by the instinct to see if anyone
has noticed. You agonize about what to do, whether to tell anyone, what to say.
Later, the event replays itself over and over in your mind. You question your
competence but fear being discovered. You know you should confess, but dread
the prospect of potential punishment and of the patient’s anger. You may become
overly attentive to the patient or family, lamenting the failure to do so earlier and,
if you haven’t told them, wondering if they know. (Wu, 2000, p. 812)

Responding to Harm
Wu’s heart-felt confession illustrates how deeply personal, relational and social
the experiences of physicians are who erred and harmed patients. Personal because the
experience is not frequently shared, it is only the physician who can mentally situate
herself in the complexities that shaped her personal and professional life, her thoughts,
emotions and actions before, during and after a dreadful event. It is easy to follow that
physicians despair in self-doubt and fear when imprisoning these experiences in mental
imagery without relating to others. Looking at Wu’s description, it is interesting to note
that negative emotions are shaped primarily by relational concerns: “Has anyone noticed?
Should I tell?”
Fear is the result of creating mental possibilities of how others, such as the patient
and her family, colleagues, and perhaps the organization, will think and react. As a result,
there is uncertainty about how to relate to persons who are involved and how to respond
to those who are in positions to judge. Aside from mentally reconstructing the event and
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from being uncertain about how to relate, physicians who committed errors seem to place
themselves in the role of someone who should expect “punishment” either through the
patient’s anger, or organizational and professional consequences. The possibility of
loosing face and the fear of punishment may be so great that they shadow feelings of
remorse about harming a trusted patient. It is in the context of this heavily-weighted
double-layer of personal and relational struggles that immediate decisions have to be
made about how to act and how to care. As physicians navigate through the pressures
created by public expectations they also have to stay afloat in the struggle against loosing
professional autonomy and control.
Hilfiker’s (1984) classic narrative, which I described in the introduction, was one
of the first more detailed descriptions of physicians’ emotional experiences of having
made an error. Since the publication of his story, several empirical studies have been
launched to answers concerning the impact of errors on physicians (Christensen,
Levinson, & Dunn, 1992; Newman, 1996; Gallagher et ah, 2003) and residents (e.g. Wu,
Folkman, McPhee, & Lo, 1991, 1993; Hobgood, Hevia, Tamayo-Sarver, Weiner, &
Riviello, 2005; Engle, Rosenthal, & Sutcliffe, 2006). For instance, in their qualitative
interviews of 11 internists and medical sub-specialists practicing at a community hospital,
Christensen, Levinson and Dunn (1992) report that all of the participants experienced
“dysphoric feelings” (p. 426) soon after they made a medical error. Emotions such as fear
about the patient’s welfare, guilt, anger at oneself and other physicians, embarrassment
and humiliation were common. For some individuals, these feelings lasted from several
days to several months. In fact, negative emotions may stretch out over years (see also
Wu et al., 1991). Factors that influenced emotional responses and modes of coping were
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related to the physician’s perception of the inevitability of failure, the extent of control
she believes she had over medical processes, and her assessment of peers’ and
supervisors’ responses to the event. Moreover, physicians’ personal reactions to medical
errors were shaped by the degree of confidence these individuals had in their competence
as a physician and person.
From a group of 30 family physicians, Newman (1996) learned that self-doubt
and disappointment about having failed were the primary emotional responses. This was
followed by a tendency of physicians to self-blame. Fewer physicians in Newman’s study
reported of shame and fear. One of the attending physicians in my study expressed
notions of self-blame and regret after a patient suffering from idiopathic
thrombocytopenic purpura (ITP) died following the wrong decision to administer
platelets: “we felt like schmucks for a little while, I would not give platelets again.”
Noting similar feelings, Gallagher et al. (2003) observed that physicians were particularly
disappointed about not living up to their own standards of practice. They also feared
lawsuits and were anxious about their reputation. For some, the emotional impact of their
errors was so significant that they lost sleep, had difficulties concentrating and
experienced anxiety. As we already learned from Hilfiker (1984) emotional trauma can
be so severe that physicians feel “deeply wounded, lose their nerve, bum out, or seek
solace in alcohol or drugs” (Wu, 2000).
Although residents are physicians, their role in the hierarchical structure of a
teaching hospital differs. According to how many years they are into their specialty
training, residents are entrusted with tremendous responsibilities as they make
independent decisions about patient care. Yet, they work under the watchful eyes of their
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attending physicians. Several studies investigated the perceptions of these doctors in
training. Engel, Rosenthal and Sutcliffe (2006) recorded the experiences of 26 surgery,
medical and OB/GYN residents and report that more than half of their participants were
severely distressed about the errors they committed, a finding that corroborates the
observations of Wu et al. (2003). Engle et al. (2006) noted that one-third of the
participants in their study emphasized the presence of guilt, self-doubt and
disappointment. Moreover, residents reported “feelings of intense responsibility” (p. 88).
An interesting finding is that nine residents experienced a great deal of frustration and
were angry at other healthcare providers who they felt were “disloyal” and made
“inappropriate accusations” (p. 88). A few residents were confused and fearful or felt
isolated.

Coping
Given the deep emotional impact that medical errors leave behind, the question
becomes the following: in a profession in which perfection is expected and open
discussions are limited, how do physicians cope with failure? Wu (2000) highlights
physicians' need to talk with colleagues about their errors, their emotions and the steps
they make take to cope. An attending physician in this present study describes that “most
people have one or two colleagues to talk about it [an error or mistake they made]. My
best friend is an ENT doctor and we drive to the beach talking about cases, what would
you have done. We are not particularly hard on each other.” He further comments that
“everybody has made a mistake. It is okay as long as it is not repeating.” Reflecting on
the need for communication he notes that physicians like to talk about their stories, “you
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don’t feel quite as bad when somebody did this before.” Yet, openness about cases is
limited. This participant mentions that he would not take work home and to his wife. He
nevertheless used to talk to his dog while biking in the mornings! Another attending
physician from the same department also focuses on the need to talk with close
colleagues who are also friends rather than individuals from different services or
occupations:
I think we all have some friends who are in the profession that we could talk to
about. I would guess it would be our own peers your own professional tower. I
don’t know if you’d talk to a nurse, but if you were close friends you might and if
the dialogue was going both directions.
Neither of these physicians felt the need for additional assistance and communication as
they were content to discuss their mistakes in their close group of peers.
Newman’s (1996) study of family physicians also found that the kind of support
physicians valued most was having somebody to talk to; somebody who listens without
being judgmental. Yet, most of them did not receive this support from their peers but
from other sources including their spouses. Interestingly, physicians in this sample were
reluctant to help unconditionally a colleague with similar needs. Even more troubling
were the responses of the physicians in Christiansen et al. (1992) interviews who felt that
talking with colleagues about their emotions and feelings is threatening or unhelpful.
Rather, “emotion-focused coping” took place in the context of spouses or close friends.
On the other hand, talking with colleagues about the facts of their case, about how to
prevent harm or how to improve future practice contributed to “problem-focused coping,”
an approach similar to Hilfiker’s (1984) description of his own handling of error. He
consulted with colleagues and experts and meticulously studied his patient’s records;
however, on the emotional level he dealt his failure entirely on his own. Indeed, rooted in
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a culture of perfectionism, there is a “tendency for physicians to bear the burden of their
mistakes in isolation” (Goldberg et ah, 2002). Whether these experienced physicians
speak about their emotions in close group of colleagues, seek comfort at home, or result
to isolation; dealing with failure is certainly difficult.
Interestingly, some of the studies of residents’ coping with medical errors seemed
to suggest that they have slightly different perspectives. Where Engel et al. (2006) found
that talking with others was perceived as the primary mode of coping, in contrast to the
attending physicians in the previous studies, residents preferred to discuss technical and
emotional aspects with their peers or superiors. Although they appreciated non-medical
opinions and perspectives, residents preferred to get reassurance and learn from their
mistakes from peers and attending physicians.
Patients are eager to obtain immediate detailed and continuous information after a
medical error occurred. They also seek comfort and care. But do physicians reciprocate
the desire to speak with patients for their own emotional healing? Talking about one’s
failure requires the willingness to let down the guards, to open up, and in a sense to
permit vulnerability. It requires “moral courage” (Banja, 2001, p. 10) in an environment
that may not support it. Admitting failure transforms the doctor patient relationship. It
narrows the carefully defined social and professional space in which doctors and patients
interact. Honesty after failure is shattering at first; however, continuous and
compassionate dialog also offers a new beginning. Physicians in Gallagher et al. (2003)
study said that they would feel better about disclosing the error yet they were concerned
that their own relief came at the expense of the patient. Were Christensen et al. (1992)
report that talking with patients and their families raised anxiety levels, most physicians
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found such conversations to be positive experiences. In one case, a physician explained
that getting together with the family was critical, it led to mutual reduction of stress, and
offered “forgiveness and absolution” (p. 428). An attending physician from the
Emergency Department in which I conducted field research explicitly referred to the
importance of maintaining her personal wholeness by speaking honestly and openly with
her patients:
You know, this is where I think disclosure and being honest with the patient
comes into play. I have to maintain my wholeness too; it is not just the patient’s
wholeness. To maintain my wholeness personally, I have to be honest; I have to
be honest to myself, and know that I have to be honest with what my construct of
my world view is, and to make sure that the patient is also whole. So the way I
take care of my wholeness is to disclose and to make sure the patient knows what
is happening.
Specifically, she emphasize in the importance of the spiritual aspects of disclosure. For
her, patient care and especially those aspects that bear on honesty reflect values that are
deeply rooted in her worldview as a Seventh-day Adventist.
From the studies of patients’ perceptions of medical errors and physicians’
practices and feelings about them we learn that failure is traumatic for both, yet in
slightly different ways. The manner in which medical errors are treated is a function of
organizational contingencies and the physician’s ability to stay on her own moral course.
Resolving failure requires high ethical standards and presupposes the willingness of
healthcare providers to participate in an organizational structure that supports
transparency. It is important to note, however, that physicians’ reluctance to openly speak
about their mistakes is also intertwined with values and practices cultured in their
profession. Traditionally, medicine regulated itself embracing the high level of autonomy
that society was willing to allow. Today, the kind of professional individualism that was
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celebrated for centuries is at odds with the call for transparency and a healthcare system
that operates in the form of a highly interconnected network. And it is within the highly
specialized division of labor in the hospital that medical errors unfold and in which they
need to be addressed collaboratively. These new realities present challenges for the
profession. First, because there are few organizational structures that facilitate transition
and second, there is no alternative philosophical base to draw on.

The Medical Profession’s Response
The term “profession” is fundamentally a social concept. Sullivan (2005)
describes three main characteristics of professions: First, professions maintain high levels
of specialized knowledge through formal training and apprenticeship. Second,
professions are autonomous to varying degrees, carrying public trust to self-regulate their
practice. Third, they commit to serious civic responsibilities and to serve the public good.
The author notes that professional membership differs substantially from employment or
holding a job. The commitment to a profession and thus the engagement in professional
work is a response to a “calling” or a “Beruf ’ in the German language. Sullivan suggests
that a profession is deeply rooted in the notion of “freedom in vocation” (p. 21), a
concept that I will argue to be problematic when applied to the medical profession.
Assuming a “civic identity” (p. 21) and serving as partners to the public, professionals
participate in society by carrying out obligations that honor the social contract. Sullivan
notes that “the professional depends on kind of a social compact of reciprocal trust and
good faith between practice and the public they serve” (p. 37). For instance, in medicine,
the notion of reciprocity is of particular importance and as such was central to the AMA’s
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(American Medical Association) 1847 Code ofEthics, the first set of ethical principles
that guided the practice of every physician (Wynia, 2006).
The relationships between members of a profession and their relationship to
society are of fundamental importance. To seal the covenant, qualified individuals enter a
profession, such as medicine, by swearing an oath that signals their transition into the life
of a professional. Describing the meaning of the Hippocratic Oath in medicine, Sulmasy
(2006) notes that “one then becomes privileged to be part of a moral community
committed to the care of patients” (p. 95). Despite the tendency of professionals to draw
boundaries between themselves and the public whom they serve, professionals and the
associations they create and their membership are strongly intertwined with society. In
fact, they stand in a mutually constitutive relationship. Professionals’ specific social and
political location, their autonomous status, combined with exceptional knowledge of their
specialties allows them to “re-create the layman’s World” (p. xvii), as Freidson (1973) so
eloquently points out in his study of the medical profession. Political expression takes
place by defining and interpreting important public issues, such as healthcare.
It follows that professions play a strong role in shaping the social fabric. For a
long time, they have been trusted by society to do so collaboratively and on their own
terms. However, to sustain the covenant, Sullivan (2005) argues that the professional
moral community is dependent on a common understanding of professionalism as a
“public good” having “social value” rather than existing as a “special interest” (p. 160).
In his book In the Age of Experts (1996), Brint argues that in modem society
professionalism has undergone a significant shift from the old conception of “social
trustee professionalism” to a new “expert professionalism” (p. 7). In the social trustee
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conception, there used to be a strong focus on community and cultural authority.
Professions in the old paradigm were conceived as having balanced technical and moral
aspects. Technical responsibilities include the acquisition and application of highly
specialized knowledge whereas moral responsibilities entail that expertise is exercised in
the interest of pubic service. In a similar vein, Freidson (1973), who specifically looks at
autonomy and structure of the medical profession, describes the two aspects of
professionalism as “expertise” and “ethicality.” He notes that “what professionals do
represents their effective knowledge and expertise', how they regulate what they do in the
public interest represents their effective service orientation; or ethicality" (p. 361,
emphasis added). In other words, there is a delicate balance between the control over the
content of work, which certainly may include stringent internal reviews of professional
excellence, and public service orientation and how professionals are trusted to organize
the terms of their work. This relationship bears the full meaning of all medical encounters
and is dependent on the degree and quality of professional autonomy.
Brint (1996) argues that in response to the demand for specialized knowledge, the
old spirit of a collective public service orientation has been challenged by a “new
expertism” (p. 15). Expert professionalism is organizing itself according to the demands
of the market’ which Brint calls the “splintering of the professional stratum” (p. 5). With
this he means that professions have re-organized themselves around other criteria than
civic service, such as functional aspects, organization goals or market strategies, thus
producing a marketable hierarchy of professional knowledge. Where Brint contends that
some professions may lend themselves more towards a social service orientation, thus
remaining true to the social trustee professionalism, others adopt these expert
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characteristics. Overall, he notes that even professionals who still work in a fee-forservice setting articulate their work in the context of the breadth and complexity of
knowledge that they possess and the sensitivity and judgment that is required to apply
that kind of knowledge. In a study that Brint and his colleagues conducted of doctors,
lawyers, engineers and scientists in Boston, asking them about the meaning of their work,
they learned that only a few participants thought about their professional life in the
context of a social good. This study implies a loss of the social meaning of work that is
rooted in the emphasis on the market value of knowledge.
Certainly, contemporary society can not exist without experts. Modem medicine
is built on highly specialized knowledge situated in complex technical and social settings.
It is important to understand that the difficulty does not lie in how “technical” knowledge
is getting; it is about how we, as a society, deal with a changing World. As Bellah,
Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1992) and Sullivan (2005) emphasize and as I
will describe in more detail later, the significance of common, interrelated life unfolds in
its institutional arrangement. In contrast to the professionals who Brint (1996)
interviewed, I like to point out that expert knowledge is always deeply intertwined with
society and thus never escapes social and moral interpretation. Echoing Sullivan (2005)
emphasis on “civic professionalism” in an interconnected society, experts need to be free
to think collectively about the physical, social mental and spiritual effects of their work
products. Where professional autonomy might be tied to a market ethic, the quality and
degree of professional autonomy is also a function that is dependent on professionals’
relationships to the rest of us. It is up to us to replace the hierarchical structures of expert
professionalism and its market goal, as Brint (1996) describes, with a professionalism
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that is in tune with institutions that are built on the idea that humans, experts and non
experts alike, never cease to strive for wholeness.
The following sections will briefly highlight how professional autonomy and
public trust in the medical profession changed over time. Subsequently, professionals’
ability to regulate their practice has also changed. The main point is that only a strong
profession that is critical of its work and that accepts full responsibility for its mistakes
while serving the public with transparency, truthfulness, and respect will earn public
trust.

A Profession in Transition
The practice of medicine, as with the practice of law, is among several
occupations in which Western society has placed trust to regulate itself as an autonomous
profession. However, medicine has not always enjoyed this special status. Only since the
past 100 years society has granted the profession sovereign status. In The Social
Transformation of American Medicine (1982) Starr provides a detailed account of the
development of the medical profession. In this substantial work he highlights the
pendulum swings that characterized the professions’ struggle for autonomy and self
regulation beginning in 18th century Colonial American and ending with a fairly accurate
prediction of modern day corporate practice. Starr’s work is remarkable in that it draws
together several intersecting factors that were responsible for the transformation of
medicine. In order to understand why the medical community is reluctant to speak more
openly about their failures, it is important to consider key historical moments that
transformed the profession.
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Starr (1982) describes how during the 1760’s some educated physicians attempted
to establish medical schools modeled after institutions in England. While they succeeded
in establishing medical schools and installing a system of licensing, they were
unsuccessful in securing public approval of an autonomous profession. Worse yet to
come, during the Jacksonian era, ground gained in earlier years was lost in a social
climate that bent under the conflicting forces of a young democracy. Also responsible for
the failure to establish a profession was the emerging capitalist ideology and growing
class inequality. Some steadfast physicians aspired to an “elite profession with a
monopoly practice” (p. 31), however, the public refused to support their desires.
Combined with many physicians’ own doubts about the effectiveness of their therapies,
the “medicine of the physicians” was of equal value as “the medicine of the household”
and that practiced by “lay healers” (p. 32). The popularity of Samuel Thomson’s “botanic
medicine” (p. 51) is an example of the latter. Within each of these democratically
sanctioned spheres of expertise there was a continuing struggle between public common
sense and professional expertise, negating the importance of professionalism. Up until the
mid 19th century states discontinued licensure and withdrew their involvement with
medical practice. Interestingly, this occurred with the exception of dealing with medical
malpractice cases.
The dramatic shift to public acceptance of medicine as a sovereign profession
occurred during the progressive era. As scientific advancements came to the American
shore from Europe, Americans started to loose confidence in home medicine guided by
common sense. The complexity of medicine began to be understood and appreciated. As
a result, public support of professional control over medical knowledge increased.
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Moreover, physicians experienced a shift in their ways of practicing from treating illness
to providing preventive medicine. The changing political climate, the growth of the
market, the developing transportation system and the rise of hospitals along with the
popularity of medical schools supported a sovereign profession. Sullivan (2005) notes
that by the beginning of the 20th century, medicine claimed its status as a “guild-like
monopoly” (p. 56) that had full control over its expertise and institutional structure.
Among other efforts aimed at improving the quality of medical care, the
publication of the Flexner Report in 1908 supported the efforts of the American Medical
Association to raise the standards of medical care by taking control over university-based
medical education and licensing (Sharp, 1992; Sullivan, 2005). Until the appearance of
third-party payers and increased involvement of Federal Government in healthcare in the
1960’s, the professional network developed autonomously without significant outside
regulatory interference. Autonomous control was justified primarily in reference to
professional altruism along with the need to protect the doctor-patient relationship from
any external control (Kitchener, Caronna, & Shortell, 2005).
Although the AMA traditionally resisted programs that hint at the idea of
socialized medicine, the installation of Medicare and Medicaid signaled the
transformation of medicine from a fee-for-service philosophy to a system that is
dependent on external cost centers. Starr (1982) explains that this shift called for the need
to redraw the “contract” between the medical profession and society, which also meant
that its basic institutional structure be reorganized to fit modem economic and political
realities. This trend began in the 1970’s. Whether or not a redrawing of the social
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contract has taken place, Starr’s prediction of the coming of corporate medicine and
managed care at the close of the 20th century was to the point.
Inadvertently, bureaucratization decreases professional freedom. Holsinger and
Beaton (2006) claim that as the 20th Century drew to a close, “medicine had become a
profession plagued by bureaucracy, decreased autonomy, diminished prestige and deep
personal dissatisfaction” (p. 473). Both, professional values and professional practice
were raised into question. Where the old system heralded autonomy, the new healthcare
industry is characterized by interdependence requiring collaboration and teamwork with
individuals and services who operate outside professional circles. Unfortunately,
physicians have difficulties adjusting to this new reality. Thus the authors suggest that
they fill new roles in this interconnected system and adopt a new values framework that
does not center on autonomy. Instead, it focuses on essential values such as fair access to
healthcare, quality, efficiency, patient respect and advocacy, all of which are supported
by six instrumental values of which provider autonomy is only one. It is the authors’
hypothesis that the transition in physicians’ values will produce a “convergence” (p. 477)
of professionalism and physicians’ satisfaction and the expectations of the public.
Moreover, the focus on team work would address the long-standing inefficiency of
physicians’ “fiefdoms” (p. 478) or “silos” as several participants in this present study
describe. A team approach might be part of the solution; however, the question whether
autonomy has completely given way to interdependence or is simply transforming into a
different kind of independence warrants further consideration.
It appears that even with increased government control and corporate policies that
regulate important sectors of healthcare, professional autonomy remains strong in some
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aspects of medical care. As administrators began to exert control over organizational
issues and employee matters, physicians, by way of their medical staff organizations,
maintained oversight over patient safety, clinical performance and admitting privileges
(Smithon & Baker, 2006). As a result, there is a division of labor, or one may better say,
a division of autonomy in the modem hospital with physicians maintaining a high level of
autonomy over the content, or the technical aspects of their work. Kitchener, Caronna,
and Shortell’s (2005) examination of eight US hospital systems revealed that physician
control is not lost but spread across different bureaucratic settings. Within each setting.
some control has been transferred to an emerging “administrative elite of physicians”
who work in senior managerial positions, such as the supervision of quality assurance
programs. But whatever the management model a hospital system adheres to, the authors
suggest that “in US healthcare, as new bureaucratic modes have evolved, there is little
indication of a monolithic iron cage of physician subjugation” (p. 1320).

“Talking To”
One reason physicians have always felt so strongly about their autonomy is that
they regard the doctor-patient relationship as unique. Being held accountable to anyone
outside this relationship presents an unwarranted interference. Another reason is that
physicians make consequential decisions based on the application of highly specialized
knowledge to concrete circumstances, practical knowledge that only they possess.
Rightly so, physicians take pride in their work (Smithon & Baker, 2006).
Thus, for a long time, and perhaps to some extent still today, outside critique was
regarded as intmsive and unacceptable. Even within the ranks, critiquing a colleague or
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pointing out somebody else’s mistake is not something that has traditionally been done, at
least not openly. Freidson (1973) learned from physicians that there was the informal
practice of “talking to” (p. 149). Critique took place “in private, to the man’s face, or at
worst within a closed professional circle” (p. 179). Not only did physicians feel
uncomfortable being questioned or even reprimanded by their patients. Discussions about
medical errors were not held openly because medical staff perceived the public to be
unable to follow the content of professional discourses, not would they accept their
outcomes. Freidson notes that
all practitioners are vulnerable to the reproaches of their clients, who, quite
understandably, cannot philosophically accept the contingencies of medical action
when they are the ones who suffer the contingencies. Thus all practitioners should
stick together, preserving a united front against criticism by outsides. Laymen
cannot understand the character of clinical work well enough either to be allowed
to hear professionals citizen others or to permit much credence to be given their
own criticism of a colleague, (p. 179)
Physicians acknowledged the inevitability of medical mistakes and accepted personal
responsibility, yet expected their colleagues to “cultivate a sense of charity.” When a
colleague observed that one of theirs is very likely to harm patients she needed to be
stopped. In this case, the worst that could happen was for the colleague to seek new
employment. Revoking someone’s license was not something that was done often.
Moreover, there was the tendency of avoiding collective responsibility by participating in
a personal boycott against the colleague whose practice was regarded problematic. The
focus on personal responsibility represented a culture of professional individualism
(Freidson, 1973).
Driven by the fear of litigation, we occasionally witness the remnants of this
shared sense of individualism even today. However, since To Err is Human (Kohn,
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Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999), the public’s expectation of safe health care and
transparency is driving the medical institution to re-evaluate how medicine is practiced
and controlled. Overall, there is a strong push toward systems overhaul along with the
realization that hospitals, not just individual healthcare providers, need to accept full
responsibility for the safety of their patients. Where individual responsibility is important,
collective responsibility is imperative for an interconnected healthcare system of highly
specialized medical services taking care of a single patient. It is because of loosely
networked settings that it is essential to not only strengthen medical peer review to
assume individual and collective responsibility, but to do this with a focus on a kind of
autonomy that is transparent.
Perhaps this is what Sullivan (2005) had in mind when he referred to “freedom in
vocation.” However, my notion of transparent autonomy supports the idea of strong
multidisciplinary peer review of medical errors that is visible, yet protected. It also
captures a strong link of peer review to patients and the public interest. Thus, “expertise,”
the review of the technical facts of medical error events, quality control and patient
safety, and “ethicality,” the moral decision to talk openly with patients and to adequately
respond to their multidimensional needs, are strongly tied together by the kind of
professionalism that gains its strength in the context of transparency. With its principles
of civic freedom and equality as equal consideration, a vision of justice as wholeness is
supportive of the notion of transparent autonomy (see Fig. 2, p. 96).
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Figure 2. Reconnecting expertise and ethicality.

Peer Review
Healthcare organizations and government recognized that medical peer review,
which is a formal process that goes beyond the old practice of “talking to,” is essential to
patient safety efforts and quality control. In fact, the College of Surgeons established peer
review in the early 20th century. Next to state licensing board disciplinary procedures and
the medical malpractice system, peer review is one of three mechanisms that are charged
with reviewing physician’s performance (Newton, 2001). It is an efficient process in
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which physicians evaluate objectively the work of their colleagues. Peer review is an
expression of effective professional self-regulation, legitimizing the exclusivity of
medical knowledge with which the profession performs its work. It is where expertise
regulates the content of work. As such, peer review became a requirement for hospitals
that seek accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations (JCAHO) and for those healthcare facilities that receive Medicare funds. In
1972, Congress gave the green light for Peer Review Organizations to work with hospital
peer review committees to asses the quality of care for patients covered by the Medicare
program (Newton, 2001).
Until the passing of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, peer
review processes were regulated by the America Medical Association and protected by
state statutes. Statutory provisions vary from state to state. Generally, they include the
granting of immunity for institutions and peer review participants from civil liability. For
instance, in California the California Civil Code protects members of a committee or
professional staff of a licensed hospital who review professional standards, any member
of a peer review committee that was established to review the quality of medical care, as
well as individuals who testify to peer review proceedings14 from monetary damages.
Immunity statutes function to encourage peer review by removing threats of being sued
for defamation, antitrust, or negligent credentialing. Some statutes outline privilege,
which is the protection of information produced in peer review processes from legal
discovery. For instance, the California Rules of Evidence extend privilege to materials
that are the results of research activities conducted by in-hospital medical or medical

14 California Civil Code §43.7(a)-(b) (Downloaded 5/30/07).
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dental staff committees for the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality.15 More
importantly in regards to the review of medical errors, privilege is also extended to
proceedings and records produced by in-hospital medical and other peer-review
committees16 who review and discuss adverse events rather than engaging in specific
research. The Rules also state that no person who participated in any of the included
kinds of peer-review committees is required to testify to the content discussed in those
meetings17. A fewer number of states, not including California, recognize confidentiality
of peer review information even outside legal proceedings. For instance, confidentiality
laws hold healthcare providers accountable not to discuss the content of peer review
meetings in elevators or reveal information to the media (see Cate, 1999; Newton, 2001;
Nijm, 2003).
However, physicians remain reluctant to participate in peer review processes
primarily because of the inconsistency of statutory protection. Additionally, the old
tradition of not interfering with the performance of a colleague, lost time, worries about
the loss of patient referrals and fear of anti-trust litigation warrant physicians’ caution. By
enacting the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), Congress reacted
to the professional hesitancy by extending the protection of peer review processes beyond
the patchwork of state regulations, thus recognizing the need to improve participation and
the quality of medical care on a national level. Where the Act does not address the
privileged nature of certain types of information or issues of confidentiality, it protects
peer review participants and specified others from damage liability18. Limits on damages

15 California Evidence Code §1156(a) (Downloaded 5/30/07).
16 California Evidence Code § 1157(a) (Downloaded 5/30/07).
17 California Evidence Code § 1157(b).
18 42 USC § 1111 et seq. (1998).
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do not include the treatment of patients’ medical malpractice claims.19 However, the Act
does require reports on medical malpractice payments including both jury verdicts and
settlements. Moreover, it governs the reporting of sanctions taken against physicians by
the Boards of Medical Examiners21 as well as professional review actions by healthcare
entities.

Situating HCQIA into the modem healthcare context as described earlier, and

a more critical note, it protects experts from the consequences of testifying to the actions
of other experts. The problem being: the public does not always trust experts, particularly
if their work lacks transparency and has a negative effect on their well-being.
What the Act does well, however, is strengthen professional self-regulation and
its internal power to “weed out bad doctors” rather than allowing them to transfer to the
next hospital to carry on their practice without improvement. Yet, this only works when
errors are disclosed. The Act does not make medical care more transparent. In fact, it
maintains the disconnect between expertise and ethicality. Physicians’ fear of losing
professional status, concerns about economic consequences, professional liability, the
potential loss of licensure as well as the possibility of facing criminal sanctions clearly
cause those who fail to either be cautious with words or to blame others for the mistakes
they themselves made. This increases the blame and shame culture described in the
previous chapter and evokes fear in those who make mistakes.
Similar to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, the more recent
enactment of the Patient Safety Quality Improvement Act of 200523 (PSQIA) tackles the
professional wall of silence by giving more uniformity to the creation of safe and
19 42 USC § 1115(d) (1998).
20 42 USC § 11131 et seq. (1998), leading to the establishment of the National Practitioner Database.
21 42 USC § 11132 etseq. (1998).
22 42 USC § 11133 etseq. (1998).
2j Public Law 109-41.
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transparent healthcare environments (see Liang, Riley, Rutherford, & Hamman, 2007 and
McBride, Greening, & Redmond, 2006 for a review of the act; Kinnaman, 2007 for
review of its legislative history). Specifically, it provides privilege and confidentiality
protection of a “patient safety work product.” The work product may consist of data,
reports, records, memoranda, error analysis, or written and oral statements24 that are
collected by a healthcare provider2^ as the basis for a report to a certified patient safety
organization.26 Reporting is voluntary and redacted materials will be part of a national
“network of patient safety databases” that provide resources to for healthcare facilities,
patient safety organizations, and other entities. 27
The PSQIA is another layer added to legislatively strengthen peer review
processes. According to Liang, Riley, Rutherford and Hamman (2007) it has the potential
to increase system transparency because it protects information from being used in civil
litigation thus permitting a “culture that supports intellectual honesty” (p. 10). One has to
point out, however, that the new policy protects only those pieces of information that are
part of the patient safety work product. Where a more open discussion may be conducted
in the peer review process, its relationship to medical malpractice litigation and
particularly the connection between physicians, patients and hospital administration is by
no means clear. Indeed, state and federal legislation has the potential to strengthen peer
review, which leads to improvements in patient safety. As seen from a systems
perspective, the act responds to modern interconnectedness. However, whether the
legislation will also strengthen professional culture and provide the foundation for an
24 42 USC § 921 (7)(B)(2005).
25 42 USC § 921 (8)(A)-(B). The term healthcare provider is broadly defined and not limited to hospitals.
26 42 USC § 923-924. The organization must be registered with the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services.
27 42 USC § 923(a), (b). (c)
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environment that allows physicians’ personal moral convictions to find application needs
to be seen.
The current trend to manage expertise in light of systems transparency may not
necessarily achieve the desired results if the focus completely shifts in the opposite
direction of the old value of physician autonomy. Smithson and Baker (2006) share
similar reservations and question the effectiveness of medical staff organization to
address issues of quality and point out that “most physicians no longer understand that
they are collectively responsible for patient safety and clinical performance” (p. 78).
Traditionally, physicians are willing to accept personal responsibility in the context of a
doctor-patient relationship. However, the idea of managed collective responsibility as
evaluated by experts in the context of system improvement is asking them to accept a
new kind of professionalism, perhaps one that is even less willing to reconnect technical
expertise with civic interests and virtues.
I am ending this section with an example in which a surgeon acknowledges the
importance of autonomy and accepting responsibility. Gawande (2002), a surgery
resident, emphasizes the ownership of decisions in his specialty, which are risky and
include a high potential for failure. By describing the events of a gallbladder operation
that he and his attending physician performed when he was a resident, he illustrates the
criticality of split second decisions that surgeons, not systems, make. He explains that
“removing the gall bladder is fairly straight forward” yet there is one “looming danger”:
to mistakenly cut or even injure the main bile duct instead of the gall bladder stalk. There
is a ten to twenty percent chance the patient will die from damage to the liver. At that
point in the surgery where they looked at the gall bladder and what they thought would be
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the correct duct, Gawande says they stopped, as was their usual practice, and discussed
the anatomy. The physicians agreed that everything looked fine and the attending
signaled “go for it.”
I slipped in the clip applier, an instruments that squeezes V-shaped metal clips
onto whatever you put in its jaws. I got the jaws around the duct and was about to
fire when my eye caught, on the screen, a little globule of fat lying on top of the
duct. That wasn’t necessarily anything unusual; but somehow it didn’t look right.
With the tip of the clip applier, I tried to flick it aside, but instead of a little
globule, a whole layer of thin unseen tissue came up, and, underneath, we saw
that the duct had a fork in it. My heart dropped. If not for that little extra
fastidiousness, I would have clipped off the main bile duct. (p. 72)
That split second, a moment of hesitancy, often determines whether a patient will live or
die. The crucial point that Gawande makes is that even the most meticulously planned
procedures and the most fine-tuned systems are, in the end, subject to human
performance. Operations such as this laparoscopic cholesystectomy showed him not only
how easy it is to make a mistake, but that effort, diligence and attention to detail are the
foundations of his work as a surgeon. In this light, he critiques the current direction that
healthcare quality improvement takes. It also supports my argument that the professional
shift to “expertism” (Brint, 1996) does not by itself reinvigorate a “civic professionalism”
as Sullivan (2005) imagines so optimistically. In the old profession, personal
responsibility stood strong in the context of the doctor patient relationship, leaving the
discussion of medical errors a matter of discretion. The extreme side of modern
professionalism, which is expertism, has made medical errors to a system evaluation
matter, not a topic that involves people and their relationships.
This may explain why many doctors take exception to talk of “system problems,”
“continuous quality improvement”, and “process re-engineering.” It is the dry
language of structures, not people. I’m no exception: something in me, too,
demands an acknowledgement of my autonomy, which is also to say my ultimate
culpability. (Gawande, 2002, p. 73)
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A good solution is one that would be able to connect systems and people to let unfold the
human side while striving towards excellence in health care.

Relating to Patients
Medical errors are situated in technologically complex and interconnected
environment. As illustrated earlier in this chapter, their human side is not less interwoven.
A very curious dynamic exists between a physician’s moral beliefs, her feeling of
responsibility for a patient, organizational culture, and institutional structure. Mixed in
this hodgepodge of feelings and regulations is fear; fear of being blamed by peers or
being punished by hospital administration. Additionally, physicians worry about the
reaction of the harmed patient or family. Will they show anger during the conversation,
or most importantly, will an apology be perceived as admission of guilt and will they
sue? Among other psychological and legal barriers to disclose are inconsistencies in
regards to physicians’ beliefs when disclosure is necessary and what kind of information
should be included. A risk manger in this study points out that physicians or other
healthcare staff are afraid to speak with patients openly. However, keeping failure secret
makes the situation worse:
What happens, unfortunately, is a lot of times people are afraid. They are afraid of
being sued, they are afraid of being blamed, and so because of that fear, they
move away from the patient. And that makes it worse because then the patient
feels isolated and says not only did they make a mistake, but they won’t admit it,
they won’t talk to me, now they’re completely neglecting me and so it just adds
fuel to the fire and that makes the patient really angry. But that is kind of natural
for humans. It is very difficult. I can only imagine what it must be like for a
physician when something goes wrong and you have to go in and talk to the
patient and say ‘you know I’m really sorry, this didn’t go well.’ That’s very
difficult. Much better to be able to come in and tell them, good news,
everything’s wonderful.
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The literature is clear that physicians prefer to be open with patients.
Nevertheless, where they began to find mechanisms to overcome professional silence,
they “choose their words carefully” (Gallagher et ah, 2006, p. 1585). For instance,
Garbutt et al. (2007) found that 99% of the pediatricians they surveyed endorsed
disclosing serious errors, 90% would talk with the patients about minor errors and 39%
would discuss near-misses. Yet, their study also indicates that not all physicians who
promote openness and transparency follow their endorsement. There are several reasons
for the uneasiness that involves the reporting of error and their disclosure to patients. The
pediatricians who comprised their sample identified barriers such as the inadequacy of
current reporting systems and the lack of training in how to go about disclosing errors to
patients. Echoing the comments of the risk manager in my study, physicians in Gallagher
et al.’s (2003) research were particularly concerned about legal implications. In this same
vein, Gallagher et al.’s (2006) recent study of practicing physicians in the United States
and Canada revealed wide variations in what kinds of information physicians would
disclose and how they articulated the mistakes they made. Forty-two percent of their
respondents would tell patients if the adverse event was due to error. Yet more than half
of the physicians would mention the adverse event but not that it was the result of a
mistake that was made. Physicians were also less likely to disclose errors if patients were
unaware of them. The authors note that on one side, ethicists and patient advocates
demand “full disclosure;” on the other hand, some risk managers and malpractice insurers
advise against such openness. Similar issues surround the provision of apologies. While
33% of the physicians in Gallagher et al.’s (2006) study said that they would offer an
apology, 61% would only make statements of regret. It follows that physicians are caught
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between competing interests and are often left with little guidance about what
information to provide for patients.
Indeed, personal ethics and institutional morality may not always match; an
observation that Niebuhr (2001) explores in more detail in his book Moral Man and
Immoral Society. There he argues that often the morality of individuals does not express
itself in the morality of groups. Similarly, an individual physician may find it morally
unacceptable not to disclose a mistake to a patient that has not harmed her, yet influenced
by the legal department, hospital moral culture may find non-closure acceptable based on
a set of different criteria. This distinction between moral convictions is one of the
challenges of common life, one that easily leads to social injustice and the injustice of
some collective arrangements:
[It] symbolizes one of the tragedies of the human spirit: its inability to conform its
collective life to its individual ideals. As individuals, men believe that they ought
to love and serve each other and establish justice between each other. As racial,
economic and national groups they take for themselves, whatever their power can
command, (p. 9)
Niebuhr argues that we must draw on our deepest moral convictions when we interact
with others and make decisions that bear on our common social lives. Yet “society
remains man’s great fulfillment and his great frustration” (p. 82). How society has
handled its failures has largely reflected “man’s frustration.” Many times, there is a
difference between how an individual thinks mistakes should be handled and how
hospitals and the medical profession have traditionally responded. The result is that,
practically and metaphorically, those affected by medical error transition from a moral
sphere of closeness, compassion and care to one of distance and distrust.

105

Berlinger’s (2005) work reflects some of these observations. She argues that,
when mistakes occur, in many hospitals the treatment of patients suffering from a
medical condition deserving compassion and care shifts to their consideration as “legal
problems for the institution” (p. 25). Professional hospital staff involved in the injured
patient’s care may formally or informally be instructed not to talk with patients and their
families once error has been uncovered. Goldberg, Kuhn, Andrew, and Thomas (2002)
note that hospital attorneys often ask residents not to admit their mistakes to patients or
colleagues until they speak with their attending physician and the legal department. It
appears that forthrightness about harms caused by medical error is “at odds with the
traditional approach to risk management in healthcare” (Studdert, Mello, Gawande,
Brennan, & Wang, 2007, p. 215).
Since July 2001, JCAHO requires hospitals to put in place procedures for the
disclosure of unanticipated outcomes to patients.28 In standard RI. 1.2.2, the accrediting
agency demands that healthcare practitioners “clearly explain” such instances to the
harmed patient or her family (JCAHO, 2003). Moreover, in Nevada, Florida, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Vermont and recently California the disclosure of serious
unanticipated outcomes to patients is now mandated (see Gallagher, Studdert, &
Levinson, 2007). The general trend for taking responsibility and offering apology is also
reflected in the recent publications of professional organizations such as the American
Society for Healthcare Risk Management (2006) and the National Quality Forum (NQF)
who in Safe Practice #4 promotes a nine-point outline of very specific disclosure
processes that hospitals ought to follow (National Quality Forum, 2007, pp. 77-80). Some
28 Lamb, Studdert, Bohmer, Berwisk and Brennan (2003) conducted a national survey in 2002 which
revealed that about 1/3 of the 245 hospital risk managers they surveyed said that they had board-approved
disclosure policies in place.
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organizations are slow to catch up with the changing climate and continue to encourage
or even require caution and parsimony in regards to post-medical error dialog. Others,
spear-headed by the Veterans Hospital in Lexington, which was the first to install a
disclosure policy in 1986, have been more forward-looking and established medical error
policies and programs. Among other hospitals these include The University of Michigan
Health System (see Boothman, 2006), Catholic Healthcare West (2003), Advocate
Lutheran General Hospital (2005), Johns Hopkins University Medical Center (2001), the
Harvard Hospitals (see Harvard Consensus Report, 2006), and Kaiser Permanente (see
Devencenzi & O’Keefe, 2006). Following the publication of the NQF standards,
Gallagher, Studdert, and Levinson (2007) report that 29 large healthcare purchasing
coalitions in the Leapfrog Group use these standards in their pay-for-performance
programs. Moreover, the authors note that more than 1300 hospitals submitted
information to Leapfrog for analyses and publication of their compliance scores.
In order to encourage statements of sympathy or apology from the legislative side,
34 states have enacted so called more or less inclusive “apology laws” (Gallagher, et ah,
2007). Colorado and Oregon are more aggressive than most other states and put into
force statutes that render full apologies, which are apologies that include a statement of
responsibility, inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability in civil actions. Both
statutes specifically address apologies for unanticipated outcomes of medical care. Other
states are less protective and offer statutory protection for statements that express notions
such as “sorry that this happened to you.” For instance, the California Evidence Code
protects statements of benevolence or expressions of sympathy relating to the pain and
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suffering of someone who is involved in an accident ,29 Yet an admission of fault, such
as a physicians or hospital taking responsibility for a medical error, would be admissible
and is subject to inclusion as evidence in civil actions. The result of limited legal
protection is that conversations between hospitals and patients are held with caution.
The journey has begun; however, in many places the infrastructure to support
such significant change in policy has not yet been established. Moreover, the medical
profession, hospital culture and institutional morality need to re-adjust, something that
can not be achieved by policy alone. In a climate of conflicting interests it is difficult for
physicians to explore their own moral choices and to reconcile their failures with
themselves and others. Yet, physicians need to find mechanisms to overcome personal
fear as well as institutional pressures to stay true to their moral convictions and to
maintain their emotional health.
Physicians have always been on guard against external regulation of their work.
The very meaning of medical “profession” implies that it shapes a member’s self-image
and constructs her identity. Curiously, despite its high regard of autonomy and push for
self-regulation, medicine is also a profoundly relational profession. Where the old
professionalism focuses on personal responsibility as part of the doctor-patient
relationship, the recent emphasis on experts working in systems shifted ownership to
corporate or collective responsibility. Neither conception has sufficiently addressed
concerns of public moral philosophy. Where legislation is improving with protecting peer
review processes while at the same time recognizing the importance of addressing the
interconnectedness modern healthcare delivery, perhaps over time letting emerge a new-

29 California Evidence Code §1160(a).
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found sense of professional autonomy, it would be an illusion to think that physicians
embrace the corporate freedom offhand.
Moreover, how the profession relates to patients and to themselves when medical
errors occur is not only a function of creative rules and regulations. As Gawande (2002)
pointed out, by focusing entirely on systems, we negate the importance of the human side
of taking responsibility for failure and expressing remorse. Even if “sorry” is required by
hospital policy and if quality reviews have nearly reached perfection, it is the quest for
wholeness that should drive decisions and actions between people and between people
and organizations. Due to organizational, professional and primarily legal barriers neither
patients nor the physicians are free to explore possibilities when failure occurred. It is
interesting, even somewhat ironic, that physicians remain hesitant to speak with patients
openly because of the legal system and patients seek assistance of the legal system to be
heard. But does the legal system truly “listen?”

The Legal Response
“The law begins where community ends” (Auerbach, 1983, p. 5). America likes to
sue and does it often. The Council of Economic Advisers (2002) estimates the direct
annual cost of the tort liability system to be nearly $180 billion, making it the most
expensive in the World. In various forms including court-induced settlement, arbitration
or litigation it reflects the sensibilities of a blame and shame paradigm that characterizes
liberal America. Generally our willingness to endure the slow moving wheels of the civil
justice system persists even in healthcare; at least since the litigation explosion in the
lOTO's, our response to medical errors has largely been legal. Whether the popularity of
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tort law is related to the coporatization of medicine and the threat to professional
autonomy as discussed in the previous section and as Annandale (1998) argues, the loss
of community (Auerbach, 1983), or whether it reflects our inability to deal with the
consequences of an increasingly interconnected life, as Bellah et al. (1992) seem to
imply, medical malpractice lawsuits have had a tremendous impact on society;
financially, emotionally and institutionally.
In a policy brief of the Council on Health Care Economics and Policy (2003) the
authors report that medical malpractice claims remained relatively stable during the
1990s; however, the awards per claim, which includes jury awards and settlements,
doubled between 1990 and 2001. Except in California where there is a cap on non
economic damages, the brief explains that eight percent of medical claims now exceed $ 1
million, which is two times higher than the amount five years ago, and they do not stop to
increase. Mello and Studdert (2006) estimate the nationwide annual compensation to
victims of negligence to be $5.8 billion. Where this is significantly less than the annual
healthcare spending even when including administrative costs of litigation, which
according to Studdert et al. (2006) entails that “for every dollar spent on compensation 54
cents went to administrative expenses” (p. 2024), the estimate does not include “shadow
costs.” Those are expenses that result from the practice of defensive medicine, an effect
of the medical malpractice system that I will describe shortly, and which may increase
the spending another $ 15 billion. Along with the high expenses associated with litigation
is a steep increase in medical malpractice insurance cost. Understandably, this puts
doctors on strike and discourages many continuing their careers in healthcare. A
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pathologist who participated in my study reports that medical malpractice destroyed the
lives of many physicians he knows and causes many to retire early:
[Malpractice] is a fact of life that every doctor lives with. Once they end up in the
profession they know that their chances of being sued are whatever they are, onein-three. And even though many of those cases don’t result in any findings, they
are still nerve-racking for the physician who is involved. And the threat of being
sued has, I know, caused a fair number of my classmates who were approaching
retirement to retire and not do anything medically after they retire. Whereas in a
less litigious environment I suspect that they would have continued to volunteer
and these are things they no longer do because of the threat of malpractice. . . .
And many of these are still quite young and healthy and ... I have a classmate
right know who is spending most of their time traveling overseas doing volunteer
work in mission hospitals. Because of the threat of malpractice here and there is
no threat there go over there and work! It happens all the time. Of my classmates,
I know of at least four or five who have gone overseas in retirement because they
can afford to do so rather than providing medical services in this country.
Considering the complex nature of medicine and the physical, mental, spiritual and
social-relational toll its errors place on patients and physicians, it is questionable whether
the medical malpractice system with its high price tag is equipped to respond to the needs
of a “just” society.

Compensation
One objective of the medical malpractice system is to compensate patients fairly
for the economic and non-economic injuries they suffer (Mello & Studdert, 2006). In
order to study the compensatory effectiveness of the malpractice system, Studdert et al.
(2006) reviewed 1452 closed claims of five major malpractice insurance companies in
four regions of the United States.30 The researchers found that 63% of claims in which

30 Claims were evaluated by investigator-trained board certified physicians, fellows, or residents who
employed the IOM’s definition of medical error. Judgments were recorded on a six-point scale with a score
of 6 indicating the reviewer’s certainty that an error occurred. Claims that received at least a score of 4,
meaning that an adverse outcome was more likely than not to be the result of error, were included in the
error category. All other claims were excluded (Studdert et al, 2006, pp. 2025-2026).
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injury was due to a medical error, 73% of the plaintiffs received compensation. Non-error
claims were twice as likely to reach trial than cases in which medical error could be
determined, but they had a less of a chance to be compensated. If they did result in
monetary awards, compensation was significantly lower than payments for medical errorbased claims. The authors conclude that the medical malpractice system does fairly well
with identifying claims that do not involve error separating them from those that do.
Contrary to common belief that frivolous claims play a major role in the “medical
malpractice crisis” (see Norland, 2003), in Studdert et al.’s (2006) study only 13-16% of
the cost went to unfounded claims that did not involve errors. The main financial burden
remained with cases in which mistakes were made. The authors argue that, in comparison
to weeding out bad claims, the malpractice system performs less well in compensating
patients who actually deserve financial awards (see also Dauer, 2003; Council on Health
Care Economic Policy, 2003). In their sample, only one in six claims was compensated
leaving plaintiffs stranded with the high costs associated with harm caused by medical
mistakes. Magnifying the problems of uncompensated patients is the reality that the
majority of patients who experience harm actually do not sue (Studdert et ah, 2006;
Gallager and Levinson, 2005; Mello and Studdert, 2006; Berlinger 2005). Adding the
substantial number of cases heard by courts but did not result in compensation when they
should have with the number of valid claims that were never filed, the legal system falls
short of fulfilling its first promise.
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Punishment
Another, perhaps less explicit goal of the medical malpractice is to dispense
“corrective justice” (Mello and Studdert, 2006, p. 21). The idea of punishing physicians
for their mistakes is certainly not new. As early as the times of the Babylonian King
Hammurabi (1728-1686 BC) physicians were held legally accountable for the mistakes
they made. Legal guidance for the medical profession, particularly for surgeons, was
outlined in §§215-223 of the Code of Hammurabi. The legal code established not only
the cost for specific kinds of surgical procedures but also prescribes the consequences of
medical errors. Both fee schedules were arranged according to a patient’s class
membership.
For instance, if a surgeon made a medical error that caused severe injury or killed
his patient, the legal punishment was to cut off the hand with which the operation was
performed. Boecker (1976) suggests that were the Code of Hammurabi was drafted based
on the concept of Lex Talionis, an eye for an eye, punishment for medical error was more
reasonable and practical than for other offenses. It followed the notion of a
“Sinnbildstrafe” (p. 109); perhaps one could translate this into “symbolic punishment.”
This means that rather than reciprocating injury with punishment of the same kind, the
code demanded that this hand that was responsible for the injury needed to be removed.
Recidivism in this case was prevented; the surgeon would not commit future acts of
similar negligence. Interestingly, the punishment for the accidental death of slaves was
less severe. It required that the surgeon had to provide the slave master with a new slave
(§219). In case of severe injury, such as the destruction of a slave’s eye, punishment was
simply monetary (§220).
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In modem times, punishment for failure is more subtle but also complex. Due to
the fact that physicians carry malpractice insurance or are employed by hospitals that do,
compensation paid to the patient has little punitive value. However, for the healthcare
provider who failed, corrective justice may translate into professional and psychological
punishment as malpractice lawsuits tend to have significant psychological implications.
More often than not, legal action presents an unfair threat to practitioners and their
profession, with dire consequences. Hilfiker (1984) laments that, “even the word
‘malpractice’ carries implications that one has done something more than a natural
mistake; it connotes guilt and sinfulness” (p. 121). Even more recently, Brennan, Mello,
and Studdert (2006) pointed out that lawsuits are experienced as “betrayals” of a doctor
patient-relationship that otherwise engenders intimacy and which is built on trust. They
are stressful as physicians feel victimized because being sued feels like an “unwarranted
criminal accusation” (p. 110). Clearly, physicians feel are punished, often unfairly, by the
process.
The correctional ideology that supports the guilt-punishment paradigm advocates
deterrence. In fonn of case precedent it is thought to caution physicians not to make
similar errors as the ones litigated. There are several problems with applying this
conception, most of which are rooted in the very nature of medical error as described in
Chapter One.
The first difficulty is that the concept of deterrence implies that the actor acted
rationally with the intention to cause harm while having a choice to doing things
differently. The discourse on intention and intentional action has clarified that medical
errors are failures of intentional actions or cognitive planning. They themselves are
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unintentional. Moreover, as we learned from Mill (1957), the morality of an action is
independent from the motive of the actor. And it is not the motive that is of concern here.
As I demonstrated with double effect, the overall intent to improve the patient’s condition
has not changed even when as error was made. Thus, it makes no sense to say that an
actor could rationally decide not to make an error.
Second, the legal standard of care which is put in place to make the uncertainty of
medical work certain can not be known for all instances of decisions and procedures. It
also has the potential to confuse negligence and legitimate situations of risk. For instance,
if surgery resident Gawande (2002) would have cut the duct instead of the gallbladder
stalk, that is if he would not have hesitated for that life-saving split second, would he
have committed an act of legal negligence? Certainly, the legal standard of care is to cut
ducts or stalks in the correct place. But at what point does risk and uncertainty blur legal
clarity enough to reconstruct mistakes into unexpected events? Recall that my model of
medical error proposes a peer review process to evaluate the medical error context and to
create setting and situation-sensitive standards. Universal standards of negligence do not
capture the complexity of medical care and the multiplicity of interacting factors that may
contribute to someone making an error. Thus, measuring a specific event against a
universal measuring stick does not produce the effect that another event can actually be
prevented by looking towards the same standard. Moreover, an error is still an error even
if it does not qualify for the legal measuring stick of negligence.
Third, the current complexity of interrelated medical care systems often makes it
impossible to identify a single person who committed the error and who can subsequently
be “deterred” from committing another one. As Wu et al. (1997) remind us, hospitalized
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patients navigate through the complex web of medical encounters. If they experience a
medical error in one of the departments or under the care of one service, they often
discover that responsibility is distributed across the entire health care team. Another
example would be the following: A resident writes an order for a medication but omits
the route by which this medication is to be administered. He gives it to the unit secretary
who faxes the order to the pharmacy. The pharmacist fills the order by specifying the
wrong route. The nurse, then, gives the medication to the patient without noticing the
mistake. The question is who is responsible? In many cases it is the last one to be found
at the scene. Recall that in my model of medical error (Fig. 1, p. 66) antecedent failures
are represented by the etiology of error. Taking only a snapshot of this reality, and most
often it is the bad outcome of an array of treatment procedures somewhere in which error
occurred, the legal system has difficulties to hitting its target. This is not to say that no
one is responsible; ultimately, the attending physician is responsible for the injured
patient. But it is to point out that the person who ends up in front of the judge might only
be the person who experienced the results of several adverse antecedents.
A fourth concern about the concept of deterrence is that besides the occasional
difficulty of linking a specific person to an error, it is not always clear whether the
adverse outcome was due to a mistake even if the claim ended in settlement. In their
interviews of North Carolina physicians who had been sued, Peebles, Harris and Metzloff
(2000) learned that almost half of the time when physicians did not believe that they were
culpable compensation was awarded in settlements. Although this resolution might be
more efficient than defending a case in trial, many of these doctors expressed the desire
to be vindicated by experts or peers because “settlement means guilty” (p. 343). And as
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the previous section indicated, “guilt” is reportable to professional governing bodies,
such as the National Practitioner Database (NPD). Unfortunately, however, the authors
find support for the view that this need is often ignored in favor of economic expedience.
In my study, a neurologist who also holds an administrative position explains that
if we were insured by a commercial carrier and the patient said “I have gotten sick
because of the medicine you gave me” and after they looked at it they said “no it
was not our medicine that we gave, it was naturally what would have happened to
you next anyway whether you took the medicine or not,” oftentimes the lawyer
would ask them ‘well, we were going to sue you anyway, or if you pay my client
$20,000 than we will just fix up the $20,000 and will not go ahead and sue you.’
For the insurance company, paying them the $20,000 is actually a better financial
deal than taking it to court. Because they know they cannot take it and go pay all
the lawyers and all the expert witnesses and everything else for less than $30,000.
So they will say “that is a $10,000 savings to us so even though we do not think
anything was done incorrectly, we will go ahead and pay you the $20,000.”
In this example, the physician might be punished having to endure the process but is not
deterred from future negligence because he did not make an error that could be avoided
with more care. It follows from the four discussion points that the deterrent effects are
surrounded by ambiguity. Rather than deterring error, they deter individuals from
practicing medicine.
So far, the discussion was primarily concerned with individuals, professionals,
and systems. We saw how medical errors affect patients and physicians and that, for a
long time, the medical profession was unable respond to the problem by regulating failure
from its own ranks. This section indicated that the legal system fails to address the needs
of patients suffering from harm and even if cases are resolved by arbitration and
settlement court guided process may seem unfair to healthcare providers. What follows is
a consideration of medical errors from the perspective of institutions. There are striking
differences between the legal institution and medicine including their goals, professional
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cultures and discourse. As a consequence, they are on a collision course blocking the
efforts of the medical profession to increase transparency and magnifying the frustration
of both patients and physicians whose personal and relational wholeness is broken.

Colliding Institutions
Medical errors are profoundly social. They are social because they have social
and relational implications that are dealt with within two major institutions, medicine and
the legal system. According to Bellah et al. (1992), we conduct our lives through
mutually constitutive interactions within the moral and regulatory frameworks of
institutions. For instance, we invest in medicine as an institution that is guided by
professional, legal and ethical patterns and expect in return an improvement of our lives
through health education and clinical care. An important aspect of any institutional
arrangement is that life within is carried out in a context of language and meaning.
Bellah et al. (1992) note that conversations about “things that matter” are held by using
metaphors that “provide normative interpretations of situations and actions” and which
define “rightness or wrongness” (p. 12). Thus, institutions have interpretive and
normative functions that are explicated through language. As such, they are charged with
profound social and moral responsibilities.
There is an expectation of technological sophistication and precision, progress in
research, and of professionals working with expertise and competence. Any of these
promises are, or should be, carried out in light of social and moral obligations. Patients
rightly expect to be treated similarly according to their medical needs. Access to care,
primary prevention, providing information, transparency, and honesty are fundamental to
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a just healthcare system. Despite the focus on professional self-regulation and patient
autonomy, it is impossible to divorce medicine from these institutional groundings and
even more impossible to view medical errors as isolated discrepancies between
individuals. Instead, how they are dealt with, the determination of their “rightness or
wrongness,” and how mistakes are talked about depends on the institutional context and
on how society defines what is good. And with “good” I do not mean the utilitarian
notion of the ends justifying the means, measured by a theory of value as happiness, but
the good in reference to the mutual concern and care for one’s neighbors for wholeness in
a general sense. As an institution thus conceived, medicine carries a concern for the
common good and at least on this level, the boundaries between public and private health
becomes less clearly defined.
Bellah et al. (1992) argue that, unfortunately, Americans have become
disconnected from the institutions they created, leaving it to experts to fine-tune their
functions without participating in maintaining a moral base. More often than not
problems are first approached on an individual level before becoming an organizational
matter. They rarely turn into an institutional concern. The authors note that
We think what is required here is only a high level of competence, of expertise, of
professionalism, not the moral wisdom that should be at the basis of any good
institution. And when things go wrong, we tend to blame individuals, we decry
their lack of “ethics but we don’t question the morality of the institutions
themselves, (p. 43)
This same pattern holds true when looking at medical errors. Competence, perfectionism,
and professionalism are expected of physicians along with the public’s belief that
medicine can be made safe. The primary focus is on finding technical solutions to
processes that also require a careful moral consideration. When things go wrong, we tend
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to blame and punish individuals, sometimes compensate patients, but fail to see that the
restoration of well-being also requires calls for a comprehensive ethical framework that
guides actions and decisions on institutional, organizational and individual levels. In
other words, the present and the future of a healthy and peaceful society ought to be
approached in a more wholistic fashion. From this bird’s eye view, the medical
profession, hospitals and healthcare organizations operate under their own mission but
should be bound by a strong institutional commitment to wholeness.
If we ask of medicine as an institution to make a commitment to public wholeness
as a guiding principle, can the legal system be expected to make similar concessions?
Fiss (1984), an outspoken opponent of extra-legal settlement, argues that civil litigation is
of public importance because the legal system interprets the laws of society brining us
closer to our ideals. The role of the courts in administering justice is essentially public
and the adjudication of major social issues, such as civil rights, leads to what he calls
“structural transformation.” In light of the absence of alternative social institutions, this
argument has considerable force.
Luban (1995) proposes that we compare and contrast two conceptions of the legal
system, the “problem-solving conception” (p. 2632) and the “public-life conception” (p.
2633). The problem-solving conception, assuming the presence of alternative settings,
approves the Government’s role in facilitating dispute resolution processes that keep
peace between private parties. This view also supports the idea of hospitals making early
offers to injured patients. The public-life conception, on the other hand, is rooted in the
belief that citizens have a legitimate interest in participating in discussions that concern
crucial legal issues. This is similar to the view Fiss (1984) defends. From this latter
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perspective, the law is an expression of a “public morality” (p. 2634) to which even the
deliberation of private matters contributes. Public deliberation is based on consensus
building in search for a common good rather than using private dialog to find right
answers. Consistent with the political philosophy of classic Greek and early Roman
thinkers, Luban concludes that “adjudication, then, is necessary to define and redefine the
conditions of the public space” (p. 2635).
If the legal process is suited to instill public values into its laws and interprets
them to us, what are the specific products of malpractice litigation that represent their
successful incorporation and interpretation? Some argue that legal opinions, rules and
case precedent are hard copies that evidence the production of public goods (Coleman &
Silver, 1986). According to Coleman and Silver (1986) they do not only benefit the
disputing parties but signal what is socially acceptable and lawful and what is not. Legal
opinions and precedent are sources of information that claim to offer certainty in troubled
situations of social life. Subsequently, they benefit the paying public. Luban (1995) adds
that in addition to stabilizing the framework in which future cases can be evaluated, civil
adjudication may enhance the legal proficiency of litigating attorneys thus moving
advocacy skills into the realm of public goods. He further suggests that the discovery and
publicizing of certain facts about cases and the subsequent use of those materials by
social actors and even the authority of the courts themselves should be considered public
goods.
The idea of a public moral sphere that can be shaped by just laws is appealing.
Ideally, an institutional moral framework for medicine that is wholeness-oriented
produces patient safety, system transparency and restorative protocols that are put in
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place to facilitate the just resolution of medical errors. Thus, in the ideal situation,
medicine would define and redefine the conditions of its own space even after error and
would need the law only to legitimate its program. Yet, the medical malpractice system
is one that operates on the level of the individual rather than invoking a public morality.
In other words, as a fundamentally self-referential system that is informed by adversarial
outcomes of certain instances it has a hard time capturing the richness of a deliberative
civic spirit. Unless cases are settled out of court, in medical malpractice litigation
deliberation takes place primarily in the process of discovery and, in a scripted fashion,
during trial. As a result, the stories of patients and physicians are being heard, though
mostly the voices of attorneys speaking from adversarial positions. Although the trial
process reconstructs the stories of both sides to produce an aggregate narrative of the
event, patients learn what happened to them and why it did. Sometimes they have the
opportunity to express their needs. If the case does not terminate with settlement, a jury
decides how much their harm is worth. The public process thus conceived gives rise to a
particular response of justice that addresses an instance of medical error and responds
with exacting that which is supposedly deserved. Chapter four will discuss the
philosophical underpinning of this popular notion of justice. The public value is such that
a private matter between patient, physician and hospital is elevated to a public concern.
There are two sides to this. The positive side is that the problem of medical error
has gained tremendous public and political attention leading to changes in hospital policy
and legislation. The negative side is that although the legal system is able to point out that
there is a problem, it takes a highly complex and relational matter and turns a single issue
into public interest that is removed from its original context. In addition to being context
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removed, the legal process separates patients, physicians, and hospitals physically,
procedurally and metaphorically, rather than facilitating a mutually engaging,
participatory dialog that would have public value. Due to the lack of a conversation that
heals in an environment of people who care, there is little opportunity for restoring
relationships and re-growing public trust. Separating individuals and reconstructing the
private sphere of the hospital has significant consequences that bear on how medicine as
an institution approaches failure.
That litigation by itself does not reinvigorate the moral discourse in the hospital is
evidenced by another important reason: its affects on physicians. Rather than fostering
discussion, the nature of the system to blame individuals for their mistakes and then
publicly broadcasting it causes physicians to be less open about the mistakes they make
(Banja, 2001). In this same vein, the current system creates barriers to the investigation of
mistakes and prevents the use of medical errors as “formative experiences” (Wu,
Folkman, McPhee, & Lo, 1991). As frequently noted, the malpractice system fosters
“distortion” in medical practice and engages healthcare practitioners in the practice of
“defensive medicine” (e.g. Dauer, 2003; Brennan, Mello, & Studdert, 2006). This means
that physicians order too many tests, stay away from high-risk patients, or abstain from
performing more invasive procedures. In fact, in their survey of 824 physicians in
Pennsylvania, Brennan, Mello and Studdert (2006) found that more than half of the
doctors ordered more tests than medically indicated or referred patients to other
specialists when it was not necessary. One-third of specialists ordered too many
medications or suggested invasive procedures when not clinically appropriate. Over 30
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percent of the physicians avoided certain kinds of procedures and a slightly higher
number avoided high-risk patients in general.
There is one relief for those who regard tort litigation as an expression of public
values and who find that case precedent makes a contribution to the social reservoir of
public goods. As a producer of precedent, malpractice litigation establishes the value of
limb and life. Court cases are then used by risk managers to guide settlement offers. In
response to my question how settlement offers to patients are determined, a clinical risk
manager explains that this is a very complex calculation process:
There’s precedence depending on what it is. If it’s a Bowie burn, and we’ve had a
Bowie of a cautery pen in a surgical environment, what you do is you try to come
up with solutions to your problems. And we had a couple where the Bowie pen
was left on the operative field and somebody stepped on to turn it on and we
ended up with a Bowie burn where it didn’t belong. It was unintended. We can’t
have these things in the operative field. There’s a holder, you know. So what I
can do is come in and say, “You know if we want to be sloppy, if we want to just
willy nilly want to leave stuff,” and we don’t, people don’t do that kind of stuff
intentionally, “but if you don’t want to change your practices and make sure that
it’s a regulatory requirement.” You can’t describe regulations for putting a Bowie,
but you just say, “This is the practice, we want you to put that Bowie over here,
out of the field, off the patient, we do not want it any place close, we don’t want
patients burned. If you guys want to leave it, here it’s gonna cost us $100,000
here, $150,000 there, $75,000 here.” It also depends on who it is. Is it a young
female? Is it on her breast, is it on her belly? Is it on a man’s leg, you know, the
value is all different and those cases ’precedents are set in the courts. ... In
addition to that, we can also calculate [it] out; we don’t have to use that. With
this other case that I shared with you anecdotally we could just say, okay, if for
example [the patient] went and got a sympathetic verdict from a jury, we think
they might give [him] this much, there is no grid that you can go to that says
male, 29 years old, you know you go down the grid; there is no such thing. That
doesn’t exist, but you can calculate and you figure out your damages. The
damages are the very complicated part of the claims process. That’s part of the
legal side. You’re looking at economic, non-economic damages. You’re looking
at wages, you’re looking at medicals and futures and all that kind of stuff. It’s
very complicated, it’s very complex.
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From this narrative, the public good of case precedent consists of specific amounts of
compensation that juries awarded to particular patients who have been harmed by
mistakes. How we value something has been translated into money, the correct
determination is what we may call justice. What case precedent has to offer, then, is a
blue print of the narrow conception of medical harm measured in money. It is not a blue
print that hospitals can use to establish processes in which restorative dialog, reparation
and systems improvement are part of the same package. And as most medical error cases
settle out of court, settlement itself becomes a distribution station for money rather than a
mechanism that allows patients and physicians to express their feelings and needs. Seen
in this light, legal settlement narrowly construed warrants the critique of litigation
advocates such as Fiss, Luban, and Coleman and Silver. However, if regarded as a result
of a restorative justice process, mediated settlements can be transformative and healing.
How medical errors are handled by professionals, hospitals and the legal system is
dependent on a variety of factors including a hospital’s medical culture, professional
culture, hospital policy, legislative regulation and public attitude. Driving these factors
are their underlying values and beliefs. When patients are harmed there is a concern for
making things as right as possible. Sometimes patients receive early offers from
hospitals. In the language of the law “making right” means that patients turn into
claimants who then become plaintiffs awaiting the outcome of an adversarial process. As
we saw, making right for physicians can mean a variety of things ranging from “talking
to” to loosing their license. The question becomes what notion of justice do we currently
draw on that drives this thinking and what alternative conception has the potential to
transform the moral framework of the medical institution?
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Conclusion
When errors cause physical, spiritual, mental or social harm, patients and
physicians are often traumatized. Errors impact personal and social wholeness. Patients
begin to cope when there is good communication, an explanation of what happened and
why, when somebody says “I am sorry” and when the hospital makes sure that this will
not happen again. Physicians attempt to cope by talking with close colleagues or friends,
mostly about the facts of the case. More often than not, they have little opportunity to
engage with their own emotional trauma. What seems evident is that patients and
physicians or healthcare teams rarely experience their feelings together, thus negating this
important aspect of restoring wholeness. The uncertainty about how to relate to harmed
patients and their families, the absence of clearly defined organizational support
structures, fear of professional sanctions and fear of litigation are barriers that impinge on
resolutions that embrace justice and wholeness.
Particularly in cases of medical error, professional medical culture has had walled
itself off against outside critique and sometimes against accountability. The continuing
struggle for professional autonomy mirrors the same liberal political philosophy that
informs American individualism and in which freedom is conceptualized as non
interference. Pushing for moral space in which one is to be left alone works against a
more transparent and relational culture. The recent focus on managerial models and
systems improvement has strengthened peer review thus encouraging the medical
community to be self-critical about the errors it makes. What is concerning, yet recently
improving, is that for a long time the relationship between expert professionals and
patients has also been shaped by a technical and legalistic language. This negates the
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importance of structures that support what I articulated as “transparent autonomy,” the
contextual condition that bridges a strong sense of professional expert-sense of self with a
commitment to accepting civic responsibility. Transparent autonomy with its
philosophical roots in civic freedom and equality as equal consideration, principles of
justice as wholeness that will be described in Chapter Five, is fundamental to patient
safety and the just treatment of medical error. Nearly all commentators agree that the
medical malpractice system has largely failed in its ability to instill public values into the
law and to provide justice; it neither restores harmed patients nor does it encourage the
kind of openness that sparks systems improvement. In sum, there are theoretical, ethical,
and pragmatic reasons to embark on a new journey.
The second part of the dissertation, then, compares two fundamentally different
visions of justice. It will first clarify and put into context the theoretical underpinnings
that underlie the current approach to medical errors as found in the notion of justice as a
right to what one deserves. It will then develop a vision of justice that unfolds in the
context of transparent autonomy. The moral compass according to which we should
orient our efforts is the culturally sensitive, comprehensive, teleological conception of
justice that aims at restoring the physical, mental, spiritual and social elements of
wholeness in its fullest sense.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE JOURNEY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Introduction
The concept of justice and the distinction between what is right and what is good
has stimulated philosophical as well as theological discussions since the beginning of
human history. What is justice? Recall for instance Plato’s (1985) Republic, which
outlines the invigorating dialog between Socrates and his friends who attempt to answer
this crucial question. Initial contemplations were quickly rejected. Neither Cephalus’
suggestion that justice is telling the truth and to pay back what is owed nor
Trachymarchus’ idea that justice might simply be the interest of the stronger find
Socrates’ approval. After also rejecting Glaucon’s concern about human self-interest and
his suggestion that by nature people would not be just if they could get away with
injustice, Socrates offers his own reflections. In contrast to the suggestions of his friends,
his understanding of justice is less concerned with individual actions. Rather, it represents
the overall Greek sentiment for proportion, balance, and social harmony. In a well
functioning and just society, Socrates says, everyone occupies a social and occupational
location for which he is naturally best suited. In other words, a person who is born into
being a shoemaker, a soldier, or a leader assumes a naturally assigned role in life and the
harmonious functioning of this system is what represents justice.
Regardless of how we conceptualize balance in common life, words such as
justice and fairness and the willingness to do what is good or what is right express our
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deepest moral convictions in regards to how we should relate to each other. Empathy for
those who have been injured and whose lives took unwanted traumatic turns because
someone has done something wrong is rooted the human desire to return to the
experience of internal and external balance. How we attempt to restore the balance
depends on the specific perception of justice that guides our efforts. For instance,
compensatory justice is the kind that awards money proportionally when one person has
suffered a loss through the acts of another. Retributive justice exacts harm for harm,
although in modem times the notion of an eye for an eye is replaced by other forms of
punishment; even in criminal cases it is sometimes substituted with restitution.
Restorative justice, such as justice as wholeness, assures that personal and relational
aspects of human life are restored in the best way possible. Lastly, transformative justice
invokes major spiritual and social paradigm shifts. What kinds of justice we allow to
regulate responses to harm depend on social and political values, perhaps even on
personal temperament. When trying to understand the justice that informs the
predominantly legalistic approaches to medical errors that we have today, it is imperative
to consider its foundational elements which are desert, right, and freedom as promoting
individualism.

Just Deserts
Many would argue that victims of medical error deserve compensation; some
would say that a bad doctor deserves to be punished in some form or the other or
deserves to pay. Indeed, the notion that one ought to receive what one believes she
deserves, or framed in a language of rights what one has a moral or legal right to, reflects
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a natural self-interest that becomes relevant in matters of distributive justice and
frequently is a first-response to a perceived injustice against oneself. It is a first response
because desert-based justice is a kind of justice that responds to a particular instant in
time always looking backwards in order to address separately harm received and harm
caused. Particularly when placed into the context of making things right after medical
error, the notion of just deserts provokes reflection.

Fact and Status-based Morality
In his classic book Doing and Deserving (1974), Feinberg provides a detailed
account of the concept of personal moral desert as it stands in close relationship with the
notion of justice. Feinberg’s theory is based on the assumption that desert is a “’natural’
moral notion” (p. 56) and as such is formed independently from rules, practices, and
institutions. The notion of desert, he argues, represents a part of justice; however, it is not
necessarily the most important part. Yet, it is a very interesting one because it is how
justice is often thought about. The consideration of justice as the provision of something
deserved requires the consideration of at least three important aspects, which I will
briefly develop by drawing in part on Feinberg’s (1974) work. Although the concept of
desert is also relevant when considering the just distribution of goods and services, justice
in the context of medical error is rectificatory (Aristotle, p. 179), it applies to cases in
which one person has done wrong to another. In the case of medical error, wrongness
means causing unintentional harm to a patient.
When thinking about desert as a response to perceived injustice, a person must
internalize an experience as something that upsets her internal moral balance, a feeling of
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being wronged by the behavior or actions of another person. According to Cahn (1975), it
is this peculiar “sense of injustice” that elicits our “magical” or “imaginative interchange”
in which we put ourselves in the shoes of another to join into a “reaction of outrage,
horror, shock, resentment and anger” (p. 24). The sense of injustice that Cahn describes
needs to be distinguished from the disappointment of expectations, which have no moral
implications. For instance, a patient who has been a diabetic for more than 30 years
experiences a sudden hypoglycemic event while recovering from a minor surgical
procedure. He becomes unconscious yet recovers quickly following an injection of
Glucagon. After awakening, the patient indicates his surprise about the event by noting
that “this never happened in the 30 years I have had diabetes.” The nurses assure him that
these events do indeed occur and that he was just lucky in the past. Knowing better, the
patient calls a physician-friend who reviews the patient’s chart about a week after the
incident, immediately noticing an order of 70 units of insulin. Being 10 times as much as
a normal dose, the order was clearly a mistake.
In this case, the answer appears simple: the patient was never told about the
mistake by the hospital staff or the attending physician. Even worse, he was lied to.
Consequently, he felt betrayed and treated unjustly. It is important to point out that it was
not the error itself that was the injustice, nor would it have been an injustice if the insulin
therapy had not produced the anticipated outcome. Instead, a sense of injustice emerges
when we witness or experience a denial of human dignity or violation of common
morality such as someone lying or withholding the truth when he or she should not have.
But another less obvious concern of justice should also be considered. If the
hospital staff had told the patient of the dosage error, would the consequences also be a
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matter of “injustice”? Arguably, the error itself would not be an injustice of the kind that
we usually describe when we are intentionally hurt or lied to. The kind of justice that is
invoked in case of unintentional error is a peculiar one because it does not concern moral
wrongs. What is moral, however, is the relationship within which it occurs. Feelings such
as emotional and spiritual brokenness, the loss of trust, and sudden groundlessness are of
moral concern and as such invoke obligations to make things right. In this example, the
error harmed the patient physically—he passed out—and emotionally because he was
very concerned even before he found out that the nurse had lied to him. Moreover, there
was a loss of trust in the hospital and its staff causing him to fear subsequent visits.
Consequently, in this case, as in many other cases of unintentional harm, the
feeling of being wronged is distinct and finds moral application primarily in matters of
restoration rather than in the morality of the event itself. It follows that concerns of
justice may arise on two occasions: first, from the backward-looking perspective of an
injustice due to a moral violation. Second, from the perspective of looking ahead,
acknowledging the moral obligation to restoring the patient’s wholeness.
How we often respond to these instances is by looking backwards as if an
unintentional error itself is a moral violation. We search for what each party may deserve
or may have a right to based on certain facts. Another consideration when discussing the
notion of desert in the context of justice is the establishment of a basis for desert. In other
words, there needs to be a specific reason why one would think one deserves a certain
kind of behavior or action of another person or organization. Feinberg (1974) suggests
that, as a natural internal feeling, moral desert requires the satisfaction of “certain
conditions of worthiness” (p. 57). To deserve something a person does so in virtue of a
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“desert basis” (p. 58) that one can determine in reference to certain facts about the
individual. In the medical student Tim’s case, a basis for compensation would be the fact
he lost his finger due to a medical error. Thus, judgment needs to be grounded in what
Feinberg refers to as a “basal reason” (p. 59). A false claim of desert is present if
judgment lacks basal reason, if the reason is “logically inappropriate,” or if the reason is
simply false (p. 59). According to Feinberg, the moral assertion of “ought” does not
qualify as desert base and thus does not validate a claim that someone would deserve
something. That most people would think that Tim ought to receive financial
compensation would not establish basal reasoning. The fact that he lost his finger due to
an error, however, does fall into Feinberg’s sphere of worthiness.
Besides the notion of a desert basis itself, a desert base also requires that internal
moral notions are associated with the formulation of goods or behaviors that a person
feels he or she would deserve in a particular circumstance. Feinberg (1974) describes
several kinds of treatment one could deserve. One category is comprised of treatments
that find application in contexts in which desert is a “‘polar’ concept” (p. 62), which is
the kind that interests us here because it is at this junction that moral relationships begin
to separate. A person deserves either something good or something bad. This includes
rewards and punishment as well as reparation and liability, all of which generally fall in
the realm of retributive justice and which, according to Feinberg, have this polar
characteristic. The other category of treatments, for instance compensation, grades, and
prizes, is aligned with the conception of desert as “non-polar” (p. 62) and are concerns of
distributive justice. The distinction between polar and non-polar desert is based, among
other conditions, on fault. For instance, Feinberg notes that reparations are paid when
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injury was somebody’s fault, thus qualifying as a polar desert concept. Reparations
“restore the moral equilibrium as would an apology or expression of remorse” (p. 74).
They acknowledge “past wrongs, repay debt and express sympathy, benevolence, and
concerns” (p. 76). In contrast, compensation, a treatment that according to Feinberg is
based on a non-polar desert base, is paid for losses for which no particular person or
organization can be held accountable.
Similarly, in Justice as Fittingness, Cupit (1999) magnifies the polarization of
individuals in situations when harm is a caused by someone’s fault as well as the crucial
distinction between fault and non-fault approaches to making things right. Promoting a
theory of status, the author contends that “an unjust act is an unfitting act; it is an act
which fails to accord with the status of the person treated” (p. 2). Justice requires treating
people not more and not less than they are worth based on their status. People can be
perceived as having status in three kinds of social relationships: as individual wholes who
express their wholeness-31 separate from their relationships with others, as complete
members of society without individual interests, or as social partners, a situation in which
they are both wholes and members. In contrast to Feinberg’s suggestion that the basis for
deserving something should be determined by certain facts about a person, Cupit
proposes that the defining factor is one that fulfills the “status requirement” (p. 38).
Thus, facts about a person are a consequence of the status-requirement but not a
determinant of desert.

Jl Cupit (1999) understands wholeness in reference to a socio-political position and in terms of selfexpression rather than articulating it as a multi-dimensional concept with personal and interpersonal
constituents. Wholeness is either referenced in regards to the interests of a “social whole” (p. 66) or
represents an expression of the “exclusive wholeness” (p. 67) of individuals.
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In those instances when one person treats another unfittingly and it was her fault,
the injured person deserves compensation, the determination of which requires an
“disentangling” of the individual whole person from the complexity of her situation in
order to “give expression to the person’s exclusive wholeness.” Wholeness thus
conceived is status-conferring, Cupit (1999) argues, and qualifies as a desert basis in
cases in which fault can be determined. On the other hand, when compensation is
demanded based on instances where nobody has done anything wrong, responsibility is
shared by partners of society. In this case, the desert base for non-fault compensation is
not individual wholeness but “partnership” (p. 89).
In contrast to Feinberg and Cupit, I contend that concepts such as fault and its
resultant responsibility are relationally significant and call for shared social
responsibility, in some cases more than actions that require attention in form of non-fault
compensation. Indeed, taking responsibility for fault creates obligations to make good,
preferable together, for our wrongs. Both Feinberg’s notion of polarity and Cupit’s focus
on the expression of personal wholeness as status-conferring element illustrate that at
least these theories of justice as desert tend to separate individuals based on what they
deserve and why.
A final consideration of the connection between the notions of justice and desert
is that desert-based justice requires that someone other than the person who was injured
must either accept or reject another’s claims and respond accordingly. It is on this point
that my assessment of justice as desert differs from that of Feinberg (1974). More often
than not it is this third condition in which Feinberg’s pre-institutional notion of desert, the
feeling of being wronged which leads to the perception that one would deserve
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something, is connected to formal expressions of moral right. Additionally, as a preinstitutional moral notion, desert is often integrated into formal structures, translated into
institutional metaphors such as liability and compensation32. Feinberg does not regard
this transition as a natural consequence and warns us about conceiving desert as a certain
kind of entitlement, an “eccentric species of the law,” or something that leads to the
notion of “moral right” (p. 85). But how often do we think we would deserve something
because it is our moral right or because we are entitled to it? I would defend the idea that
enough evidence can be mounted to suggest that the concepts are at least logically
connected, even though, pace Feinberg, they cannot be equated.
On a similar note, Bellah et al. (1992) point out that individuals are agents acting
within institutions and organizational settings, and as such carry personal moral
convictions into the their ethos. Referencing Niebuhr’s (2001) work, I pointed out in an
earlier chapter that quite often our personal convictions may not match the morality of the
organization we work for. Nevertheless, organizational morality has been shaped at some
point by individuals, although it is constantly being re-shaped. As a result, conceptions of
justice are mediated by individuals and structures. Even if the moral notion of desert is
pre-institutional at one time, it is negotiated within institutional and organizational
structures. An organization, such as a medical center, that operates on the understanding
of justice as desert fulfilled or that responds only to an assertion of rights operates within
a different moral culture than one that capitalizes on its interconnectedness and shared
values.

Note that even Feinberg himself articulates his notion of polar desert in the language of “liability” and
“compensation” (p. 62), both of which are legal terms.
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Implications for Medical Errors
Why, then, would a conception of justice as desert be a problem when addressing
issues such as medical errors? I will briefly consider concerns about the internalization,
separation, and institutional integration processes that I associated with the desert
paradigm.
The first concern is over the concept of “worthiness” or the idea that a desert base
is a function of it. As a pre-institutional, natural moral notion, Feinberg’s (1974)
conception respects the intrinsic worth of a person, yet due to the requirement of “facts”
about a person, reduces the conception of dignity to its social contingencies. Similarly,
Cupit (1999) situates wholeness into its socio-political context either in reference to the
individual or society. Dignity is an externally conferred property and has little relation to
its intrinsic origin.33 The kind of justice that is informed by these perspectives is, as
others and I have argued, backwards-looking: a person gets what he or she deserves in
accordance to specifics of an instance, not more and not less. As such, it reverses a moral
trajectory that would otherwise lead to individual and relational healing. For example, a
person may deserve an apology after a medical error based on certain facts that define
specific wrongness. However, would it not be more conducive to the integrity of human
relationships if one would offer apology even if one of the criteria for offering it might be
unclear? If so, then one ought to think of solutions that free the kind of compassion that is
inherent in acts of apology from their confinement in the notion of fault.
j3 Stetson (1998) distinguishes between “intrinsic dignity” universal to humanity and traditionally JudeoChristian and “extrinsic dignity,” which is derived from intrinsic dignity but subject to historical and
cultural circumstances. Extrinsic dignity is “the dignity of everyday life,” also called “practical dignity” (p.
17). It differs between individuals and as such is behavioral, expressing intrinsic worth in actions and
behaviors. Stetson argues that our ability to evaluate individual behavior as external manifestations of
intrinsic dignity has been lost in contemporary America. He notes that “our moral aphasia and moral
egalitarianism -bom of contemporary liberalism’s peculiar understanding of tolerance, compassion, and
fairness- have undercut our moral literacy, our ethical acuity” (p. 18).
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In my view, apology is an affirmation of someone’s dignity and as such should
honor something more than facts or loss of status. As I will argue in more detail in
Chapter Five, the Judeo-Christian perspective of intrinsic worth is independent from the
messiness and indeterminacy of social life and, as subsequent sections will show, it is
when embedded in this context that justice may unfold in all its relational and spiritual
richness. In other words, the only reason why one deserves anything is because of the
unshakeable presence of our human dignity and its embeddedness in our relationships to
each other as children of God. Where the former conception of dignity presents itself to
the process of social construction and is easily re-conceptualized with an assertion of
individual need, or, as Cupit (1999) would say, of the expression of wholeness in light of
individual status, the latter suggests a deeper involvement in each other’s lives by giving
consideration to personal and social wholeness as a common goal.
Secondly, the focus on the individual is common to just desert perceptions and
Feinberg’s (1974) conception of a desert basis that is “polar” when one person harms
another is certainly a case in point. On the individual level, the harmed patient and the
healthcare provider who failed frequently experience an internal and external moral
separation based on the polarity of their desert base. The patient, or as some call the
unfortunate person the “first victim,” may struggle with the hospital to reveal information
and to receive whatever it might be that the patient feels she would deserve based on the
injury. The “second victim,” the healthcare provider who made the error, finds herself
positioned on the opposite “pole” of desert, facing disciplinary actions or even the
possibility of a revoked license. According to Denham (2007, presentation at LLUMC)
there is also a “third victim,” the organization or hospital that mediates conflicting
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interests while guarding against medical malpractice litigation and preserving its
reputation.
Consequently, a relationship that previously had a common focus, namely
intervention in a patient’s disease process, and which was a relationship of trust, is forced
into separation. In this same vein, Cupit’s (1999) focus on the expression of individual
wholeness in cases in which harm was someone’s fault signals that justice is for the
individual and that restoration bends towards personal needs and obligations. Justice
unfolds on opposite sides of the justice scales with little opportunity to reconcile. Yet, as
previously noted, errors are experienced in a complex web of personal and social
relationships; their meaning lies on a continuum between historical past and projected
future. Harm in medicine invokes physical, spiritual, mental and social dimensions that
are in dire need of repair.
Finally, we should be concerned about the process of what I alluded to as
institutional integration. It is when internal feelings of moral desert are integrated into
organizational or institutional patterns, practices, rules and laws. When looking at the
practical realm of medical error, one witnesses the blurring of boundaries between its
personal characteristics and its formal and informal organizational expressions. The
determination of someone deserving something in virtue of certain facts or reduction of
status bears the assumption that desert is knowable and can be formalized. For instance,
recall the case of the medical student who lost his finger due to a medical error and who
saw his career as a pediatric surgeon vanish. Tim’s lost finger is the basis for a specified
amount of money to be awarded to him, offered by the Risk Management department.
That money was not the only concern for Tim became obvious through his rejection of
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the offer. His concerns were emotional and immediate as evidenced by the requested
letter as well as future-oriented, “what are children going to think?” So does Tim
“deserve” a letter, a continued conversation, or money? It can’t be missed that the
determination of desert is problematic, one reason why money frequently serves as
substitute for the more ambiguous and emergent needs of people.

Right by Principle
This understanding and some of its connected elements can be translated into a
language of rights mediated by a culture that places a high value on individualism. A
patient may deserve an apology for a medical error that harmed her, but does she have a
moral right to it? According to some recent hospital regulations, she has indeed.
Bestowed to her via hospital policy she not only has a moral right to it but a formalized
right, against which claims can be made as entitlement. So it is often via the language of
rights that personal moral contentions find legitimacy. Rights, not unlike deserts, are
absolute; they are considered independent from actions and their consequences. For
instance, Leape (2006) states the following:
Just as patients are entitled to know all the results of laboratory tests, opinions
from consultants, risks of treatment and alternative therapeutic options, they are
entitled to know the causes of the breakdown when things go wrong. . . . the
patient has a right to know what happened, (p. 16)
There is no doubt that the entitlement to medical documents ought to be construed as
legal entitlement. Yet, when looking at medical error in the context of a morally binding
relationship between doctor and patient, the notion of exercising a right to an apology
versus a consideration of what might be good in light of the relationships ought to be
considered carefully. What Leape suggests is that telling patients the truth after medical
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error, or providing an apology, is “right” by principle; patients have a moral or legal right
to know what happened. Having a moral right to something implies that the act of
providing it is in fact morally acceptable as a matter of principle. It is categorical and in
congruence with moral law. In other words, “having a right to” is based on a duty or
obligation to provide it and providing it is the “right” thing to do independent from
external circumstances.
If in a system of justice the focus is on determining what is right by principle
rather than regarding justice as goods produced, the ethico-political orientations is
frequently referred to as deontological liberalism. Contemporary moral and political
discourses that highlight the concept of right are rooted in the works of philosophers such
as Kant, Rouseau, and Rawls. Central to the political and moral perspectives found in
deontologial liberalism is the argument that individuals are autonomous actors who
should interfere in each other’s lives as little as possible. As part of moral life, rights and
obligations unfold within the boundaries of a social contract. Attributing this view of
moral and social freedom primarily to Kant, Sandel (1998) argues for liberalism to
defend the argument that
society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims,
interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by
principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the
good; what justifies these regulative principles above all is not that they maximize
the social welfare or otherwise promote the good, but rather that they conform to
the concept of right, a moral category given prior to the good and independent of
it. (p. 1)
While Sandel (1998) is essentially correct, it should be noted that both Rawls and Kant
articulate a conception of the good. Rawls (1971) proposes a “thin theory” of the good (p.
347-350) which is used to derive principles of justice in reference to primary goods. Once
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established, a “full” theory of the good can be developed from these principles of justice.
Kant (1997) acknowledges that there are actions that one chooses based on the prediction
of the good they produce; however, these are grounded in “hypothetical” imperatives and
do not conform to moral law (p. 25). Actions such as this are good for a purpose, for
instance happiness, the precept of which he argues to be prudence (p. 26-27).
The notion that actions are right in reference to established rules and principles,
independent from the good they produce, is a theoretical orientation in ethics referred to
as deontology. The following section presents the deontological perspective of Immanuel
Kant, whose ideas about a priori rules, freedom, and autonomy profoundly influenced
ethical and philosophical discourses. Equally important are the views of Rawls, whose
deontological theory of distributive justice primarily addresses inequality of socialstructural arrangements, and W. D. Ross who defends a set of prima facie duties that
ought to be applied in reference to the nature of the relationships in which they are
applied. Together, they support the idea that the notion of right is prior to that of the
good.

Deontological Perspectives
Deontological theories are of different kinds.34 The two major categories are actdeontology and rule-deontology. The former holds that each case is unique; to determine
whether actions are morally right, we need to evaluate them on a case by case basis.
Rule-deontologists, on the other hand, suggest that moral judgments should be guided by
one or more established rules that tell us how we ought to always act in certain kinds of
situations. The choice of rules is not dependent on cultural perspectives or shared social
34 See Frankena (1973) for an excellent description of theories in ethics.
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values but is based on introspection or intuition. This orientation is promoted by
philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and to a certain extent by John Rawls and W. D.
Ross. I will briefly summarize the arguments of these three important thinkers as they
offer insights into liberal notion of worthiness and autonomy as they relate to the concept
of justice.
In Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals (1997) Kant argues, consistent with
rule-deontology, that human beings create rules to guide their moral choices, and they do
so as autonomous and rational actors according to their free will. With the formulation of
the categorical imperative, which holds that one should “act only in accordance with that
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (p.
31), Kant promotes a system of morality that is independent from social circumstances,
common values, or political goals. He contends that it is our “duty” to act only in
accordance with those rules that we will to find universal acceptance as laws of nature.
As law-giving and law-receiving members of a “Kingdom of ends” (p. 42), humans
should never be treated as means to an end, but are to be considered as ends inthemselves. Human dignity, then, is grounded in the autonomous choice of moral
expression. Any interpretation of a good life, or any other end-state or value, is
disqualified as a measuring stick for moral action as it is only the actions in-themselves
that are of moral worth.
As an example, Kant asks the question whether a very ill person should take her
own life from self-love to end suffering. Note that the universality of the considered
action is not determined by the question “What if everybody else would do the same?”
which begs an answer for potential consequences, but whether one would will everybody
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else to end his or her life and suffering from self-love. His answer is that killing one-self
from self-love is not a principle that can be universalized and as such it could not
possibly be a law of nature towards which it is our duty to act. Similarly, could it ever be
considered acceptable not to tell the truth about a medical mistake? In other words, would
we will that not disclosing medical errors to patients became a universal rule of nature?
Probably not; Kant himself points out that lying, thought different from withholding
information, is categorically unacceptable. In Kantian ethics, then, individuals as rational
and autonomous givers and receivers of rules and laws do not allow for exceptions when
making ethical choices.
Putting Kantian metaphysics into the realm of political philosophy, Rawls
developed his influential theory in A Theory of Justice (1971). As in Kant, it is a theory
that regards “the concept of right prior to that of the good” (p. 28). As such, Rawls
thought of a method by which to exclude, at least in theory, prior moral conceptions of
worthiness and desert from his conception of justice. Principles of justice, he argues,
should be derived by autonomous individuals who do not make moral choices from the
vantage point of their social location but who think about them independent from any
social, political, or religious goals. Rawls calls this hypothetical situation, a scenario that
serves as a heuristic device for looking at how rational actors make choices, the “original
position” (p. 11). Individuals so situated are unaware of their social and economic
position, abilities, strength, or fortune. They are, however, cognizant of the fact that they
value certain primary goods such as rights, liberties, opportunities, income, and wealth
(p. 79) which are important for long-term life plans. As noted previously, this represents
Rawls thin conception of the good. By drawing on the notion of the social contract as
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articulated by Locke and Rousseau, he argues that people who would find themselves
behind a “veil of ignorance (p. 11)” would come to a fair agreement about which
principles of justice would best govern the basic structure of society based on their
individual interests. This differs from Kant who, except for the categorical imperative
itself, does not promote a set of a priori principles. Rawls calls the principles so derived
“justice as fairness,” because they “are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair” (p. 11).
Their role is to assign rights and duties to the basic institutions of society and to define
how social and economic advantages should be distributed fairly.
As a result, there are two principles of justice that individuals in the original
position would agree on. The first states that each person has an equal right to a system of
liberty that is similar for everybody and that as such, liberty can only be restricted if this
restriction results in more liberty. The second principle holds that inequality is acceptable
in social arrangements as long as they are arranged to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged. Rawls calls this the difference principle, and it is the one for which his work
is most known. The second principle of justice offers a second rule which establishes that
offices and positions should be open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity. As in Kant, the groundwork for justice is the selection of right-giving
principles and, though more explicit in Kant, the foundation of humanity is strongly
intertwined with moral independency. Why should we accept Rawls’ proposal? The
answer is, Rawls says, because “the conditions embodied in the description of the
original position are ones that we do in fact accept. Or if we do not, then perhaps we can
be persuaded to do so by philosophical reflection” (p. 19).
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Rawls’ principles of justice are of profound importance. What he argues in
essence is that if his conception of liberty, the difference principle, and fair equality of
opportunity were to be respected by individuals who relate to each other based on their
commitment to a social contract, society would be just and thus the distribution of goods
would also be just. The first principle guarantees their freedom not to be interfered with
by others unless the result would be greater individual freedom. This assumes that what
we value most is our independence and based on it we assure that access to independence
is protected by rights:
Persons are at liberty to do something when they are at liberty to do something
when they are free from certain constraints either to do it or not to do it and when
their doing it or not doing it is protected from interference by other persons, (p.
177)

The basis for freedom as equal liberty is location of individuals in the original position
who relate to each other not on a common moral basis, but in virtue of their contractual
agreement and commitment to the primary goods that they as rational moral actors would
want.
The absence of a moral base, one that is grounded in either religious or
philosophical values, also undergirds his second principle of justice. While Rawls grants
individuals to be moral and cable of treating each other as ends, he rejects the idea that
pre-institutional notions of moral desert have relevance for the concept of justice, as
Feinberg suggests. Nor does he accept that notions of intrinsic worth play a role in how
we choose principles of justice. Instead, moral worth is secondary and only begins to
play a role after principles have been defined in the context of social institutions:
A just scheme, then, answers to that what men are entitled to, it satisfies their
legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions. But what they are
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entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth. The
principles of justice that regulate the basic structure and specify their duties and
obligation of individuals do not mention moral desert, and there is no tendency
for distributive shares to correspond to it. (p. 273, emphasis added)
As I will show in the next chapter, Rawls’ regard of moral worth fundamentally differs
from justice as wholeness, a theory in which the notion of dignity is clearly prior to the
principles of freedom and equality which comprise justice. In other words, justice as
wholeness is based on dignity as a relational concept carrying relational obligations into
its conceptions of freedom and equality.
Although it is clear in Rawls that the justice of actions is not determined by the
goods produced, justice as fairness is not entirely independent from concerns about the
moral good of people and our social condition. What I find interesting in Rawls’
approach is that his conceptualization of justice is one of special concern for the less
fortunate. With the difference principle, Rawls makes a value judgment yet denies any
grounding in the moral nature of man based on his dignity. Without pre-conceived moral
notions, justice in Rawls truly begins in the original position, thus replacing conceptions
of intrinsic worth with contractarian obligations to secure primary goods. In other words,
he does not draw on socially accepted belief systems, such as religion. In fact, as
comprehensive doctrine he only grants religion as much space in public discourse as its
concepts can be expressed and justified by proper political values.

or

What may strike

religiously oriented scholars who read Rawls’ difference principle however is its
similarity with the concerns of the Old Testament prophets. Their outcry against the

35 In The law ofpeoples (2001) Rawls offers several examples that illustrate his argument. One is the story
of the Good Samaritan: “Consider the familiar story of the Good Samaritan. Are the values appealed to
properly political values and not simply religious or philosophical values? While the wide view of public
political culture allows us, in making a proposal, to introduce the Gospel story, public reason requires us to
justify our proposal in terms of proper political values” (p. 146).
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structural inequalities of their times and their special call for justice for the poor recalls
Rawls’ approach. Perhaps we ought to think of Rawls’ second principle of justice as an
elegant, though unintended, restatement of biblical concern.
Justice as fairness finds application in socio-economic matters that emerge from a
society in “ideal compliance”; it does relatively little when things go wrong. In this same
vein, Rawls’ application of justice as fairness in matters of criminal law leaves many
questions open. In the absence of a conception of a value that people hold in common and
towards which they orient their efforts, one that defines the morality of relationships in an
interrelated, not individualized society, it is difficult to imagine in light of life’s
complexity that conflicting claims can be evaluated with due care. Rawls’ approach to
justice is technical and structural, which is what he intended. However, when justice
demands that we look for ways to restore the multidimensional well-being of individuals
and individuals-in-relation, we enter a realm of humanity in which emotional and
spiritual factors also place a crucial role. It follows that in the absence of an evaluative
goal, principles of justice may need to be considered from a more contextually grounded
position that responds to a broader set of relational issues.
W. D. Ross (2006) offers such an approach. Promoting a deontological theory of
the right he argues, similar to Kant (1997), that rightness should be determined by the use
of intellect. Next to many actions that can be considered right and which he calls actual
duties, are certain unshakable moral truths which are in-themselves independent from
their cultural and social contexts. These principles, which he refers to as prima facie
duties, are the result of “direct reflection on what we really think” (p. 433), which is
perhaps similar in thinking to Rawls’ (1971) conception of reflective equilibrium. They
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include duties of fidelity, such as to keep promises and not to tell a lie, duties of
reparation of past wrongs as well as duties of duties of gratitude, distributive justice,
beneficence, and self-improvement. How these principles find application is based on
the specific relationships within which they are considered. Relationships such as the one
of “promisee to promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to husband” (p. 431), and a few
others, are morally significant and as such provide the context for choosing between
duties. The duty that is more important in the particular situation is the one that will be
chosen.
Ross (2006) acknowledges the importance of some goods such as virtue.
knowledge, pleasure and the “proportionment of happiness to virtue” (pp. 433, 435).
However, unlike conceptions of the good that utilitarian approaches promote, Ross’
proposed goods are not based not based on what people value but are worthy of pursuit
because of their intrinsic goodness. Subsequently, they neither determine the initial
choice ofprima facie principles, inform the resolution of conflicting claims, nor do they
establish the rightness of actions. What does make Ross’ theory more context-dependent
than other deontological approaches is its sensitivity to the nature of relationships and
obligations that arise between individuals who accept different social roles. Even though
the rightness of the actions themselves is not dependent on them, the choice of prima
facie principle is.
Ross’ theory is attractive. Its principles capture a broad range of more specific
concerns and, as he also contends, they reflect broadly how we think in moral terms.
When trying to heal the effects of medical errors, the moral nature of the doctor-patient
relationship certainly demands that we consider duties such as reparation, gratitude, and
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beneficence. The question remains, however, what do we do if, for example, the principle
of beneficence requires us withhold information about a medical error to an emotionally
devastated patient because her natural death is near while at the same time, the principle
of reparation demands that we pay money. Following Ross’ idea of principle-in-context,
the answer would lie in the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship as it would
determine which principle ought to be assigned priority.

Implications for Medical Errors
One way to think of the moral foundations of justice is in terms of a
transcendental determination of moral imperatives; another is to grant a fixed set of
principles or moral rules a permanent place in moral life. What all three perspectives
share is the focus on autonomy and, either implicitly or explicitly, the idea that
worthiness and human dignity are concepts that lie somewhere outside the moral space
that defines human relationships. What also counts, however, is the perspective of
everyday life, and it is there that intrinsic dignity defines how we should relate to each
other given our multi-dimensional nature. Indeed, it is a value which we can count on and
which should be the one that serves as a foundation for justice.
In the more specific context of medical errors, theories that prioritize the right
over the good should be evaluated by looking at the three most crucial policy issues.
The first concerns the issue of disclosure, or truth-telling. As described in
Chapter One, medical errors occur in complex environments and often unfold over days
or even months. Some medical errors cause harm to a patient, some do not, and others
have the potential to cause injury at a later point in the patient’s life. Uncertainty about
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whether an error had occurred, the patient’s own status in his course of illness, family
circumstances, and the values held by hospital moral community shake the foundation of
what may otherwise be considered an ethical absolute to let ethicality unfold in the murky
water of its relational context. Act-deontologists would argue that every case is unique
and that at best we may refer to rules of thumb how to act in a certain situation. Ruledeontologists also render judgments independent from any consideration of the potential
outcome of such crucial conversations but argue, for instance, that truth-telling is a law of
nature or prima facie duty that we ought to choose based on the doctor-patient
relationship. But even if disclosure is the right thing to do, as a universalized rule or a
rule that was chosen in virtue of a certain relational duty, there are exceptions and
limitations that we ought to consider based on the good that truth-telling may produce
overall and does so at a particular time.
A second consideration is how a fixed set of rules or principles may guide us in
developing restorative responses. In a more extended view, would rules be able to capture
the moral intricacy that unfolds between doctors, patients and the hospital when things go
wrong? Act-deontology may advise that we consider what is right for every situation.
With that little guidance, however, there is no post to perch on. Rule-deontology may
hold that restoring patients and physicians after medical error is something that could
become a law of nature, as in Kant, or a prima facie duty as in Ross. Ross’ proposal that
we look at the relationship between a physician and her patient when moral truths conflict
seems reasonable. Helpful are also Rawls’ principles of justice as they define for us the
kind of freedom that government and organizational policies ought to protect, although it
is not the kind of freedom that justice as wholeness would promote. In terms of
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restoration, the difference principle may hold that efforts to restore all three victims of
error should raise the level of the least advantaged, which most often would be the
patient. Yet, at the end of the day the question is not only whether to disclose an error or
if we should make up for things done wrong. Instead it is the question of what needs to be
restored. Without a conception of the good that warrants kinds of restorative actions,
principles of freedom and equality lose their guiding power.
The third and final issue when looking at deontological approaches to medical
eiTor is how perceptions of the right may encourage the professional and hospital moral
community to be more open about medical errors by incorporating organizational values
that encourage transparent autonomy. One advantage is that rights based theories convey
certainty and finality in an environment in which decisions are emergent and complex.
Whether or not we accept this approach depends on how much we want to tighten the
strings around discretion. It also depends on how we view obligations that arise in the
context of social and moral interconnectedness. While I support the notion that some
principles need to be put in place to limit unreasonable moral choices, I nevertheless find
it difficult to imagine that the disclosure of an error or an apology as right by principle
would engender a culture of responsibility, trust, and reciprocity. When the notion of
moral right, or legal right, replaces a common focus on possible consequences, it negates
the importance of our moral interconnectedness in making choices together in difficult
situations. If it is by right alone that we fulfill our moral obligations to each other, and if
rights are an expression of individual or group interests, they may very well turn into a
conversation-stopper in situations in which moral dialog is most called for.
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Healing Alone
The previous sections described the notion of justice as desert. It pointed out that
desert and particularly the establishment of its polar basis tends to separate individuals on
grounds of what they deserve and why and that we tend carry these moral notions into
institutional arrangements. Closely linked to the notion of desert but not the same is the
idea of a moral right and its associated deontological conceptions of justice as something
that stands independent from the results it produces. These theories locate rights and
principles in the decision-making processes of individuals who are, in terms of their
moral choices, autonomous. One of the most important considerations that travel
alongside liberal notions of justice is the specific view on autonomy and freedom that
they promote. How relationships are defined and differences resolved on a more practical
level depends on how much we are willing to allow others to take part in our decisions
and how much we grant institutions to regulate common life. Regardless of the kind of
political robe it wears, freedom is the cornerstone of justice. In fact, autonomy and
freedom are so profound that for Kant, the foundation of all humanity—dignity—is
grounded in the ability of individuals to make moral choices from the standpoint of
autonomy. In order to set the stage for promoting different perspectives of the social bond
and of dignity injustice as wholeness, I will briefly contrast two notions of freedom
which are frequently associated with political liberalism.

Freedom in Liberalism
In his often-cited inaugural lecture to the University of Oxford, Berlin (1958)
makes a distinction between two kinds of freedom that underline many notions promoted
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by political liberalism: positive freedom and negative freedom.36 According to Berlin,
positive freedom is the kind of freedom that allows an individual to be her own master,
making decisions and regulating her life without depending on others. Positive freedom is
often associated with Kant’s work. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Berlin
conceptualizes positive freedom in a distinctly Kantian genre. Kant’s take on freedom is
at the same time complex as it is intriguing, and I will only briefly address it to illuminate
the predominance of individual rationalism as a driving concept in Western political
thought.
In The Metaphysics ofMorals, Part I (2000), Kant defines freedom as the
“independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (p. 30). He construes his
definition as an “inert right” that people have in so far as it is consistent with the
categorical imperative. Freedom, Kant argues, is an “original right” that can be
universally given and which belongs to everybody by virtue of their humanity. Kant
further specifies freedom as containing the following “authorizations:” the first one is
“innate equality,” which he describes as the “independence from being bound by others
to more than one can in turn bind them.” The second authorization is the distinct positive
conception of freedom as being one’s own master and that humans are to live a life in
which they have the right to make choices independent from others. Lastly, Kant argues
that humans are “beyond reproach.” As long as one has done nothing to affect the rights
of another person or diminish what is theirs, nothing has been done wrong and one is

36 See Pettit (1999) for an excellent interpretation of Berlin’s in Republicanism: A theory offreedom and
government. Contrasting Berlin’s notion of positive and negative freedom, Pettit argues that there is a third
kind of freedom, which he refers to as republican freedom, or non-domination. See Honohan (2002) for a
comparison of freedom as non-domination from other republican notions of liberty.
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authorized to communicate or promise anything whether it is true and sincere or not. In
other words, it is up to the other person to believe us or not.
Kant’s emphasis on free will combined with his argument that humans should
never be treated merely as means to another end but as “ends in-themselves” avoids, at
least theoretically, the danger of coercion in the name of rationality while remaining
focused on superiority of the autonomous self. In the reality of everyday life, however,
humans are subject to their feelings and emotions and it is difficult to believe that a true
state of autonomy can be reached. Kant (1997) recognizes this in Groundworkfor the
Metaphysics ofMorals (pp. 58-59) where he offers a more detailed account of freedom
and how it, as an attribute of all rational beings, is connected to moral law. Kant notes
that the moral “ought” is based on the autonomy of the free will, which is rooted in the
concept of freedom. If we were only to live in what he calls a “world of understanding”
(p. 58), or the intelligible world, pure reason would lead to the creation of moral laws
according to an actor’s free will. Subsequently, actions would always be in conformity
with the will of autonomous rational actors. However, since we also live in a “world of
sense,” which is the observable world, Kant acknowledges that we are indeed subject to
sensations and perceptions. Morality, then, is dependent on our freedom to make moral
laws in the world of understanding. It is also dependent on their realization in the real
world where moral laws are acted upon as duties. The freedom to create laws of nature
according to the categorical imperative represents Kant’s positive conception of freedom
as autonomy. In fact, we are only completely free in the world of understanding. Free
will thus conceived and a will under moral law are “one and the same” (p. 53).
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Kant’s work is indeed attractive. Together with Rousseau’s work, Kant’s notion
of positive freedom as the autonomy of rational actors to create moral laws were at “the
heart of liberal humanism” (Berlin, 1958, p. 23) in the 18th century. According to Berlin
(1958), this perception,
in it’s a priori version,... is a form of secularized Protestant individualism, in
which the place of God is taken by the conception of the rational life, and the
place of the individual soul which strains towards union with Him is replaced by
the conception of the individual, ended with reason, straining to be governed by
reason and reason alone and to depend upon nothing that might deflect or delude
him by engaging his irrational nature, (p. 23)
In a society of these steadfast rational minds, then, everybody acts upon what they will,
bound only by those laws that they themselves are ready to give.
In contrast to the emphasis on the exercise of free will in the creation of moral law
and their application as duty, a negative conception of freedom would hold freedom to be
the absence of interference by others in one’s private sphere. From this perspective, the
private sphere is a politically defined space of individuals acting in the reality of
everyday life. Representing the ideas of libertarians such as Locke, Mill, Constant, and
Tocqueville, Berlin (1958) points out that there is a “minimum area of personal freedom”
(p. 9) that should never be violated, otherwise it would be impossible for individuals to
identify and pursue “the various ends which men hold good or right or sacred” (p. 9).
Particularly in the United States, freedom as non-interference reflects the preference for
standing on one’s own feet and being left alone to pursue one’s happiness. Pettit (1999)
describes that freedom as non-interference became the dominant political thought during
the American struggle for independence when it replaced the Republican ideal of
freedom, one that held that a stable system of good laws would protect individuals from
domination, not interference. According to Braithwaite and Pettit (2000a), the
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overwhelming consensus of liberals, including some of those who give preference to the
positive conception of freedom, is that “the law is merely an instrument for promoting
liberty, not a part of what it involves” (p. 57). In other words, law is an unwanted
interference unless in its most frugal use it protects us from human nature by maintaining
the boundaries between individuals and individuals and institutions. Since there are few
relational values in this perspective, and freedom as non-interference embraces the one
and only desire to march according to one’s own drum, it is an “asocial conception”
(Braithwaite & Pettit, p. 57). Although I would argue that Kantianism produces a much
more meaningful and richer conception of morality, both conceptions represent a heart in
solitary confinement.
Today, freedom carries less of the Kantian spirit but still embraces the old
meaning of “the right to be left alone” (Bellah et al., 1992, p. 9). Bellah et al. (1992)
rightly point out that it is a political ideal that fails to resonate with the interdependence
of modern social and political life and note that “freedom cannot simply mean getting
away from other people” (p. 9). Moreover, I wonder whether a conception of justice that
is rooted either in Kantian rationalism or embedded in the foundations of a society of
isolated individuals, one in which dignity is expressed at best in terms of “self-esteem”
(Stetson, 1998, p. 10), encourages us to take seriously our moral obligations as free but
interconnected “citizens” willing to accept the responsibilities that go along with taking
care of each other, engaging in moral dialog open-heartedly even when situations are
difficult. Berlin (1958) is right when he remarks “I am not disembodied by reason. Nor
am I Robinson Crusoe, alone upon his island” (p. 40). Yet the two perspectives of
freedom just described support the kind of individualism that drives the turning wheels of
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progress in much of the Western hemisphere. As technical sophistication is growing
exponentially, the establishment of its moral base is moving along less rapidly and is
often limited to economic concerns.

Justice and Individualism
An implication of individualistic images of society is that they are not only
theoretically elegant but are of practical relevance. The trademarks of individualism
profoundly influenced private and institutional moral frameworks. For instance, Kraus
(1979) argues that American individualism promotes the regard of religion as a private
concern. Consequently, the interpretation of the Bible has placed a strong emphasis on
the individual. Kraus’ thesis is that when reading the Bible in its cultural and historical
contexts, a different interpretation emerges, one that situates the individual into the close
networks of the collective group or organic society in which moral and spiritual concerns
have shared meaning. From this perspective, in the Old Testament individual identity was
experienced in religious and cultural traditions of the fathers of Israel; in the New
Testament, self-identity was found in the Spirit of Christ through participation in Flis
body. In contrast to “rational individualism,” both emphasize the community as a vehicle
of self-fulfillment and spiritual expression.
As pointed out in Chapter Two, individualism has also influenced the institution
of medicine and its professions. This is not to argue that every physician or nurse
subscribes to ideal of Robinson Crusoe; however, the medical profession in general finds
great value in autonomy, as we have seen in Chapter Three, a kind of autonomy that
reflects at least to some degree the characteristics of individualism. As a result, the loss of
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freedom in recent years may perhaps be part of the current dissatisfaction with increased
government and managerial control of physicians' practice. Perhaps Sullivan’s (2005)
conception of “freedom in vocation” might better be served if it were to include a more
specific consideration of the kinds of individual freedom that Berlin describes. The same
ideology might be an important factor that is at least in part responsible for the gap
between Freidson’s (1984) notion of expertise, or the control over technical aspects of
work, and ethicality, which refers to physicians’ civic obligations. If I am correct, either
conception of freedom as non-interference or self-mastery may distort the image of the
physician as civically-oriented professional.
There is one final point I wish to make prior to beginning the search for a new
vision. Freedom as non-interference places great emphasis on the protection of the
individual sphere even when the removal of personal boundaries is most crucial. As
mentioned previously, we tend to create rights around issues that are individually,
spiritually, mentally, and relationally significant and as such warrant interpersonal
attention including truthfulness, compassion, and care. Healing and erring occur in the
context of individual and organizational relationships. Making medical mistakes means
accepting vulnerability. Accepting vulnerability creatively can be done by reconciling
professional expertise to public ethical concerns. It is only recently that the treatment of
medical errors has been articulated as a moral issue as we come to terms with their moral
implications. Generally, there is agreement that patients should be told about medical
mistakes followed by apology. In fact, many say that this is the right thing to do, but then
quickly offer non-moral provisions that shield vulnerability.
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For instance, I recently attended a leadership meeting at the faith-based hospital
and trauma center where I conducted field research. During this meeting one of the
hospital’s attorneys felt that it is morally right to apologize but immediately qualified his
statement with needing more evidence that shows that it would not cause more lawsuits. I
would call this particular inconsistency in moral reasoning “market consequentialism.” It
is in this context that the language about medical errors is not only a language of rights
but also a language of economics. Although they do not discuss the cost of medical
malpractice litigation, Bellah and Tipton (2007) report similar observations and point out
that “primary relationships,” such as those between doctors and patients, “are being
stripped of any moral understanding other than that of market exchange. Thus the
autonomy of professions, such as medicine, is being encroached upon by the “economic
field” (p. 402). In this same vein, Habermas (2005) writes that,
Today, the all persuasive language of the market puts all interpersonal relations
under the constraint of an egocentric orientation toward one’s own preferences.
The social bond, however, being made up of mutual recognition, cannot be
spelled out in the concepts of contract, rational choice, and maximal benefit alone.
(p. 110)
He argues that “democratic common sense” (p. 108) should include and take seriously
voices that come from religious traditions, an argument that Stout (2005) also defends on
grounds of what he calls “expressive freedom.” I would defend an augmentation of
democratic common sense by including religious voices that capture the depth of
relational expressions and the revelation that God is acting through us in our
relationships, particularly in matters that concern justice.
The question, then, is when thinking about justice, are we truly victims of our
personal preferences or have we simply forgotten to draw on the rich resources that our
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cultural heritage provides? As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, Plato’s Cephalus
made the proposal that justice is telling the truth and giving back what is owed.
Trachymarchus and Glaucon articulate their views on justice in similar categorical and
non-relational terms. However, both were rejected in favor of the more contextual socialrelational conceptions which Socrates/Plato and to a greater degree, as I will show in the
following chapter, Aristotle promote: justice is the harmonious functioning of society and
is exercised in relation to others and for their good.
Similarly, the rich narratives of communal justice in the Old Testament as well as
the healing ministry of Jesus reveal richer contexts in which to locate meanings and
applications of justice including those that have the potential to create a more restorative
faith-based hospital community. The next chapter will bring these perspectives to life.
Although religious contentions rarely end up in policy debates unless they are recast to fit
public reason, as Rawls demands, the voices of the Old Testament prophets as well as
biblical images of wholeness resonate with sensitive minds as many Americans claim to
be religious (Stout, 2005). Specifically, the experiences of illness and healing raise
ontological questions that bear on spiritual as well as religious and factors. So do
instances in which one person harmed another either intentionally or unintentionally, and
it is often in reference to a transcendent reality that we search for ways that allow us to
reconcile and forgive. If we accept the proposal in Chapter One that healing involves
counteracting or reducing the effects of medical errors with the aim to restore the
multidimensional well-being of individuals who have become highly vulnerable it is
imperative to accept a perspective of justice as integrative and which is oriented towards
wholeness.
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Conclusion
The just desert model responds to harm by separating the parties to determine
what each person deserves or has a right to receive. The parties are treated individually,
and more often than not the relational gap is bridged only symbolically. Deontological
perceptions, particularly those that draw on liberal conceptions of autonomy and freedom
that engender a language of rights, are equally limiting. They certainly differ from the
more integrative views of both the Greek and biblical traditions. To make somebody
whole after failure is a more complex matter than one in which specific rules are the sole
determinants of how restoration should take place. Perhaps it would be more human to
think about harm from a restorative perspective in which patients and healthcare
providers encounter the results of failure together and in light of shared values. For
instance, values such as compassion, honesty, and integrity are based on mutuality and as
such orient themselves toward concerns about the future. Restorative justice, including
justice as wholeness, regards justice as an opportunity to reconnect, to restore and to heal,
thus bridging the gap not symbolically from different vantage points but in actuality by
working together towards a common goal. Rather than being a first response to harm,
justice as wholeness is an enduring affirmation of human dignity that takes into account
the interconnectedness of all life. It is to this vision that I will now turn.
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CHAPTER FIVE
JUSTICE AS WHOLENESS

Introduction
The notion that justice is what one deserves is a common theme of liberal theories
of justice and widespread in our culture. The previous chapter argued that this view of
justice should be reconsidered. The purpose of the present chapter is to develop a
culturally rooted normative theory of ethics called justice as wholeness. Rather than
considering justice exclusively in terms of the provision of that which people deserve or
have a right to, justice as wholeness takes a principled consequentialist approach. It
proposes that actions are good and also just if they bring back or “restore” a person’s
experience of wholeness while at the same time honoring the principles of freedom and
equality.
The chapter begins by providing a rationale for a new vision and describes the
theory’s cultural relevance, Judeo-Christian foundation, and consequentialist structure.
The major section develops the theory of value which explores the notion of wholeness,
distinguishing between its eschatological significance as a vision and its relative
experience in a broken world. What follows is the theory of obligation in which justice
as wholeness is developed for its restorative elements in order to respond to the loss of
the physical, emotional, spiritual, and social well-being of individuals and organizations
harmed by medical errors. After putting into place the two constraining principles put
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forth by the theory of obligation, this chapter concludes with a brief statement of the full
vision of justice as wholeness and an outline of its propositions.

Finding a New Vision
Taking on a new perspective means to think differently. Drawing on deeply
rooted cultural traditions and making use of long established theoretical discourses in
ethics, justice as wholeness moves from a post-enlightenment individual focus to a
theologically rooted relational one, thus providing an alternative theoretical base from
which to launch organizational policies and practices that encompass a multi-dimensional
and interrelated representation of reality. By doing so it is based on a different selection
of those tools from a toolbox that allow for participation in a new language game. Justice
as wholeness is thus an invitation to shift paradigms.

A Culturally Situated Approach
If a new perspective, especially one that invokes changes to major social issues
such as dealing with the aftermath of medical errors, is to find acceptance in
organizations, it needs to be based on commonly held values. Some scholars argue that
morality is a shared set of values that all humans have in common and that can be
discovered (for example, Gert, 2005). However, even the most common moral
imperatives and their systems of evaluation are culturally patterned and expressed within
the frameworks of major cultural traditions. Justice as wholeness highlights both the
viability of the Christian position and the political philosophy of classic Greek and
Roman cultures. A culturally situated understanding of justice means returning to the
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wisdom of these established traditions by expressing their core ideas in contemporary
contexts37 .
Within the amalgam of beliefs and practices that form American cultural heritage
Religion played a major role. Religious values in 17th Century America were those held
by Protestants such as the Puritans who traveled across the ocean from Europe in order to
escape religious persecution. Their hope was to establish communities in the New
England states that supported their way of worship and in which purity and simplicity
reflected the kind of life that God’s people should live. As in Calvinism, there was a
focus on hard work and the distribution of wealth was to promote the good of the
community. The accumulation of wealth was considered a blessing of God and a sign of
the “chosen;” its public display was sinful and forbidden. Murphy (2001) describes that
“a thin diet and mean clothes were regarded as virtuous, whatever one’s circumstances”
(p. 257).
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1998), Weber defends the
thesis that the distinct Protestant ethic, which is based on the idea that continuous
systematic work following the Lutheran conception of a “Beruf,” or “calling” as a means
to asceticism and sign of rebirth, has promoted an attitude towards life that he calls the
“spirit” of modem capitalism (p. 172). Weber observed that Protestants of any
socioeconomic class, particularly Calvinists and later Puritans who brought their beliefs
to America, “have shown a special tendency to develop an economic rationalism which
can not be observed to the same extend among Catholics” (p. 40). The explanation of the

37Justice as wholeness rejects arguments that support the exclusion of religion from theoretical propositions
and supports those that welcome religious principles into public and political discourses face value (e.g.,
Stout, 2005).
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wide-spread difference is based neither on Enlightenment philosophy nor on political
contingencies but on the very nature of their religious beliefs.
During the westward expansion, the ethic of hard work in combination with
biblical moral imperatives played a key role in shaping the American mind as early
colonists faced the challenges of traveling through God’s Promised Land as covenanted
peoples. Many of these ideals were carried into 18th century America and had a profound
influence on the founding of the new republic. Many religious groups were surprised and
disappointed to learn that neither the Articles of Confederation nor the United States
Constitution contained specific religious provisions. Exceptions are Article VI38 and the
first Amendment in the Bill of Rights39, which was ratified in 1791. Elowever, the
Continental Congress and the first two presidents, George Washington and John Adams,
emphasized the moral value of religion and strongly supported its role in political
discourse and public life40. The phrase “in God we trust” represents the centrality of
religion in colonial times and throughout the political history of an independent America.
Bellah (2005) notes that, in American political theory, sovereignty rests with the people;
he immediately adds that “implicitly and often explicitly, the ultimate sovereignty has
been attributed to God” (p. 42). A steadfast belief in God connected American Christians
even as the churches divided under the forces of changing socioeconomic conditions41.
Despite the formal separation of state and church and the division within the churches
38 Article VI [3] “no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
the United States.”
j9 Amendment I [1791]. “Congress shall make now law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit
the free exercise thereof.”
40 See “Religion and the founding of the American Republic,” Government exhibit, for an excellent
discussion of this topic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/. downloaded 7/24/08.
In The Social Sources of Denominationalism, Niebuhr (1987) investigates the influences of pertinent
historical moments in the United States such as colonization, industrialization, the division of labor,
immigration influx, as well as slavery as the social determinants of Church ecology and characteristics of
religious beliefs.
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themselves, common elements of the religious heritage are shared by a majority of
Americans as an integral part of public and political life. They comprise what Bellah
(2005) refers to as “civil religion” (p. 42).
However, it was not only religion that inspired early American thinking. Images
of God’s Kingdom were mixed with a strong sense of political independence. It was a
combination of religious and political perceptions of community and freedom that shaped
American legal and political ecology. The dissatisfaction of colonists with the structure
of British colonial governance and methods of taxation prompted the consideration of
alternative political structures that were more responsive to the religious and political
goals of the early settlers. Murphy (2001) points out that during the 1760’s there was a
growing interest in the ancient Roman-Catonean and Greek-Spartan Republics. The
image of the ascetic farmer-soldier-citizen was particularly appealing to the colonists
whose understanding of classic literature resonated with their focus on hard work and the
simple, virtuous life. Thus, “alongside the Bible and Protestant hymn-book images of
ancient Sparta and Crete and the early Roman Republic entered into common currency”
(Murphy, 2001, p. 264).
As Americans prepared to draft a constitution for their new independent country,
they looked at the socio-political arrangements of the Greek city-states and the type of
balanced Government that distinguished the early Roman Empire. They turned
specifically to the political philosophies of the ancient writers Aristotle and Cicero. Their
views on politics laid the foundation for an orientation referred to as “civic
republicanism” which, as an alternative to communitarianism and liberalism, was
influential in the United States and much of the Western world until the late 18th century
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(Honohan, 2002). In the Greek Republics and the early Roman Empire there was focus
moral excellence in civic life, on self-government, freedom and interdependence under
the rule of law. These political values and specifically the arrangement of balanced
powers of the Roman constitution were attractive to Americans and influenced American
structures of governance. Yet instead of making the city the center of public life as was a
characteristic of the classic traditions, Americans had to rethink the dimensions of their
first “extended republic” (Murphy, 2001, p. 261) in terms of geography and class
membership.
Politically, it was a republic that was modeled according to the agreement of
contracting individuals who arranged to govern their expanding country with a
comprehensive system of checks and balances operating in accordance with a separation
of powers. In other words, a revision of the balanced class system of Rome and its
representative government provided the blue print for the American constitutional
configuration. Over time, however, there was less emphasis on the kind of public
freedom that citizens once enjoyed and treasured. In alignment with Enlightenment
philosophy, Americans soon were to focus on the role of state as a protector of the very
specific kind of individual freedom that became central to liberal political views.
Socially, American public life took place primarily in the context of institutions
and individuals participated in voluntary associations, each having a specialized focus.
When Alexis de Tocqueville recorded his observations of American culture during his
visit in 1830 it was this cultural distinction that the author noted. Public life was of
importance to Americans as evidenced by the public nature of the legal process and by
extensive voluntary engagement in special interest groups. Yet, it has rarely been
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invigorated by a sense of civic duty or by a shared commitment to the common good. In
other words, political and social arrangements in the new American republic were not
based on the recognition of the interdependence of life but on independence with a great
sense of philanthropy. As indicated in chapter three, the focus on individuals and their
interests that existed alongside the realm of public participation and images of the
Biblical community has become an important characteristic of modem American culture,
though luckily not the single most important. As Murphy (2001) points out so
eloquently, “America was created of images of the Catonian citizen-farmer, Protestant
rational asceticism, Promised Land politico-theology, and Enlightenment know-how” (p.
266); the remnants of these diverse roots may still be uncovered today.
When considering elements of these crucial moments in American cultural history
as building blocks for a culturally rooted vision of justice one may examine theological
roots and investigate primarily those beliefs held by Protestant religion. One should also
step back to take into consideration images of the early Roman republic, the integrity of
the person as citizen committed to a common good as well as its specific
conceptualization of freedom as recognition of interdependence. The question becomes
why in a modem multi-cultural America that promises highly technical medical care it is
important to look at these seemingly ancient themes when thinking about the theoretical
underpinnings of post-medical error policies?
One important reason is that is that the fundamental values underlying policies, in
this case the concept of justice, are independent of technological progress and continue to
reference cultural traditions. As Habermas (2005) argues, scientific theories—to which
could be added the theories and processes of modem medicine—change the content of
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our self-understanding; they do not change the framework of everyday knowledge about
ourselves and our place in the universe. For instance, as an element of the cultural
framework, religion is woven into the social fabric shaping values and beliefs. This is
reflected in the results of a 2002 survey Religion and public life, where 87% of
respondents indicated that religion carries importance in their lives. Moreover, the 2004
General Social Survey reveals that 64% of Americans found it at least “fairly important”
to be Christian. The 2002 Exploring religious America survey found that for a significant
number of Americans, the Bible helps in making decisions about their lives, and about
one-half of the respondents said that they would attend religious services at least once per
week.
The fact that religious principles continue to play a role in Western culture is also
demonstrated by the prevalence of biblical metaphors in everyday language, although
many Americans do not realize their origin when using them (Bellah, 1988). Phrases such
as “an eye for an eye” or concepts such as compassion and forgiveness are known to
nearly everyone, but are frequently taken out of their biblical context to be translated to
fit secular discourses. The problem, however, is that they tend to lose some of their richer
meanings, particularly in those instances when human relationships are deeply troubled.
For example, Habermas (2005) argues that some past wrongs and injustices are
irreversible and impossible to repair by any means of human power. In those situations,
“the lost hope for resurrection is keenly felt as a void” (p. 111). However, when situating
profound terms such as reconciliation and forgiveness into the context of the cross and
searching for purpose in light of prophetic hope, injustices or harm don’t become
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reversible, yet the meaning of their outcomes may be transformed to invoke change rather
than terminating in resignation.
A similar argument can be made in instances of severe medical error, when one
person harmed another and there is a need to reconcile and forgive. In order to heal
relational brokenness, to restore a loss of trust, or soothe deep emotional pain of
individuals who have become highly vulnerable, it is imperative to accept a perspective
that is integrative and which offers richer metaphors than those of rights and duties. Thus
when talking about the “more” that is required of the kind of justice that aims to restore
wholeness after medical error, one should turn to concepts and ideas that draw on the
richness cultural tradition and select those which have the potential to elevate a sense of
the good to a higher level.
Another equally important reason for drawing on our cultural roots is that they
provide fresh insight into old dilemmas. When trying to change medical culture from one
of silence to one of transparency, it is more effective to look at alternative structures of
governance in light of time-honored values and conceptions, such as civic freedom, than
uprooting all that is customary. For example, compassion requires involvement in each
other’s lives. Especially in times of pain and suffering, it calls on us to be present and to
share in each other’s vulnerability. The dilemma is that compassionate engagement of
this kind is a common value, yet professional and organizational conceptions of freedom
do not support it. The main task of a Christian organization, as I see it, is to formulate
values that are rooted in the biblical tradition and to create an organizational structure in
which this kind of political freedom protects these values and encourages that they be put
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into practice. In civic republican tenns, this would be an organizational culture in which
freedom encourages virtue.
Values such as wholeness, freedom, equality, and compassion are rooted in an
understanding of what it means to be human. The foundation of justice as wholeness,
then, is the specific notion of human dignity. It is this particular understanding of
humanness and interrelatedness that shines through theoretical abstractions and which
defines human interactions. As a reflection of cultural integrity, the respect of human
dignity is fundamental to any organizational arrangement and as such warrants utmost
clarity in definition and argument.

The Foundation: Human Dignity
Kant (1997) who is famous for articulating dignity as an unchanging and
unequivocal characteristic of human kind argues that
in the Kingdom of ends, everything has either a price or dignity. What has a price
can be replaced by something else that is equivalent; what on the other hand is
raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity, (p. 42)
For Kant, autonomy and the existence of humans as ends-in-themselves possessing free
will, who are law-giving and law-receiving, is the “ground of human dignity” (p. 43). The
possession of dignity by virtue of autonomy lends itself to the expression of individual
rights, duties and obligations, as evidenced by Kanf s categorical imperative and certainly
by the practical use of Kantian ethics in Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness. In fact, the
secular conceptualization of dignity in absolute terms was a common element of
Enlightenment philosophy (see Watts, 2006).
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Similarly, the vision of justice as wholeness begins with the understanding that
every person manifests a dignity that is unbending under the forces of social and political
change. Yet, following the biblical tradition, dignity injustice as wholeness differs
substantially from the conception of Enlightenment thinkers. In the Judeo-Christian
worldview, the concepts of intrinsic worth and inherent dignity are deeply rooted in the
creation stories (Ge 1-3, New International Version). When God created the Earth, the
sky, the sea and all the living creatures, He judged His work to be “good” (Ge 1). Asa
result, there is an intrinsic goodness in all of creation: all creatures, and not just humans,
have intrinsic worth. This worth does not depend on any individual characteristic,
position in life or achievements; in God’s eyes, every creature is worthy. However, when
God created humans, He not only regarded them as good in-themselves but conferred a
special status:
Let us make man in our image, in our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of
the sea and the birds of the air, over livestock, over all the earth, and over all the
creatures that move along the ground. (Ge 1:26)
Because humans are created in God’s image, they not only have intrinsic worth like all
creatures, but also reflect His image by manifesting a fundamental level of God-given
dignity. It follows that in Christian theology, the ground of dignity is not autonomy but
the creation of humans in God’s image.
Recall that neither the Kantian nor the Christian theological conceptions of
dignity are socially dependent, yet they differ in content and extrinsic expression.42 They
also provide different notions of justice. From the Kantian understanding of a dignity
rooted in autonomy springs a notion of universal principles that primarily focus on the
individual. Dignity that springs from humans being created in God’s image, who actively
42 See Stetson’s (1998) distinction between intrinsic dignity and its extrinsic expression.
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participate in the vast network of His creation, does not only have implications for the
individual but primarily implies a multidimensional and relational perspective (see
Brady, 1998). At the beginning of time there was a condition of perfect wholeness as
reflected by the complete integration and order of all life. Humans were in
communicative and spiritual closeness with God and related to each other and creation
integrating His will. Genesis 1:26-29 suggests that it was God’s purpose to create an
interrelated ecological system in which humans live in community accepting
responsibilities as part of their special position in the order of creation. The specific
notion of freedom that emerges from the integrated perception of humans in creation
reflects the focus on multi-dimensional interconnectedness.
Rice (2006) suggests that the creation narratives explicate two evolving
understandings of the notion of freedom. The first is of non-moral nature and evidenced
by the fact that Adam was free to name the animals according to his choice (Ge 2:19).
The second conception of freedom has moral implications and is often referred to as
“moral freedom” (Rice, 2006, p. 12). As such, it involves decisions about doing what is
morally right and doing what is wrong. For instance, God told Adam not to eat fruit from
the tree of knowledge of good and evil, the consequences being that he would die (Ge
2:17). Eve, temped by the serpent while having full knowledge of God’s command
weighed the consequences of eating the forbidden fruit. Based on the possibility of
knowing good and evil as God does along with the tasty look of the fruit, she decided to
disobey God’s command (Ge 3:6). It is interesting to note that the first documented moral
decision made by human kind, albeit a misguided one, was consequentialist.
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Biblical freedom unfolds in the context of creation. Actions are participatory and
consequential in light of the whole creation. With the freedom to make moral and nonmoral choices humans were endowed with an understanding of self in light of their
ethical obligation to God, to others and to their environment. In light of God’s will for
man to rule over the earth in His likeness, high ethical demands were made known as “in
God’s likeness” means ruling with perfect love thus reflecting His nature. In turn, as a
complete system, nature in all her beauty and variety sustains life on Earth. All seed and
fruit bearing trees and plants were available as nourishment; all other creatures were
provided with green plants for food. It follows that the physical, mental, spiritual and
social aspects of human life were in perfect balance and woven into the fabric of life.
God established that complete wholeness would require the recognition of equality of all
who are created in His image and the presence of God-given freedom in the framework
of His purpose. Dignity, then, as a reflection of the original creation, expresses the triadic
relationship between wholeness, freedom, and equality.
Schwoebel (2006) defends the view that the meaning of being created in the
image of God and the concept of dignity are to be located in a framework of relationships
between God and His creation, focusing particularly on how the concepts change when
analyzed over the whole time span of human history. Once bestowed on humans by God,
then bending under the impact of sin, it is only through God’s grace and the death and
crucifixion of Jesus Christ that human dignity is fully revealed in Christ and restored in
communion with Him. Watts (2006) gives an account of the eschatological significance
of dignity as unfolding reflection of the image of God in humans. He suggests that people
differ in the degree as to how fully they realize the potential that comes from being
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created in God’s image. God bestowed dignity on humans as a “gift;” however, where
everyone has retained a “basic dignity” (p. 250), its full realization as a universal
characteristic of human kind is better be understood in eschatological terms as God’s
purpose and promise. In the meantime, dignity should be expressed in qualitative or
relative terms. Because of “Christ’s gift of the spirit” (p. 261), Watt suggests that we have
been given access to the kind of “imagination” that helps us to see the position of the
other so that human relationships may be strengthened and be returned to the kind of
respect that God’s intends us to deserve. As God’s gift, dignity calls for a different
response than the universal conception that demands rights for everyone.
The danger in looking at dignity in relative terms is that our expression of being
created in God’s image may easily become a matter of social and political construction.
In other words, who is to determine what kind of dignity is more developed and is of
superior quality? This is exactly what Kant tried to avoid but didn’t succeed fully in
doing. The question then becomes whether dignity should be expressed in absolute terms.
Has God bestowed upon humans a fundamental level of dignity that was either left
unaffected by sin or has been completely restored through the death and crucifixion of
Jesus Christ? A more detailed discussion of this fundamental question is beyond the
scope of this project; nevertheless, the purpose of raising the subject was to find a starting
point for justice as wholeness and to ground its constituent concepts. Consequently, I
make the following proposal:
Justice as wholeness regards dignity in absolute terms. Every living being is part
of the whole order of creation and has intrinsic worth. Additionally, every living person
has been created in God’s image and thus has been “gifted,” as Watts (2006) expresses,
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with an undiminished dignity. The unborn as well as those whose life is extended
artificially but whose ability to reason and to carry out basic human functions can not be
preserved have intrinsic worth and deserve special consideration of their dignity. In case
of the former this is because of their potential for full personhood; for the latter it is their
humanness as it was once present. The notion that everyone has dignity is supported by a
loving and forgiving God who is acting in history holding a covenantal relationship with
His people. Seeing dignity this way implies that there is an unshakable and distinctly
God-given presence of equality in social and spiritual relationships, the presence of
which is strongly intertwined with the concept of wholeness.
The remainder of this chapter will describe these relationships in much greater
detail. However, in contrast to Watts and other authors who defend similar perspectives,
I regard the reflection and expression of being created in His image as less a matter of
varying degrees of dignity but rather as a matter of authenticity. The life of Jesus is a
perfect representation of what it means to be created in the image of God. His life is an
expression of dignity as it unfolds to its fullest extent. It is “authentic.” Not all humans
have authenticity; nevertheless they are still in the image of God, gifted with dignity.
Communion with Christ confirms this human status increasing the potential of serving
God and living life as an authentic witness.43 Lastly, God’s promise and the vision of the
prophets reveal a future in which God’s original intent of perfect wholeness will be
realized for eternity.
By situating the concept of dignity into the discussion of justice, a picture of a
relational, multidimensional, and wholeness-oriented paradigm begins to take shape.
From a Christian theological perspective, one may defend the thesis that the only reason
4j I borrow this term from Kraus’ The Authentic Witness (1979).
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we “deserve” anything is that human beings manifest intrinsic worth and inherent dignity
by virtue of God’s creative power. When dealing with harm caused by medical errors, it
is this fundamental reality that demands that “everyone counts” and is treated with
genuine respect of the whole person. Dignity, then, is an underlying assumption of a
vision of justice as wholeness. Respect of personhood is a reflection of God’s
commitment to human kind.
Justice as wholeness draws on deeply seated cultural beliefs. The foundation of
this normative ethical theory is a conception of intrinsic worth and inherent dignity that is
embedded in the web of relationships between humanity and God who created all life. It
is at this level where we witness the emerging contours of human wholeness and the kind
of justice that responds to its restoration. From the search for a new vision I will now
move towards describing the family of theories in ethics from which a framework for
justice as wholeness will be derived. In other words, what is needed is a formal structure
in which to arrange the concepts that make up the conceptual framework. Specifically, I
defend what I refer to as “principled consequentialism” that is distinctive for justice as
wholeness.

Principled Consequentialism
The previous chapter discussed the application of just deserts and deontological
theories to the search for justice after medical error. Rather than considering justice
exclusively in terms of the provision of that what people deserve or have a right to, an
approach that I argued to be limited in terms of its restorative potential, an alternative
perspective holds that actions are right or, in the case of justice as wholeness, good and
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just, if they aim at a goal that people value. A consequentialist theory holds that the
standard for what is morally permissible, right, good, or obligatory is the non-moral value
that we wish to bring into being (Frankena, 1973). Pettit (2003) argues that a proper
response to those values that individuals or institutions agree to accept would be to honor
and to promote them. However, he contends that were rights should always be honored,
values are honored only in so far as doing so is part of promoting these values. As such, a
consequentialist theory is a theory of decision and justification that tells an actor which
option she ought to choose from a set of alternatives (Pettit & Brennan, 1986; Pettit,
2003).

In general, there are two structural components that are common to all goaloriented approaches. The first is a theory of value or a conception of the good that the
theory promotes (see Frankena, 1973). The study of value does not take into account
ways to promote such as a value, nor does it derive reasons for why actions might be
right or wrong. Moreover, the theory of value leaves unconsidered any principles that
may play a role as constraining elements. It is a theory that only answers questions about
the good of human kind (see Harold, 2005). The second component of goal-oriented
approaches in ethics is the theory of obligation (see Frankena, 1973). It states how to
evaluate actions in terms of the rightness and provides guidance for selecting an
alternative from a set of conflicting claims. I will first briefly discuss the theory of value
and then turn towards more specific theories of obligation in order to develop principled
consequentialism.
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Non-moral Values
Every consequentialist theory in ethics outlines at least a rough conception of the
kind of the non-moral value it promotes. Non-moral values are in-themselves neither
moral nor immoral. Their pursuit, however, reflects on the character of the person. The
idea that there are goods worth pursuing for their own sake and that there is an ultimate
end towards which one should strive highlighted classical Greek dialog. Every pursuit
and every action has an end, Aristotle (1976) notes in Ethics. The end of medicine is
health; that of strategy is victory and so on. Most ends, however, are means to something
else. It is only what he refers to as the “supreme good” (p. 73), the good that encompasses
all other ends, that is in fact final. For Aristotle, happiness is the supreme good chosen
for its sake alone; an end towards which all actions should be directed. Values such as
happiness, then, are good-in-themselves. Instead of serving as means to an end they ought
to be promoted as ends.
There are of course many conceptions of ends one may consider desirable44. For
instance, Mill (1957) proposes in Utilitarianism that actions ought to be chosen if they
fulfill the requirement of social utility or the greatest good for the greatest number of
people. Under “good” Mill understands the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain
and contends his theory of value to be happiness. In Not Just Deserts, Braithwaite and
Pettit (2000a) propose the republican notion of freedom as non-domination as “noncontroversial goal” that ought to be promoted in criminal justice. And as noted, even
44

Frankena (1973) identifies six categories of non-moral values. These include utility values which are
useful because they serve a purpose. Another category contains extrinsic values which are things that are
good because they are a means to produce something else considered good. There are also inherent values,
which are good because our experience of them is good or rewarding, such as looking at art. Moreover,
there is a category of values that the author identifies as final values which are considered good from an
overall perspective. Intrinsic values, which are values that do not depend on external justification for being
valued (see Harold, 2005) and elements of intrinsic values present Frankena’s last two categories.
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deontologist John Rawls promotes a “thin theory” of the good. Justice as wholeness is
concerned with a non-moral value that is intrinsically good and which is the theory’s
particular conception of wholeness.
Non-moral goods may either be desired for oneself, for others, in relationships or
as part of an overall state of affairs. Standard consequentialist theories hold that the goal
whatever it may be has an “evaluator-neutral value” (Pettit & Brennan, 1986, p. 438) or is
“impersonal” or “agent-neutral” (Henden, 2007, p. 179). Mill (1957) points out that
happiness as the utilitarian standard for choosing the right conduct is not happiness from
the point of view of the actor or from the standpoint of what is best for her but an
objective assessment of the good for all concerned: “As between his own happiness and
that of others utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and
benevolent actor” (p. 22). More recent work in decision ethics moves away from the
focus on the impartiality of classical utilitarianism towards a theory of value that is
relative to the perceptions of the actor. This theoretical orientation is called “agentrelative teleology” (see Schroeder, 2007) suggesting that agents should always choose
that action that will bring about the most of what is good relative to the agent45. As such,
an individual actor draws on her own unique perspective and evaluates options and ranks
alternatives from her specific point of view.

Goodness and Justice
The second structural component of consequentialist theories is the theory of
obligation (Frankena, 1973). It is concerned with how actions, rules or policies that aim

45 Agent-relative teleology should be distinguished from ethical egoism which holds that an actor ought
always to do that action whose results will be best for the actor (Schroeder, 2007).

181

towards a value such as happiness, wholeness or any other should be evaluated and what
criterion or criteria may determine their selection as a valuable choice in light of their
predicted consequences. Pettit and Brennan (1986) offer two propositions which I take
the liberty to rephrase in broader terms.46
The first proposition suggests that the right option in any decision is the one
which best promotes the value that is to be realized in the world (Pettit & Brennan, 1986,
p. 438). The menu of theories of obligation that accept this proposition is extensive and a
survey is beyond the scope of this section. Consequently, I briefly mention two major
orientations, the second of which becomes structurally relevant for justice as wholeness.
One way of interpreting the phrase “right option” is to focus on rules and determine what
rule or set of rules ought to be chosen that promote the non-moral value, or goal. For
instance, rule-utilitarians, such as Mill (1957) determine the rightness or wrongness of
actions in reference to rules the application of which would have the most utility, or
would promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In other words, they
ask the question “what would the consequences be if everyone observed a particular rule
or combination of rules” (see Lyons, 1965, p. 11). This is in contrast to the Kantian
universalization described in the previous chapter which held that an act is right if we
wish for it to become a universal law of nature. In Kant, generalization begins with the

46 Pettit and Brennan (1986) argue standard consequentialism to be characterized by the following three
propositions: “(1) Every relevant state of the world, realized or not, has an evaluator-neutral value. (2) The
right option in any decision is a function of the value to be realized in the world: as the function is usually
understood, it is that which maximizes objectively probable value, that which promotes the best objectively
possible consequences. (3) The function which determines what is the right decision is also the function
which ought to be applied in decision-making: it serves at once to evaluate options, and to select them” (p.
438). The author’s first proposition represents the theory of value; their second and third propositions the
theory of obligation. Because justice as wholeness is organized into a theory of value and a theory of
obligation (Frankena, 1973), the numerals that the authors assigned have changed. However, I roughly
maintain their structure of argumentation on standard and restrictive consequentialism, translating some of
its components to the specific idea of principled consequentialism.

182

act itself omitting a consideration of its consequences. Rule-consequentialism, or
restricted consequentialism, begins with a generalization of an act which is then
evaluated in light of its consequences. A more specific articulation of rule-utilitarianism
has been suggested by Brandt (2003) who proposes the following:
An act is right if and only if it conforms with that leamable set of rules the
recognition of which as morally binding -roughly at the time for the act- by
everyone in the society of the agent, except for the retention by individuals of
already formed and decided moral convictions, would maximize intrinsic yalue.
(pp. 232-233)
The theory so conceived includes as a generalization a cultural perspective, the general
acceptance of rules at the particular moment in social and cultural history in which the
event occurred. It also promotes the idea that rules are learnable and then become part of
a common morality. In this view, morality is shaped by cultural currents.
Another way to interpret the rightness of actions is to focus on a particular
situation without generalizing the consequences of what everyone else may do. Instead of
asking what kinds of rules would potentially promote the value, act-consequentialists or
more specifically act-utilitarians ask the question “what affect will my doing this act in
this situation have on the general balance of good over evil” (Frankena, 1973, p. 35). In
other words, act-consequentialists choose that act among a set of alternatives which they
predict to have the greatest potential to promote their value in that particular situation.
As Lyons (1965) says, “it is the thing to be done” (p. 9). This orientation is quite similar
to situation ethics. A common critique of the approach is that it is unable to accommodate
prima facie duties, those as described by Ross, which include obligations such as truth
telling or keeping promises. Brandt (2003) argues that it is an “atomistic theory in which
the value of its effects of a single act on the world is decisive for its rightness” (p. 208).
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Whatever method is chosen to evaluate the rightness or goodness of an action,
justice as wholeness uses the word “good” rather than “right,” is not necessarily a just
option. This is because any act, policy or rule that may be determined to maximize good
overall, injustice as wholeness it would be the restoration of wholeness, may do so to the
expense of others. The potential for domination or the sacrifice of either choices or the
well-being of others for a socially defined goal that would benefit many is a common
critique of utilitarianism (see Rawls, 1971). It is also referred to as the “nasty utility-eker
objection” (Henden, 2007, p. 179) which holds that people have the tendency to try to get
the most out of every situation, as in case of medical malpractice. It follows that
consequentialism as stated so far would allow the evaluation of alternatives as well as the
selection of a favorable action to become an unconstrained function of the non-moral
value, or outcome that is promoted. In other words, common moral imperatives such as
truth-telling would depend on the predicted outcome of an action, thus negating the
importance of moral truths.
Pettit and Brennan’s (1986) second proposition of the theory of obligation in
standard consequentialism holds that “the same function that determines what the right
action is also evaluates options and selects among them the particular action that is
predicted to produce the best consequences” (p. 438). Restrictive consequentialism,
which is the theory the authors develop, makes revisions to this second proposition. As
we shall see shortly, principled consequentialism, which is similar yet distinct, was
inspired by this 1986 article. In contrast to the authors’ theory on moral decision-making
in general, though, justice as wholeness is a theory about justice. The question in this
regard is the following: can a goal-oriented theory make room for other factors than the
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criterion that determines the rightness or goodness of actions that become instrumental in
the selection a particular action? More specifically, are there other rules that play a role in
the evaluation of options not only in so far as they promote a goal but in so far as they
honor principles of justice?
In Utilitarianism, Mill (1957) considers the validity of some moral truths as they
are consistent with utility. He contends that “secondary principles” are important sign
posts that serve as guides along the way as long as the concept of concept of utility can be
applied to them:
To inform a traveler respecting the place of his ultimate destination is not to
forbid the use of landmarks and direction posts on the way. The proposition that
happiness is the end and aim of morality does not mean that no road ought to be
laid down to that goal, or that person going thither should not be advised to take
one direction rather than another, (p. 31)
Whereas Mill acknowledges that rules are indeed important, in the case of conflicting
obligations, the principle of utility, the ultimate source of morality, remains the ultimate
criterion to which we may turn when evaluating and selecting between alternatives:
“Though the application of the standard may be difficult, it is better than none at all” (p.
49). Similarly, in regards to the pursuit of happiness, Mill recognizes that there are limits
(p. 77) and that people have a right to equal treatment unless social expediency requires
the reverse (p. 78). In this light, justice is intertwined with social utility. Some may argue
that we have lost sight of justice entirely because it is now subject to someone’s
determination of what would make most people happy.
I think, as Pettit and Brennan (1986) do, that there are times when we need to look
at rules or principles not only as sign-posts but as gates that restrict the range of options.
In their landmark article, the authors suggest that it is appropriate to evaluate options
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based on whether or not they promote the final value. Yet in some cases, there ought to
be a different criterion that selects the right action. Specifically, psychological options
including those that promote certain traits, particular motives or policies may prompt an
actor to forgo an estimation of their consequences. For instance, it makes little sense to
subject predispositions such as pro-friendship or love to the calculation of their predicted
ends (for example, Henden, 2007). The authors call this kind of goal-oriented approach
“restrictive consequentialism.” It may also be referred to as “indirect” or “strategic”
consequentialism (Pettit, 2003, p. 103). The range of options is, as the theory says,
restricted by other factors than the final value.
This dissertation builds on Pettit and Brennan’s (1986) second proposition of the
theory of obligation to develop a theory of justice. Specifically, it develops a mixed
approach47, meaning that principled consequentialism consists of both, principles and a
value-goal. It evaluates actions based on their goodness (Pettit and Brennan’s first
proposition) and justness (a modification of their second proposition). Principled
consequentialism, then, suggests that it is not enough to consider the possibility that some
secondary principles or rules may guide us along the way or that factors other than the
value-goal may prompt us to forgo calculation. It is more specific. As a theory of justice,
principled consequentialism identifies two specific principles of justice that ought always
to be honored. These are the principles of civic freedom and equal consideration, both of
which are defined later in this section. Their role is to exclude those options that,
although they may be deemed to be good in light of promoting happiness, wholeness, or
any other determined goal, are unjust. They are unjust because they either interfere

47 Frankena (1973) proposes a mixed- deontological theory of obligation by including the principles of
beneficence and equality.
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arbitrarily in someone’s life or they may fail to consider the potential for promoting the
goal, such as the restoration of wholeness, equally. In other words, the consequences of
actions that fail to honor these principles may be good in light of the evaluative goal but
unjust, whereas as those that also honor the principles of freedom and equality are both
good and just. The reason for choosing these specific constraints is that they are primary
to other principles, such as honesty, which can be derived from them.
In sum, as a theory of justice, principled consequentialism shares with Pettit and
Brennan’s (1986) restrictive consequentialism the notion that options ought to be
evaluated in each situation based on their goal. Both theories are act-consequentialist.
Principled consequentialism, however, differs from its restrictive sibling on several
points. One is that options ought to be evaluated and selected in terms of their potential to
promote the theory’s non-moral value. However, and this is the second point of
difference, principled consequentialism installs two specific principles of justice that
serve to exclude unjust options. Only those options that are good in light of promoting the
non-moral value and which at the same time honor these principles can be considered
both good and just. Note again that in contrast to Pettit and Brennan’s theory, the final
selection is made in reference to the non-moral value that justice aims to promote, for
instance injustice as wholeness it is wholeness. In this regard, my approach is similar to
standard consequentialism because as Pettit and Brennan state, “the function which
determines what is the right decision is also the function which ought to be applied to
decision-making: it serves at once to evaluate options, and to select them” (p. 438). The
just decision, however, is the one that passed the gates of the theory’s constraints.
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This section highlights the need for a new vision and describes the characteristics,
foundation, and theoretical structure on which justice as wholeness is based. Its
characteristics are the biblical and civic republican traditions. The theory’s foundation is
the Christian theological perspective of intrinsic worth and inherent dignity. The
theoretical structure of justice as wholeness is teleological. It is composed of a theory of
non-moral value and a theory of obligation, the latter of which promotes the specific
notion of principled consequentialism. The following section begins to develop more
fully the vision that I call justice as wholeness and defines wholeness as the theory of
value.

Wholeness: The Theory of Value
The universe is a place of beauty and wonder. Creation in its fullest is “good” and
the light of God permeates everything that exists. “The heavens declare the glory
of God” and so does the smile of a child. From fractals to faces, all things bear
God’s aim at beauty. While we mar this beauty by our thoughts and actions, we
cannot obliterate the essential beauty of life. Chaos cannot defeat divine order;
darkness cannot vanquish light; death cannot overcome life; hate cannot defeat
love. The divine aim at abundant life flows through all things, joining the
wholeness and beauty of the part with the well-being of totality. (Epperly, 2001,
p. 7)

The unity of life—its wholeness and interconnectedness—has been a major
concern of many religions and cultures, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and
Native American spirituality. The consideration of the person as multidimensional being
is also a central aspect of narratives in the Hebrew Bible. But the conception of life held
in the Western World has not always emphasized wholeness as the foundation of being.
Although I believe that Plato’s work ought to be refocused to emphasize his conception
of individual and social balance and integrity, the Greek philosophy of human nature,
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particularly the spatial separation of body and soul as well as its reference to the
absoluteness of forms, has laid the foundation for the subject-object dualism that inspired
Western philosophical reflection. Descartes’ fragmented view of nature along with
Newton’s emphasis on principles that described physical and natural linear cause-andeffect relationships between physical and mental objects were heralded throughout the
Enlightenment and far beyond. In fact, by the end of 18th century, most philosophers
believed that human action was governed by nature, not by religion, and that all human
relationships and interactions could be studied best by applying concepts of the natural
sciences (e.g., Hankins, 1993, pp. 158-161).
The idea of “the whole person” accommodating both reason and spirit has gained
considerable interest again in the 1970’s. Specifically, it is the integration of Christian
religion and scientific medicine that is most intriguing and certainly promising in regards
to bringing back wholeness (see Provonsha, 1959). In his discussion of the meaning of
health, Tillich (1967) contends that “man should not be considered as a composite of
several levels, such as body, soul, spirit, but as a multidimensional unity” (p. 6). Tillich
describes the different qualities of life in man, such as the physical, chemical, the
biological, psychological, mental and historical, qualities that reside “within each other”
rather than being separate categories. He uses the metaphor “dimensions”48 to illustrate
his integrative perspective. Concepts of health and disease as well as healing, he argues,
should be approached in consideration of the whole—if one looks at one dimension, all
others are present within it.

48

Tillich (1967) arranges qualities of life in man according to the following dimensions: The mechanical
dimension, the chemical, the biological, the psychological, the spiritual and the historical dimension (pp. 711).
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In a recent article, Cowling (2000) criticizes the “clinicalization” (p. 16) of
modem medicine and proposes a model of nursing that follows a unitary
conceptualization of healing as appreciating wholeness. A unitary perspective regards
humans and the environment as irreducible wholes. Rather than approaching the art of
healing as paying attention to individual parts in order to promote overall wholeness, the
unitary view of healing is one that realizes, knows, and appreciates the inherent
wholeness of all life. As such, healing as wholeness focuses on the detection of patterns
which are characteristic of “fields.” Experiences, perceptions and expressions emerge
from human and environmental contexts reveal patterns that are unique to individuals and
their circumstances. These patterns are described in terms of physical, emotional, mental,
social, and spiritual phenomena that do not represent wholeness, but, most importantly to
the theory, arise from wholeness. Drawing on years of experience in nursing, the author
develops a clinical model in which the assessment of patterns that arise from wholeness is
captured in a participatory process by drawing on the patient’s life experiences,
perceptions and expressions. Ideally, in the process of mutual discovery, process also
leads to transformation.
Lamb and Thomson (2001) illuminate wholeness by engaging in a dialog between
philosophy and theology, an approach that this dissertation also promotes. Wholeness,
they argue, points to deep intuitions about the value of persons, what they are like and
what their hopes are during their life spans. In this light, a particular concern is the
wholeness and dignity of persons whose life qualities have changed and might be
compromised, such as aging. Personhood is shaped by the contingencies that become
apparent as one goes through the stages of life. Getting old oftentimes means dealing

190

with fragility and loss. Relational interdependence becomes more prominent and there is
a greater significance in the fact that our life histories are being constituted and continued
by others. Philosophically, the authors regard the self as “dialogical-self.”
Lamb and Thomson (2001) suggest that wholeness has static characteristics that
are both comprehensive and integrative. Yet, they suggest that wholeness is also
adaptable while being insistent of its continuity in spite of change. This means embracing
the challenges of life and experiencing growth within the boundaries of tragedy and hope.
The authors point out that
the task of achieving continuity of the self is therefore an active one that involves
re-negotiating memories, values and life goals. When this is done in light of
grace, hope and eternity, there can be rejoicing and forgiveness, (p. 63)
Included in the dynamic aspect of wholeness is the characteristic of adequacy, the gift of
acceptance by others. In this light, a defining characteristic of wholeness is its highly
inter-subjective nature as wholeness is shaped by mutual love, an appreciation of the
fundamental dignity of all persons along with a genuine willingness to integrate the life
of others even if there is no possibility of continuing the dialog. This often occurs in old
age, when integration is the single most important attack against loneliness, isolation and
despair. The authors identify this as “dialogical communion,” which is the power to
honor others in God’s image.
Rice (2006) reminds us of the intricacy of human life, pointing out that each
person is made up of such a vast number of factors that the complexity is nearly beyond
description. Adding another layer to the already existing intricacy is the fact that
everything that makes us human is interrelated and interdependent, nothing exists in
isolation. There is a need for balance as an attribute of wholeness that situates each factor
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in its right place and assigning it just the right amount of influence on other factors. Over
a person’s life-span precision of this kind is of course impossible. Taking a Seventh-day
Adventist perspective, Rice explains wholeness in light of creation, fall, and redemption.
Specifically, he develops a model of whole-person care, which he calls “ministry
healing,” that situates the physical, mental emotional, spiritual, and social elements of
wholeness into the life and ministry of Jesus.
Constructing a model of wholeness is indeed a difficult endeavor. Any attempt at
pin-pointing human qualities and organizing them into dimensions or elements will be
arbitrary (Rice, 2006). Constructed categories depend on current ideas that are embedded
in the social and scientific knowledge of the times. Yet they are important because they
help us organize and make sense of the world in order to better understand a reality that is
otherwise too complex to grasp. On a descriptive level, they are heuristic tools with
which patterns can be identified and described. Thus, the physical, emotional, spiritual
and social dimensions that Rice describes are windows to a much larger reality. As
Cowling (2000) rightly notes, they arise from this reality that we call wholeness. It is
important to understand that for instance the physical dimension does not only
correspond to that particular part of wholeness. Rather, looking at one dimension allows a
glimpse on the whole. In a similar vein, to see ourselves in light of a bigger reality means
to reach beyond the limitations of perception and expectation. Love becomes a possibility
when we are able to appreciate that each little part of life is woven into the integrity of
the whole.
To see a world in a grain of sand
And a heaven in a world flower,
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
And eternity in an hour. (William Blake in Capra, 1991, p. 297)
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As Epperly (2001) writes so beautifully in the introductory quote, God is a
constant in this complex web of interrelationships, His spirit being present in every life,
“joining the wholeness and beauty of the part with the well-being of totality” (p. 7). Thus,
the dimensions of wholeness that we identify separately are inter-related, mutually
constitutive and continuous in newness and beauty; chaos and divine order hand in hand.
Building a conceptual map of wholeness, its physical, emotional, spiritual and social
aspects help explain God’s purpose in understandable terms although the full complexity
of God’s creation can never be grasped fully.
As noted previously, the integrity of concept of wholeness injustice as wholeness
is strongly intertwined with intrinsic worth and human dignity. As such, universal
wholeness represents God’s plan and purpose and is the hope of human kind. As a vision,
wholeness is revealed by the prophetic imagination which begins with a condemnation of
the injustices that permeate personal relationships and institutional structures and ends
with a projection of a future reality of beauty, harmony and integration. Specifically, the
vision of God’s Kingdom to come is one in which the physical, emotional, spiritual and
social aspects of life will be completely developed individually and then integrated. This
vision of personal and social integrity, an intrinsic non-moral good which is not yet
realized in the world but in the worldview of Christians is about to come, I shall call
“vision-wholeness.”

Vision-wholeness
Throughout the chapters leading up to this section, I frequently mentioned the
word “vision”: we are looking for a “vision” of justice as wholeness. What is a vision?
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The King James Version of Proverbs verse 29:18 alludes to the fundamental importance
of a vision and notes that “where there is no vision, the people perish.” In general terms,
a vision is a mental projection of a future reality. In contrast to imagination, which
recognizes established concrete themes and images but then situates them into different
meaning-contexts, a vision maintains patterns as well as contexts. A vision strives
forward with a relative degree of certainty and direction towards a defined reality. As
such, a vision is both temporal and spatial. While a projected reality may seem
unreachable, a vision nevertheless illuminates particular conditions of the present.
Haloviak (2008) argues that John’s vision of a New Jerusalem as it is written in the Book
of Revelation “can shape moral imaginations, helping us see new possibilities changing
old perceptions and compelling action” (p. 35). In this light, a vision enhances the
creativity of the moment offering both direction and hope towards a changing future.
In Christian religion, then, a vision has distinct meaning. Visions of a new world
can be found in Scripture’s “imaginative literature” (Haloviak, 2008, p. 35), which
includes liturgy, poetry, and apocalyptic writings.49 As such, the subject of perfect
wholeness is found both in the Hebrew Bible and in the New Testament, specifically in
the Book of Revelation. As mental projections of God’s words, visions are communicated
by the Old Testament prophets who proclaim the realization of God’s Kingdom as His
messengers. In the prophetic tradition, visions of God’s Kingdom reveals how God’s
powerful acts of justice will cause a return to a reality of freedom and equality, one in
which love and righteousness are enduring expressions of perfect wholeness. Ultimately,
Christian beliefs hold that through God’s transformative acts of justice there will be a
49 The term “apocalypse” used to be associated with Rev. 1:1 where a new reality is promised to come
about through divine intervention. Contemporary discussions focus on a set of concepts found in the
apocalyptic writings from 200 B. C. to A. D. 100 (Mounce, 1997).
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complete transformation of the fallen world signaling a new beginning that recaptures
God’s plan in creation.
The vision of perfect human and ecological integrity begins to unfold in prophetic
visions of end times, a period of great distress during which God’s judgment falls upon
creation in full force but which is followed by a time of deliverance and renewal (Da
12:1-4, New International Version). In Isaiah, God reveals His promise of new heavens
and a new earth, with the old state of affairs not being remembered or ever coming to
mind again (Isa 65:17-18). Brueggeman (2001) suggests that the prophetic vision of an
alternative World community depicted here can be regarded in the same light as God’s
powerful words that preceded His liberating acts of justice in the Mosaic period of the
Exodus. In this same vein, Brueggeman regards the resurrection of Jesus as the “ultimate
act of prophetic energizing” (p. 113) that signaled the beginning of a World restored. A
vision of wholeness is reflected in images of a newly created Jerusalem in which
physical, emotional, spiritual and social dimensions of human well-being unfold in their
richest kind.
The restoration of wholeness is central to the prophetic imagination. For instance,
the passages of Isaiah 60 and 65 illustrate the restoration of a restored Israel and the kind
of wholeness that is fully revealed in the Book of Revelation. In this light, revelation
draws heavily on the Hebrew Scriptures for imagery of restoration. In Isaiah, then, the
physical aspects of a restored Israel unfold in the absence of the light of the sun and the
moon because God’s everlasting light will be the sign of permanent renewal (Isa 60:1920). There will be an abundance of the most valuable natural resources (Isa 60:17). A
renewed earth will be a place of longevity absent of infant deaths and in which an adult
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life of hundred years is still considered young (Isa 65:20). People will dwell in the houses
they build eating fruit from their own vineyards (Isa 65:21). In other words, restoration
will allow for the total physical well-being of humans considering them an integral part
of an ecologically rich context.
Restoration implies that sorrow will end (Isa 60:20) and humans will enjoy
emotional wholeness. Specifically in this passage, the creation of a New Jerusalem is
eschatological, but as characteristic of all prophetic visions, it has implications for the
present: “Be glad and rejoice forever in what I will create” (Isa 65:18). The first part
indicates that those who have faith ought to be content and rest in anticipation; they will
then rejoice forever in what is to become. And God, too, will rejoice over the New
Jerusalem and take delight in His people as there will be no more sounds of weeping and
crying (Isa 65:19). The darkness of the present will be illuminated with hope for the
future.
The spiritual closeness between God His people will clearly become evident in
the Book of Revelation; however, visionary images of the Hebrew prophets for a new
Israel point towards a reality in which people are blessed by God who will answer before
they call, who will hear while they are still speaking (Isa 65:24). This implies the
participation of God in creation thus enabling a continuous conversation between Him
and His people.
Reflecting perfect spiritual wholeness as the presence of God in human kind, the
prophetic vision explicates the importance of a transformed God-human relationship as it
is shapes the social dimension of wholeness. A recurrent theme in the prophetic literature
is that God calls on all people and together all the nations will enter the light of His
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ultimate reality. In Isaiah, the prophetic visionary experience holds that peace and
righteousness will govern the city and there will be no more violence and destruction, no
more fight over landholdings; the walls which used to be built for security will be called
“salvation”; the gates now always open will be called “praise” (Isa 60: 17-18, 21). In this
beautiful vision of the World to come peace and equality will be ever-lasting as the wolf
and the lamb feed together and the strong lion will eat straw as the weaker ox will (Isa
65:25). The union of the wolf and the lamb is often used to illustrate shalom as relational
peace (for example, Claassen, 2003). The social aspect of wholeness shows a community
without physical, social or economic divisions and boundaries. While individual
wholeness will be maintained it will be interwoven in the fabric of life through active and
continuous participation in its spiritual dimension.
The last book in the Bible, The Book of Revelation, unveils a complete picture of
this transformed world. The author of this book is John, who was exiled on Patmos
because of his Christian missionary work during period of upheaval and persecution.
Revelation is organized into four parts that follow the prologue of the author and address
to the seven churches (see Malina, 2000; Mounce, 1997). The first part describes John’s
vision of events in heaven that lead to the condemnation and fall of Judea and Jerusalem
(Rev 4-11). This vision is followed by images of creation before the flood (Rev 12-16).
The third part concerns the period after the flood, specifically the fall of the first
postdiluvian city Babylon and the final victory of good over evil (Rev 17-20). The vision
that is of concern in light of a theory of justice for justice as wholeness is the last of
John’s visions, the coming of the New Jerusalem which signals the beginning of a
restored relationship between God and His people (Rev 21-22):
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Then I saw a new heaven and a new Earth, for the first heaven and the first Earth
had passed away, and there was no longer any sea. I saw the Holy City, the New
Jerusalem50 coming down out of heaven from God, prepare as a bride beautifully
dressed for her husband. And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, now the
dwelling of God is with men, and he will live with them. They will be his people,
and God himself will be with them and be their God. He will wipe every tear from
their eyes. There will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old
order of things has passed away. (Rev 21:1-4)
Mounce (1997) points out that in contrast to The Romans and Greeks who
believed that humans go into Heaven, the Bible clearly indicates that the New Jerusalem
is descending from heaven and that God will be with His creation in a transformed
earthly World. The meaning of this visionary event is, as Mounce sees it, that
blessedness of a transformed earth is not an achievement of people but ought to be
appreciated as a gift coming from God. It the fulfillment of God’s promise as revealed to
the prophet Isaiah.
In his vision, John describes a city of indescribable beauty made of precious
stones, crystal, and gold. In this city, the nations will walk in the light of God’s glory.
There is no temple in the city because God and the Lamb are the temple. A point of
significance here, as in Isaiah, is that the gates of the city are always open for all God’s
people to walk through regardless their ethnicity or place in life (Rev 21:22-24). Malina
(2000) suggests that the communal focus of this text may have resonated with the Roman
conception of loyalty and affiliation in citizenship that prevailed during those times. In
50 In The New Jerusalem in the revelation ofJohn: the city as symbol of life with God (2000) Malina
develops a comparative model of the meaning of a city exploring the visionary New Jerusalem in the
context of first-century Mediterranean life. Herein Malina argues that the book of Revelation is a result of
John’s astrophysical observations and interpretations of sky visions (p. 23). In contrast, Mounce points out
in his revised edition of The Book of Revelation (1997) the thesis that in his visionary experience, John
deliberately reverses the directions of the Zodiac cycle when choosing the order of sky directions when
describing the city’s sides. He does so to assure that the celestial Jerusalem will not be aligned with
astrology (p. 391). This dissertation accepts Mounce’s view and regards John’s vision of the descent of the
holy city as a “’real event’ within the visionary experience” (p. 389). It is thus an inter-textual interpretation
rather than an exegetical analysis.
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early Roman Empire citizenship was defined by participation rather than ethnicity or
territoriality. The gates of the city are twelve in number bearing the names of the seven
tribes of Israel. In this same vein, the names of the twelve apostles were written on the
foundations of the city’s walls, reflecting the union of biblical community of the Hebrew
Bible and the New Testament (Rev 21: 12-14; see Mounce, 1997).
The last of John’s visions depict the restored Garden of Eden and the fulfillment
of God’s purpose, the wholeness of creation (Rev 22:1-1-5). As such, the vision lays out
all dimensions of human well-being as well as ecological integrity. The river and the tree
of life represent longevity, abundance and health; the presence of God among His people
who can see His face promise spiritual and emotional completeness, and the leaves of the
tree will heal and restore the social relationships of the nations.
For us today, prophetic visions engender the hope of a broken World while also
inspiring us to improve the conditions of the present. Apostle Paul indicates in his letter
to the Romans that the kind of suffering that characterizes life in the present can not be
compared with the glory that will be revealed in human kind. A creation that “has been
groaning as in the pains of child birth right up to the present time” (Ro 8:22) is waiting in
eager expectation for the fulfillment of God’s plan, for liberation and eternal freedom (Ro
8:18-21). As creation waits for the complete restoration of individual and relational
wholeness, it does so in hope for that which it is not yet present, “for in this hope we
were saved” (Ro 8:24). And while there is hope, human flourishing bends under the
pressure of political and social realities preventing us from reaching a perfect state of
wholeness, one in which physical, mental, spiritual and social aspects of life are fulfilled
and in perfect balance.
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As the visionary experiences of John and the Hebrew prophets stimulate our
imagination, the experience of wholeness in everyday life remains a much sought after
condition. In contrast to perfect wholeness as a transcendent reality, its experience
unfolds within the boundaries of human history and is limited by the finite existence of
human kind. The life of Jesus is a perfect example of wholeness as concrete experience in
God’s Kingdom here and now. As a non-moral value, wholeness is a personal and social
concept that is subject to self-understanding shaped by interpersonal and social
relationships. As such, it is relative and always subject to perception. Its degree of
realization depends on a person’s internal and external circumstances and place in life. It
is the experience of wholeness, its understanding from the point of view of each person,
that I shall call “relative-wholeness.” From a Christian theological perspective, wholeness
is at once a vision and a relative experience that is shaped by that vision.

Relative-wholeness
Man is a creature of fmiteness, Niebuhr (1979) argues in An Interpretation of
Christian Ethics. Essentially, we live in a World of limitations. The corruption of human
reality is not only a matter of the finiteness of the human spirit, but, from the theological
perspective of prophetic religion, reflects the constraints put on humanity as the result of
a fallen world. No matter how refined man’s rationality is, his reality is always limited to
the contextual conditions that influence perspective. This is primarily so because reason
can not escape the natural impulse of survival and the inability to negate the effects of
sin, which are manifested in self-interest or “an imperial will-to-power” (p. 72).
Historical humans, as Niebuhr phrases the term, are able to see the principles of
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transcendent unity and harmony; however, reason is always embedded in their fmitude
and as such becomes “a prisoner of the partial perspectives of a limited time and space”
(p. 40). Within the limitations put on humanity it is impossible to fully appreciate and
bring to bear these “higher values” (p. 40). Where a dim conception of an unconditional
good in which our contingent values are rooted is present, Niebuhr points out humans to
be nevertheless incapable of adequately defining it.
The question is how much does the presence of sin affect our multidimensional
being and how far are we capable of determining our own restoration? According to the
doctrine of total depravity, the presence of sin in human kind has corrupted all of man’s
being51. It manifests evil in the physical, emotional, spiritual and social dimensions of
every individual. As sin is woven through the whole fabric of life, it corrupts well-being
introducing a fundamental level of anxiety into every human relationship, interaction, and
moral consideration. Where humans are essentially free to act morally, this freedom is
not unconditional as sin places limits on morality thus tainting the motive of actions that
invoke notions such as love and justice. In other words, we can “do” good; yet, our will is
always bound up with selfishness and unbound desire (see Guthrie Jr, 1968, pp. 216218).
Niebuhr (1979) offers hope in light of the dim picture of human depravity by
pointing out that, at least in prophetic religion, every finite event points beyond itself. In
other words, prophetic religion has neither lost will nor hope. It is oriented towards its
source appreciating God as creator and towards a transcendent reality of perfection and
harmony where God is the fulfillment of life. In other words, the connection between
51 See Hubbard (2006) for a vivid rejection of the doctrine of total depravity. Hubbard remarks that “the
greatest scheme for the acquisition of power and self ever consummated by the human brain was when man
devised the dogma of total depravity” (p. 210).

201

faith and hope remains despite the chaos of the world enriching moral life by looking
beyond our present situation. Between the Christian ideal of love that is reflected in the
life of Jesus and the egoism brought on by sin lies hope for moral refinement. It is in this
moral space that a conception of relative-wholeness ought to be located. Similar to
vision-wholeness, relative-wholeness is both spatial and temporal, yet its relative
experience unfolds somewhere between human fmitude and hope. Where its location is in
flux, relative-wholeness rests on an unchanging foundation of intrinsic worth and
inherent dignity that God has bestowed on man-kind. Relative-wholeness, then, is
wholeness in a broken but hopeful world in which every effort is made to restore, as
much as possible the dimensions of wholeness.
As a result of our human condition and political and social pressures, humans will
never be able to reach a state of perfect wholeness, one in which physical, emotional,
spiritual, and social-relational aspects of our inner and outer lives is in equilibrium. If this
were possible, there would be no need for restoration. In essence, perfect wholeness
comes into being only after God’s final judgment and His perfect acts of transformative
justice. It follows that, at least what concerns the present, wholeness is an experience that
can only be considered relative to one’s place in life; it is contextually-dependent. In this
\\^i% physical well-being is something we all strive towards, yet even if the body is in
good physical condition at one point in time we cannot take our health for granted
particularly as we age and die. Where these are the effects of sin as they manifest
themselves in compromised physical conditions, one can be whole even when sick, when
fragility makes old age challenging, or when dying. As noted previously, wholeness is a
reflection of totality and represents the constellation of a multiplicity of interacting
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factors. In this light, the emotional and mental well-being of individuals become of
particular importance when coping with some of the more difficulty realities in life.
Sadness and joy, tears and laughter embrace each other in moments of despair unfolding
into the possibility of wholeness as an experience.
As indicated in Chapter Two, spirituality as an element of wholeness is the
engagement of individuals with the ultimate reality. Spiritual experiences are reflected
dialectically in interpersonal relationships and are the bonds that hold moral community
together. The ability to grasp the meaning of life and to appreciate the possibility of
wholeness depends on the richness of our spiritual resources and our willingness to let
God into our lives. Unfortunately, the relationship between humanity and God is broken.
As we refuse to listen, we forgo the power of the divine spirit in guiding our actions and
in helping us to heal, physically, emotionally, and interpersonally. This not only impact
the physical and the ability to cope with physically challenges but the social dimension of
wholeness as well. Needless to say, social and relational integrity is pivotal to human
well-being. In the end, the wholeness of the self is shaped by and reflected in
relationships. As others look through the conceptual windows of physical, emotional, and
spiritual aspects, they perceive us a certain way. This perception then influences our selfimage.

Relative-wholeness is experienced. As brokenness is part of the human condition
shaping the experiences of everyday life, its opposite, wholeness, can be experienced
within the same context. To a limited extent, it can be willed; however, a fuller
engagement with wholeness comes about through introspection and prayer. Reaching out
to a transcendental reality in prayer is central to the Christian World View. In the New
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Testament, Jesus instructs to pray as a faith community in the Lord’s Prayer.52 This
prayer is also called the “Model Prayer of Jesus, “Our Father Prayer” (see McNichol,
2004, p. 8), or in German “Das Vater Unser.” In it, the interdependence of its physical,
emotional, spiritual and social dimensions fully come to bear. In the fact, the Lord’s
Prayer captures at once the eschatological dimension of wholeness as a vision of His
Kingdom to come as well as its relative experience, addressing the concrete needs of
individuals in there and now.
The Lord’s Prayer
Our Father who is in heaven
may your name be hallowed.
May your kingdom come.
May your will come to pass as in heaven and also on earth.
Our bread for the morrow give us today
and forgive us our dept as we also forgive our debtors;
and do not lead us into test,
but rescue us from the evil one.
For yours is the power and the glory for ever. Amen. (Didache 8.2).
In the beginning of the Prayer God is addressed as “Our father.” This is rooted in
Jesus’ relationship with God calling him father and instructing his disciples to do the
same. Thus, the worship of God as the living father is approached from the perspective of
a community of faith who express their spiritual closeness with God individually as well
as relationally. The address of God as “our father” implicates an interactive relationship

52

There are three versions of this foundational text. The shortest version can be found in
Luke’s writing (Lk 11:2-4, NIV) where Jesus hands the prayer to his disciples. A longer,
public version that is part of the Sermon on the Mount is documented by Matthew (Mt
6:9-13). The third text appears in the Didache, the early Christian teachings that were
written by the Christian community in Syria around the turn of the first century
(Stevenson, 2004, p. 19) In contrast to both Luke and Mark, the Didache adds the
doxology thus directing the prayer in continuation of the Jewish tradition of ending
prayers and to represent God’s reign as an eternal reality.
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of love and trust between father and sons and daughters. It carries both spiritual as well as
relational significance.
The following three lines of the prayer confirm the presence of God in the
present and concern the arrival of the New Kingdom. “Hallowing” God’s name for
everyone to hear acknowledges His participation in human history and the establishment
of His ever-lasting reign. In this light, Christians wait in anticipation of His Kingdom to
come, hoping for the complete restoration of all creation through God’s acts of
transformative justice, as proclaimed by the Prophetic imagination. Vision wholeness is
about to be revealed. The indication of the presence of God’s will in heaven as well as on
earth signals the reality of the approaching Kingdom but at the same time highlights that
its presence on the troubled Earth. It invokes the restoration of imperfect wholeness, the
wholeness of the broken world. Those who have faith and who have been blessed with
His spirit will eventually participate in perfect and eternal wholeness.
From the bigger picture of ultimate concern, the prayer shifts to the more concrete
needs of individuals. Matthew’s version of the prayer reads “Give us today our daily
bread” (Mt 6:11). Specifically, praying for bread today and tomorrow captures the
notions that the Lord’s Prayer is not only focused on the spiritual wholeness but also
includes its physical dimension. Both are regarded in the context of the present and the
future. In this light, the metaphorical meaning of bread is spiritual richness yet it has
material meaning as simple bread as well. Wright (1996) points out that all aspects of the
Lord’s Prayer actually come together at the Lord’s Table. He argues that in the Eucharist,
we bring our “physical, psychological, emotional and spiritual needs” (p. 47) to God
addressing Him as our living father. The Eucharist and particularly the Lord’s Prayer
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show that individual needs are always bound up with the needs of larger World
community. In other words, praying for our bread means praying for the bread of all.
Forgiveness is a central concern of moral community and the foundation of both
vision and relative wholeness. The Lord’s Prayer represents forgiveness vertically, as the
forgiveness of God, and horizontally as an instrument of love that brings peace to His
people. Forgiveness is for everyone. In Luke it reads “forgive us our sins for we also
forgive everyone who sins against us” (Lk 11:4, emphasis added by author). At the last
supper Jesus gave the cup to all who shared with him and it was poured for the
forgiveness of their sins (Mt 26: 28). In this same vein, the two lines that follow concern
the quality of character and relationship, “do not lead us into temptation” (Mt 6: 13) and
rescue us from the evil one so that we may live healthfully, peacefully and mindfully with
God and each other. Recall that the previous section alluded to the fact that all
dimensions of human well-being are corrupted yet there is the restorative effect of hope.
This is captured in the doxology of the Prayer. Both Matthew and Luke highlight the
rescue from evil and God’s purpose to restore the integrity and continuity of wholeness in
creation. The Didache testifies to His power invoking transformative change; creation
restored in His glory will last for eternity. Overall, the Lord’s Prayer is astonishing as it
captures the entirety of God’s purpose
The aim of this section was to develop a theory of value as wholeness. It
distinguished between perfect wholeness as a reflection of prophetic visions and relative
wholeness, which the wholeness of a broken world. Rejecting the doctrine of total
depravity, I pointed out that the potential for restoration lies in the restorative power of
love and justice. Compassionate engagement not legal justice mitigates human
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brokenness. In this light, this expanded function of justice is to restore wholeness, the
non-moral value that a consequentialist theory of restorative justice promotes.

Wholeness as Consequentialist Value-goal
What exactly is the ultimate goal of human life and something worth restoring is
certainly not an easy question to answer. One way to go about finding an answer is by
intuition. Another is to look for what people desire. For example, in Utilitarianism Mill
(1957) justifies his theory of value by saying that happiness is something that everyone
“desires” for its own sake. As such it should be universally promoted. I certainly believe
that we make moral choices based on intuition, and we also desire to be happy. The
pursuit of good physical and mental health, spiritual richness and social
interconnectedness may also occur on the basis of desire as each element is a means to a
greater end. Desire, however, lies on the level of “interests” (see Schiff, 2007). Not all
interests are good or even desirable. Wholeness, understood as multidimensional totality,
cannot be desired as an interest because it exists on the level of fundamental being. We
need wholeness; individually, relationally, and spiritually. There are three more specific
reasons why wholeness is the ultimate good injustice as wholeness.
First, from a Christian perspective, wholeness represents God’s nature and His
will for creation to enjoy an abundant and integrated life. In this light, a Christian
perspective of wholeness addresses the individual and the community. As such wholeness
is an integrative concept that reflects the integration of self and others into a unified life
of integrity and purpose. It is also inclusive, capturing the essence of values such as
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happiness, pleasure, and love. Principles such as freedom and equality are conditions of
wholeness; as primary principles they are not included in the concept proper.
Second, a conception of wholeness that is primarily rooted in theological
discourses and expressed in biblical narratives bodes for a creative approach to
developing the restorative elements of justice. Vision-wholeness as I described
stimulates our “dialectical imagination” (Spohn, 2007, pp. 59-60). By highlighting the
contrast between reality and hope, between what is and what is about to become, it
locates the moral space in which wholeness may unfold in the present. Moreover,
Christian moral imperatives are grounded in biblical narratives. Spohn (2007) proposes
that Jesus’ command in the parable of the Good Samaritan, “go and do likewise” (Lk 10:
37) raises a conscience that finds application in ethics via our “analogical imagination”
(Spohn, 2007, pp. 50-71), a cognitive process that serves as a bridge connecting the
meaning of the past to that of the present. In other words, thinking or imagining
analogically leads to the detection of patterns which then allows putting oneself in the
shoes of Christ in a contemporary context.
The third reason for choosing wholeness as a consequentialist goal is its clinical
effectiveness. As illustrated by Cowling’s (2000) wholistic practice as a nurse, healing as
appreciating wholeness invokes a participatory and dialogical approach that involves the
patient in shaping her own therapy. This calls for a high level of interpersonal
responsibility. Additionally, from field observations and conversations with hospital
chaplains at Loma Linda University Medical Center about whole person care I learned
that the combination of physical healing and talking with those who suffer from illnesses

53 Thanks to Kendra Haloviak, La Sierra University, for this very enlightening reference as cited in her
article “Peacemaking and the Apocalypse” (2008).
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about their spiritual and emotional concerns improves their well-being as hospital
patients.
How, then, do we incorporate wholeness into principled consequentialism?
Previously I distinguished between a theory of value in which the goal can be perceived
either independent from the actor’s perspective or dependent on her point of view. The
former is agent neutral, the latter agent-relative. Discussing principled consequentialism
in terms of vision and relative wholeness, it can easily be argued that vision-wholeness as
God’s intent in creation, the hope of human kind, and His ultimate reality, escapes any
attempts of appraisal based on human experience, reflection, or points of view. As a
transcendent reality, vision-wholeness is independent from evaluation and is thus agent
neutral.
Relative-wholeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the actors’ life history and
emerges from the particularities of her experience. It is an agent-relative value meaning
that agents should always choose that action that will restore wholeness from their unique
point of view. This does not mean that the agent-relative perspective demands that we
seek wholeness only for ourselves or that wholeness is a reflection of self-interest. In its
very definition lies a genuine concern for others, a concern that invites multiple
perspectives and which calls on compassionate engagement in the lives of all who
embrace wholeness.

Justice: The Theory of Obligation
The function of justice is to bring about wholeness. The theory of obligation, then,
is a theory about justice. Specifically, it is a theory about actions that are good in terms
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of their potential to restore wholeness and also just based on the prediction of their
consequences and in consideration of two principles of justice: freedom and equality.
A concern for the goodness and justness of interpersonal and social actions as
well as for the refinement of moral behavior is woven throughout the entirety of human
history. In classical Greece and the early Roman Empire, justice was reflected in notions
of social coherency and balance. For Plato, for example, justice is an established state of
affairs in which everyone occupies a place in life she was best suited for. Moral
perfection is guided in reference to an absolute transcendent reality of form and shape.
In Aristotle, justice takes on more dynamic characteristics as something that is between
people, or doing good for the other.
From a biblical perspective, justice has little concern for proportion. It infuses
passion and compassion into acts of liberation that move towards social change. God’s
perfect acts of “transformative” justice will lead to a new reality fulfilling the vision of
the Prophets for a restored relationship between Him and human kind. In this vision
fulfilled, the universal practice of righteousness as part of perfect wholeness by people
whose lives are integrated into the totality of being is justice as wholeness. However,
justice in the present Kingdom aims at restoring the relative experience of wholeness; the
wholeness of the here and now. In essence, it is justice as relative wholeness. Images of
the classic Greek and Roman Worldviews and particularly the prophetic imagination are
reflected injustice as relative wholeness as it is situated in the structure of principled
consequentialism.
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Civic Republican Justice
Civic Republican justice has its roots in classic Greek thought and in the
philosophy of early Rome. Despite their profound influence on each other, each
worldview promoted a distinct conception of the city, its rules and laws as well as the
virtues of its citizens. Although there are other witnesses to social and moral life in
classic Greece, the writings of Plato and Aristotle are fundamental to theories of justice in
general and civic republicanism in particular. In the beginning of the previous chapter I
briefly illustrated the dialog between Socrates, Plato’s teacher, and his friends who, in the
Republic, are trying to find out the meaning of justice. Rejecting notions of justice
proposed by his friends, Socrates suggests that in order discover the meaning of justice
one ought to examine the structure of the city and look at the qualities of its citizens.
Specifically, Plato follows Pythagorean thesis that the social organization of a balanced
and just city would correspond to three regulatory elements that make up the tri-partite
souls of individuals.
A city, Socrates argues, will be good in the fullest sense of the word if it is wise,
courageous, temperate, and just (Plato, 1985, 426d, p. 123). As previously noted, the
Plutonian view of an orderly city rests on the division of its citizens who are naturally
born to into classes. There are rulers who draw on their wisdom to be leaders and soldiers
who show courage protecting the city. In an ordered city, the virtue of temperance is not
associated with a particular part of the city but pervades all of society. In essence,
temperance and its correlate self-mastery invoke consensus between those who rule and
those who are being ruled thus producing harmony among the classes. Similar to
temperance, justice as the first virtue of a good city is reflected by the whole society.
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Regulating the adherence of citizen to their social roles, the function of justice is to
sustain wisdom, courage and temperance; it is the “ultimate cause and condition of their
existence” (433c, p. 128). A city will be just, then, if each citizen performs the work or
function for which she is naturally best suited, “tending to one’s own business and not
meddling with others” (433a, p. 128). Conversely, injustice results if the maxim to mind
one’s business is “flouted” (434c, p. 129). In other words, justice is not the result of
mediating conflicts or negotiating opposites but reflects the proportionality of parts and
the harmonious functioning of society as a whole.
Moving from the socio-structural integrity of the city to the application of the
same model to the individual, Plato (1985) suggests that, corresponding to the model of
the just city, the soul can be divided into three distinct parts. One is functional in regards
to rationality and reason. Another part controls the appetites or desires. A third part,
which he calls the “spirited part” (439c, p. 134), bears emotions of anger and indignation
and together with reason controls the passions. Analogous to the city, the virtues of a just
city are the same for the individual. In this light, wisdom aligns with reason and courage
with spirit. Moreover, temperance in the soul assures that the three elements are in
harmony with each other and justice maintains proportional functioning of each part.
Thus, a just man exhibits “inner order” as he will only call those actions just or
regard those things beautiful that resonate with his soul. The ultimate knowledge of
justice, according to Plato, can only be obtained in reference to the knowledge of the
forms. These are transcendental objects to which predicative meaning can be attached
via dialectical dialog. The supreme form is the form the universal good; it is unqualified
and a perfect exemplar that reaches beyond space and time. An understanding of these
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unchanging, perhaps one can say spiritual reference points can only be obtained by
experts, philosopher-kings who exhibit an extraordinary ability of introspection and self
reflection. In contrast, the prophetic visions of perfect wholeness can be understood by
everyone.
It is the appreciation of the inner life in Plato that fascinates Breton and Lehman
(2001) who in their book The Mystic Heart of Justice base their own vision of restorative
justice on Plato’s connection between the inner and outer lives. Similar to Plato, the
authors argue that without inner guidance justice has little meaning. A kind of justice
that is entirely based on external definitions and calculations, such as deserved
punishment, is what they call “shadow justice” because it misses the potential to heal our
souls. Instead, the authors note that if one follows one’s soul and find a niche in life, a
healing and wholeness-restoring kind of justice will emerge bringing with it peace,
harmony and real happiness. Although Breton and Lehman (2001) explicitly reject the
Christian influence on the concept of wholeness, finding the Hebrew Bible too
retributive, they instead drawing on themes of indigenous cultures, the authors’ link
between wholeness and justice is nevertheless intriguing. Justice as wholeness finds
similar value in Plato, highlighting the relationship between the part and the whole within
the individual and in society.
When moving from Plato’s conception of justice to that of Aristotle, there is a
shift from the fixed position of justice as status towards an interactive conception of
emergent virtue. In this light, Aristotle disagrees with Plato on the idea of a universal,
non-worldly good of perfect form while nevertheless maintaining the classical Greek
emphasis on harmony, balance, and just order, In Ethics (1976) Aristotle lays out an
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expanded classification system of justice which remains to organize theories of justice
until this day. His overall understanding of justice is that of an “active exercise of a
complete virtue” (p. 174). It is complete because “it is exercised in relation to another
person” (p. 174) and can be understood as “the good of others” (p. 188). As previously
noted, Aristotle understands a good life as one of happiness and in essence one of
personal and social wholeness. As justice as wholeness his perspective is teleological.
Of the more specific notions of justice, distributive justice is the kind that governs
the distribution of money and goods in a community. The basis of distribution in this
system is what Aristotle (1976) calls “geometric proportion.” In this conception, fairness
is determined by the mean between two extremes and is based on equality as well as
relativity. Equality concerns the proportional relationship between two things. Relativity,
as it is connected to the concept of justice, involves what is just for a certain person. It is
important to highlight that Aristotle’s notion of equality holds that persons who are not
equal do not receive equal shares. Individuals, who are considered equal, ought to receive
the same shares. If there principles are maintained, Aristotle suggests that justice would
assure fair distribution without quarrel (p. 177).
The second kind of justice treats voluntary and involuntary transactions, which
Aristotle (1976) calls rectificatory or compensatory justice. Rectificatory justice involves
the processes of the courts and the role of judges to “equalize the inequality” (p. 180) that
is due to an injustice in order to “restore equality” (p. 181). In the process of calculating
the precise value of loss justice is a reflection of “arithmetic proportion” (p. 179-182). In
other words, justice is not concerned with the actors but with the specific act that created
a difference between them. An unjust act causes loss for one person and gain for another.
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Loss can be experienced in form money, goods, injury or assault. Judges whose task it is
to restore equality are intermediaries and considered to be means in-themselves (p. 181).
Equality is maintained in the sense that like cases are treated similarly. In the
contemporary North American legal system case precedent assures consistency and
equality in the application of law.
The final conception of justice governs a well-functioning society and is what
Aristotle refers to as political justice. In the context of civic life, political justice regards
persons as free and equal members of a community who share in self-government and
who consent to rule and being ruled. Specifically, the notion of freedom in Aristotle is
expressed in the political participation of all classes of capable male non-slave citizens.
The variety of talents and experiences, the exercise of practical wisdom shapes the
harmonious arrangement of social and political order (Honohan, 2002). A virtuous and
happy life lived as part of a well functioning social whole with members committed to
the common good, a life that is characterized by civic participation, political freedom and
a balanced sense of justice were central themes in classical Greece. In the Hellenistic
period, the ethos of the city did not die, yet the concept of the small, homogenous “city”
was transformed into the culturally diverse Kosmopolis (Murphy, 2001).
The sense of active citizenship found in Aristotle came to fruition in the early
Roman Empire. The need for a formal political system resulted in the constitutional order
that provided the blue print for the American constitution. It was a political system that
focused on self-governing citizens who, under the protection of a sound legal system,
enjoyed civic freedom granting them political power to determine their destiny. The res
republica, a Republic in which civic life was considered the ultimate good, provided the
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basis for social and moral engagements through which citizens defined themselves. In
conjunction with civic education and training good laws prevented corruption, balanced
wealth, shaped character and regulated the kind of political, social and moral life that
citizens who were bound by friendship shared (see Honohan, 2002). Overall, citizenship
demanded both moral freedom and moral excellence.
The internal and external significance of justice as a reflection of the inner and
outer lives of people is reflected in the attainment of personal and social wholeness.
Centeredness, having one’s place in life and engaging in each others affairs with respect
and virtue, accepting individual responsibility for the functioning of society as a whole,
as well as embracing the notion of civic freedom are themes that are crucial for a
discussion of justice as wholeness. Specifically, civic freedom and moral responsibility
are the foundation of organizational ethical behavior, integrity and, as I will show,
systems transparency as “transparent autonomy.” In this light, notions of justice ought to
take a broader view of social interconnectedness in the wake of trauma capitalizing on the
internal strength of moral community. A broader view of justice is also called on to
incorporate the kind of passion and compassion explicated in the prophetic imagination.

The Prophetic Imagination
The concept of justice was one of the major concerns in classic philosophy, if not
the major one; it also emerges from a careful reading of scripture. When God created
humans in His image He gifted them with equality and entrusted everyone with personal
and social responsibility and freedom. These are qualities that are not always easy to
balance. Throughout the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, the narratives of justice
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explicate an evolving understanding of their intersecting roles in restoring the
multidimensional aspects of God’s creation. From the limitations placed on punishment,
such as an eye for eye, to the call for just social structures of the 8th Century Prophets
(BCE) and cumulating in Jesus’ ministry of reconciliation, the Bible reveals that God
loves justice (Isa 61:8, New International Version). Thus, it is our responsibility to “do
justice” (Micah 6: 8) in order to maintain social equality and freedom and to implement
these principles in the complex social reality of God’s present Kingdom. This
responsibility is covenanted not with the polls of ancient Greece or the Roman res
republica, but with God who wants humans to live healthy and peaceful lives. The vision
of His Kingdom to come is one in which physical, emotional, spiritual and social aspects
of life will be integrated and it is through God’s perfect acts of “transformative justice”
that this reality will come to pass.
In apocalyptic terms, transformative justice is God’s response to sin and the social
and structural injustices that are caused by it. In light of current discussions about the
difference between the terms restorative justice and transformative justice (for example
Harris, 2008) I post the thesis that they are distinct yet related.54 In other words,
transformative justice, the complete change from one thing into something different may
or may not be restorative, though in many cases it is. Restorative justice is narrower with
a different aim; it returns something as much as possible to its original state. Justice as
wholeness, then, is transformative in an apocalyptic sense whereas justice as relative
wholeness is a restorative response aimed at mending a broken world as best as possible.
54 Harris (2008) offers an analysis of the use of concept of restorative justice and transformative justice in
the literature and discovered four ways in which they might be related. The first possibility is that the terms
are distinct, each referring to a different concept. The second is that restorative justice has the potential to
open up space for broader notions of transformative justice. Third, restorative justice lies somewhere
between transformative justice and criminal justice and lastly, the terms refer to the same concept.
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Both, transformation and restoration are closely related to the idea of liberation, to free
people from oppressive conditions, a theme that is central to biblical perception on
justice.
In the Book of the Exodus, God reveals His presence as a God of justice,
redemption, and liberation. An oppressed nation the Israelites were forced to live as
slaves under the harsh and unjust ruling of the Egyptian Pharaoh in conditions of extreme
poverty. Having compassion for the plight of His people, God’s powerful acts of
transformative justice freed the Israelites from Egyptian captivity as they followed the
lead of Moses. Justice in this case exposed social and structural injustices and took place
on the level of communities and nations. The song of Moses unified the nations in praise
of God’s liberating acts of justice; each individual rejoiced as part of the whole
community (Ex 15:1-18). In the Book of Deuteronomy, God asked Moses to recite his
song to the assembly of a rebellious Israel in anticipation of Moses’ death. In his song,
Moses and the community reiterate the justice of God, rejoicing in the notion that all of
His ways are just; he does no wrong because he is faithful to His people, upright and just
(Dt 32: 4). The transformation of social conditions led to the restoration of harmony
among God and His people. The song of Moses was sang again in the vision of John of
Patmos as World is liberated from the impact of evil. “Great and marvelous are your
needs, Lord God Almighty. Just and true are your ways, King of the ages” (Rev 15: 3-4).
All nations will come and worship because God’s righteous acts have finally been
revealed to all of human kind.
God is a God of justice. He interacts with human kind justly and with righteous
participation. Specifically, the prophetic imagination is based on the notion that God
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reveals Himself in the lives of people. He is acting in history, which is evidenced by the
continuity of His interventions all of which address individuals, communities, and
nations. Ideally, justice is woven into the fabric of moral community growing under
divine inspiration. In the Hebrew Bible, justice was often addressed not as a
consideration of individuals’ interests but as a communal moral imperative. In other
words, a sense of justice determines on an everyday basis how individuals ought to relate
to each other within the customs and traditions of their community.
For example, the Ten Commandments which reflect the root meaning of justice
are addressed to the individual. Yet, they address the multidimensionality of human life
beginning with self-awareness in light of a commitment to family, community and God
(e.g., Kraus, 1979). In other words, the Ten Commandments begin with the morality of
the individual but extend quickly into the infinite grace of God and His love for human
kind. Justice, then, must encompass freedom and equal regard for all human beings.
Righteousness and mutual concern of individual and community are unfolding under
divine guidance.
Justice restores relationships between individuals in communities and between
people and God. As such, vertical and horizontal representations of just relationships
were fundamental to Old Testament society and highlight the importance of restoring the
social and spiritual aspects of wholeness. The Day of Atonement55 (Lev 16: 1-34)
beautifully represents the biblical focus on the restoration of wholeness, or at-one-ment,
55 In biblical culture, the high priest sacrificed a bull as a sin offering for himself and his household.
Additionally, he selected two goats. One he slaughtered for the sin offering of the people and sprinkled his
blood on the atonement cover to clean the most holy place from sin (Lev 16: 15). He then sprinkled the
blood in the tent meeting for the atonement of the people. According to Lev 16: 17 Aaron made atonement
for himself, his household, and the whole community of Israel. The function of the scapegoat was to carry
the sins of all the Israelites, which symbolically transferred to the head of the goat, into the desert (Lev 16:
21-22).
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as the present is evaluated in light of the future and dealt with in the context of a socially
and spiritually interconnected world. Aaron (2006), a Rabbi, describes that Yom Kippur
is a day of special prayer, reflection and introspection. It is a day of love, forgiveness and
healing as individuals approach the conflicts and transgressions of their lives from God’s
perspective regarding them in light of His greater plan. “Our darkest deeds from the past
turn into light. This is because the light of the World to come, so to speak, is shining into
our world on this day” (p. 104). All of those who participate connect to the “expanded
consciousness of Yom Kippur” (p. 104). Human concerns, conflicts, and sins of the past
are elevated onto a high level of meaning and understanding that ultimately lead to
restoration and forgiveness. On Yom Kippur God forgives His people as they forgive
each other in the realm of a much greater understanding.
Yom Kippur is a mikwah in time. It is a day when we can immerse ourselves in
the all-embracing oneness of God and emerge pure. On that day the light of the
World to come shines into the World, and we can see ourselves and our actions
from God’s perspective. In that light, even our transgressions of the past become
blessings for our future, the darkness now serves to enhance the light, and the
ugly conflicts now increase the splendor and beauty of the love we share with
God. (p. 120)

The Jewish celebration of Yom Kippur beautifully illustrates the
multidimensional aspects of justice as the unfolding of love, reconciliation and
forgiveness. Yet, justice is an act involving God, a “transcendent demand, frightened
with divine concerns” (Heschel, 2001, p. 253). The transformative and restorative power
of justice is fully revealed in prophetic imagination. The Hebrew prophets’ distinctive
approach was to criticize, reject and delegitimize the dominant justice paradigm by
pointing out relentlessly the injustices inherent in the legal, political and social
institutions of their times. For the prophets, justice had little concern for elegance and
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geometry. Neither did it distinguish between distribution and rectification. The prophetic
cry for justice was rooted in their deep sense of injustice reflecting God’s anger about
social violence, corruption and oppression that demoralized the poor and disadvantaged
(Heschel, 2001; Brueggeman, 2001).
For instance, Amos proclaims in a vision,
For three sins of Israel, I will not turn back my wrath. They sell the righteous for
silver, and the needy for pair of sandals. They trample on the heads of the poor as
upon the dust of the ground and deny justice to the oppressed. (Am 2: 6-7)
Explicating a similar critique of the status quo, Jeremiah describes the wickedness and
unfairness of a class-oriented people of Judah and Jerusalem,
Like cages full of birds, their houses are full of deceit; they have become rich and
powerful and have grown fat and sleek. They evil deeds have no limit, they do not
please the case of the fatherless to win it, they do not defend the right of the poor.
(Jer 5: 27-28)
In these examples the prophets point to the economic injustices and unjust social
structures and lament the failure of community to protect those who are vulnerable for
“He [God] defends the cause of the fatherless and the widow, and loves the alien, giving
him food and clothing” (De 18). In this light, God requires His people to love aliens as
they themselves were foreigners in Egypt (De 19).
Certainly, community as a whole was divided and the wealthy refused helping the
poor. The legal structures were equally unjust magnifying the marks of dominance and
thus perpetuating the effects of oppressive hierarchical structures.
Woe those who make unjust laws, to those who issue oppressive decrees, to
deprive the poor of their rights and without justice from the oppressed of my
people making widows their pray and robbing the fatherless. (Isa 10: 1-2)
In order to reinstall justice among His people and to create more just social structures,
God did not seek to change the law, however. Instead, He commands people to perform
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concrete acts of justice on behalf of those who are weak: “Wash and make yourselves
clean. To take your evil deeds out of my sight! Stop doing wrong, learn to do right! Seek
justice, and encourage the oppressed” (Isa 1: 16-17). Where the first response of the
prophets to injustices is to “criticize” the present, condemnation is always followed with
a statement of encouragement, thus “energizing” individuals and communities by
pointing towards restoration illuminating an alternative reality (Brueggeman, 2001, p. 3).
In other words, change occurs in anticipation of justice as wholeness, “Let justice roll on
like a river, and righteousness like a never-failing stream!” (Am 5: 24).
The prophetic imagination embraces passionate acts of justice that emerge from
complex web of social relationships with a participating God. Instead of looking at
equality as balancing loss in a particular situation, the prophetic sense of justice has a
strong regard for those in need: the poor, the oppressed, the widows and aliens. These
individuals “need” justice. Justice is also needed on the level of community. Regarded
this way, prophetic justice is foundational, it establishes integrity. In this light, justice
and more specifically, righteousness, is not, as Heschel (2001) also points out, important
only in those places where it is formally administered. The Bible is not concerned with
legal justice of the courts but with the infusion of righteousness into the souls of people.
As such, justice, mishpat and righteousness, tsedakah can not be brought about by
specialists, “but to do justice is what God demands of every man” (p. 261).
There is a distinct difference between the related terms mishpat and tsedakah (for
example, Zehr, 1990; Wolterstorff, 1999; Ruis, 2006; Heschel, 2001). Heschel (2001)
points out mishpat to be a broad term for justice. While it should not be exclusively
equated to legal justice, mishpat unfolds in relationships as an obligation or a
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responsibility. As such, it can be a norm, a law or other more formal expressions of
obligation such as someone having a claim calling on the duty of someone else to
respond to it. On a foundational level, mishpat is charged with upholding the covenant
between God and His people; it is dependent on the everyday judgments of those who
interact with God in moral community (Heschel, 2001).
Righteousness, or tsedekah, on the other hand, is a human quality. It reveals good
character. The voices of the prophets illuminate this understanding by pointing to an
alternative community where those who accept God may grow spiritually practicing
righteousness as a universal morality. For example, the prophet Isaiah says to the women
of Israel that when the Spirit “outpours” former spiritually desolate places will become
fertile and grow; all of God’s people will grow spiritually. What follows is that “justice
will dwell in the desert and righteousness will live in the fertile field” (Isa 32:15-20).
Rhetorically, this is similar to Amos’ expression “let justice roll on like a river, and
righteousness like a never failing stream” (Am 5:24). Where the concept of justice is
loaded with transformative power, righteousness reflects the nature of God in every
person. In other words, justice restores wholeness while righteousness maintains it.
See, a king will reign in righteousness and rulers will rule with justice. Each man
will be like a shelter from the wind and refuge from the storm, like streams of
water in the desert and the shadow of a great rock in a thirsty land. (Is 32:1 -2,
emphasis added by author)
Where mishpat corrects injustices, tsedekah is the glue that holds the kind of moral
community together in which each person is trustworthy and kind, like a shelter from the
wind. The outcome, or fruits of tsedakah will be peace and its effects will be eternal
quietness and confidence (Isa 32: 17). The relationship between mishpat and tsedakah is
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that righteousness goes beyond justice, although, similar to Niebuhr’s conception of
“relative justice,” justice is not justice unless it also contains righteousness.
Looking at this text in light of the New Testament, each person will to some
extent have the character of Jesus in him, who is like a shelter, nourishing, protective and
reliable in all that He does. Where righteousness is central to the message of the New
Testament it does not replace the importance of justice, dikaios in Greek (Wolterstorff,
1999). Wolterstorff (1999) points out that although dikaios or dikaiosune occur rather
frequently in New Testament, the word is rarely translated as “justice.” As a result, the
emphasis in the ministry of Jesus is on the righteousness of individuals rather than
offering continuity in regards to both, the richness of prophetic justice as a response to
the oppression, corruption and righteousness as a quality of individuals. In this light,
Wolterstoff suggests that in some places in the New Testament, dikaios ought to be
translated as justice thus making obvious the continuity of the concepts throughout the
Bible.
Biblical justice is personal yet always situated in the context of community. On a
personal level, justice restores relationships encouraging reconciliation and forgiveness.
On a grand scale, God’s acts of perfect justice are transformative carried out with
temperament and passion. Specifically, the prophetic imagination breaks down barriers
between the rich and the poor energizing those who are open to affect change and giving
hope to those desperate for justice. Prophetic justice makes God apparent in the lives of
everyone. Justice as such it judged by the fruits it produces (Zehr, 1990). The fruit of
biblical justice are the physical, emotional, spiritual dimensions that reflect wholeness. In
this regard, vision wholeness is brought about through God’s transformative acts of
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justice whereas relative wholeness relies on His spirit working in mankind. The
restoration of wholeness in a broken world depends on our ability to draw on the
prophetic energy while honoring the baseline principles of civic life that make a full
vision of justice possible. Justice without a careful consideration of those principles,
which include notions of freedom and equality, is as barren as justice without love.

Restoring Wholeness
Whether we search for the meaning of justice by looking at the Classics or turn to
biblical narratives, the idea is that we are collectively called to maintain a state of
individual and social wholeness. Writing from a Protestant perspective, Niebuhr (1957)
argues that “justice that is only justice is less than justice” (p. 32). For Niebuhr, perfect
justice is brotherly love. The civic republican philosophy of Aristotle regards perfect
justice as complete virtue. In Chapter One, I pointed out that the “more” injustice is
what we are looking for and then proposed that together, mishpat and tsedakah offer a
richer perspective. Due to the prevalence of self-interest it is impossible to achieve a
state of perfect justice in a broken world. As a response, Aristotle illustrates the notion of
the “practical justices” (p. 176) whereas Niebuhr describes justice compromised by the
human condition as “imperfect justice” (Niebuhr, 1957, p. 32). However, where
Aristotelian philosophy stops, Niebuhr keeps the faith by suggesting that relative justice
stands in a dialectical relationship with the grace of love. Since relative justice is
constraint by perception and interpreted from the perspectives of the dominant classes,
the expression that something is “more than fair” represents brotherly love that wraps
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itself around the barren concept of justice allowing it to unfold to richer conception than
that of legal-political constructs.
Differences between these traditions of justice abound, their goals of integration
and wholeness are astonishingly similar. As such, Christianity and republicanism shaped
the American mind and promote individual and social wholeness in their unique ways.
Justice as wholeness draws on both traditions specifically emphasizing the importance of
legal protection of rights and freedom while looking at equality from the Christian
perspective of dignity. Thus, it demands formal rational law to leave space for the
creative part of justice, which means being flexible and inclusive enough not to stifle the
power of love, compassion and passion of the religious traditions. It is the “more” of
justice that transforms society and which succeeds in restoring not one aspect of relative
wholeness but all of its dimensions.
If the function of justice is to restore the relative experience of wholeness, how,
on principled consequentialist grounds, can it go about doing that? One of two tasks is to
evaluate the restorativeness of the options available in terms of their potential to restore
the experience the physical, emotional, spiritual and social elements of wholeness and
select those alternatives that are “good” in light of this goal. Under “option” I understand
the presence of choices between a set of alterative solutions that have the possibility to
restore wholeness. I am using the word “good” to indicate its reference to a particular
goal thus rejecting the use of the term “right” as it limits the evaluation of wholeness to
one solution which is the right one. The other task, distinctive of principled
consequentialism, is to select only those restorative alternatives that are both good in light
of their restorative potential and just in reference to the principles of freedom and
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equality. It is essential to personal and relational wholeness that these principled are
honored. Following Pettit and Brennan’s (1986) flow of argumentation, I will first turn to
an analysis of goodness followed by a discourse on justness.
Certainly there are many ways to restore the physical, emotional, spiritual and
social elements of wholeness. Several options may present themselves in different cases
and the task of justice as wholeness is to select those that are good or restorative. A good
option be selected from a set of interpersonal actions, such as for instance listening,
apologizing, or truth-telling, which may or may not be based on prescriptive policies.
Restorative alternatives may also be of organizational kind, such as for instance the
provision of spiritual care, psychological counseling, legal assistance, financial planning,
or other not so obvious arrangements. Additionally, rules, policies, regulations and even
modes of conflict resolution (for example, the Four Options Model, Claassen & Reimer,
2004) may be chosen based on their potential to restore wholeness.
A “good” option is one that, by virtue of the prediction of its consequences in
light of its goal, has the potential to restore one or more elements of a person’s
experience of wholeness. In this actor-relative approach goodness is a characteristic that
is evaluated from the point of view of the evaluator. Of course the actual consequences
are not yet known and even if the restoration of wholeness is an outcome of deliberation,
they can only be predicted. In contrast to foresight and intuition, “prediction” is based
either on previous observation and knowledge or on present knowledge. On a similar
note, the question of motive is irrelevant because the reason why one wishes to restore
wholeness does not impact the moral quality or the restorative potential of the action
itself. Motive does, however, bear on the character of the actor.
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If truth-telling, apologizing, or paying someone money to make her whole are
good in one case, can this be extended as a rule to similar cases? In other words, can the
experiences of one person or a group of persons be generalized as rule-consequentialism
suggests? As wholeness is a unique experience that unfolds only in the reality of those
experiencing it, it implies that options, as far as they are restorative, ought to be
considered as they become relevant in each case. Cleary, harm, in-itself complex and
multi-faceted, is both personally and socially significant. It has implications for the
present and the future, oftentimes being carried on over long periods of time. In this light,
physical, mental, spiritual and social well-being which is compromised by the actions of
another but which always involves at least two people ought to determine what is
demanded of justice. Each situation provides the soil from which empowerment and
healing arise. In this regard, justice as wholeness is act-consequentialist meaning that a
good option is one that restores the experience of wholeness in a particular situation.
As justice as wholeness stands so far, its scope remains ambiguous. A crucial
aspect of consequentialist theories and the famous dictum of utilitarianism, “the greatest
good for the greatest number,” awaits consideration. In other words, whose wholeness
ought we to restore in cases, such as medical mistakes, when the well-being of those
involved is not only compromised in fundamentally different ways but may affect a broad
range of individuals personally as well as organizationally. The restoration of wholeness
is a concern that is deeply rooted in organizational moral culture. Its extent and
inclusiveness is, at least to a certain degree, reflected in the beliefs and practices of the
members of this specific culture. Even Mill (1957) admits that good actions are not
always performed with the whole world in mind but do in fact involve a small number of
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people. In this light he views “the golden rule of Jesus,” to love your neighbor as
yourself, to be the perfection of utilitarian morality (p. 22). Schiff (2007) argues that
restorative justice models, of which justice as wholeness is one, must include a
consideration of outcomes for multiple stake holders over varying timeframes. Central to
the notion of stakeholder is the idea that harm does not only affect those who are directly
involved but impact the entire community. As a response, justice must be an inclusive
concept, which, as I demonstrated, was the distinguishing feature of justice proclaimed
by the Hebrew prophets. And if one person is harmed, restoration ought to take place in
the context of the whole community. In his letter to the Romans, Paul writes “Do not
repay anyone evil for evil. Be careful to do what is right in the eyes of everybody” (Ro
12:17). In other words, if justice is the good of others, as Aristotle notes, the notion of
“other” ought to address more than the persons involved in the immediate situation. In
civic republican terms this would mean civic participation, having an impact on one life
by thinking of implications for the whole.

Constraints
The restoration of the experience of wholeness as defined is something that most
people would agree to accept especially if they support its Christian emphasis or look for
guidance in the civic republican tradition. Caution is warranted, however. If one supports
the idea that all acts are just if, and only if, they promote wholeness one should be
prepared to defend the justice of actions or behaviors that would compromise other
values or outcomes for its sake. The potential for domination or the sacrifice of either the
choices or well-being of others for a socially defined goal that would benefit many is, as I
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mentioned previously, a common critique of utilitarianism. Justice as wholeness is bound
by two specific key principles, freedom and equality.56 These set boundaries on the
pursuit of wholeness as they limit or exclude actions that would result in injustice while
moving towards the vision.

Freedom
“Hardening of the heart is the suspension of freedom” (Heschel, 2001, p. 243). If
we open our hearts, as we do when promoting wholeness as a theory of value, and
similarly if we allow the concept of justice to unfold in such a way that it is restorative of
its physical, emotional, spiritual and social aspects, we ought to pay careful attention to
the notion of freedom. This is because freedom is a fundamental condition of human
well-being. It is impossible to reach our fullest potential if our future is being decided for
us, if we are unable to care for our health because either employment circumstances or
pre-existing conditions prevent us from getting the insurance we need, or if we can not
apologize to someone who is harmed because organizational policies prohibit such
honesty. Un-freedom can also be the result when the government fails to protect religious
practices in order to prohibit discrimination. The most far-reaching lack of freedom arises
in the context of status deprivation and poverty influencing all aspects of wholeness.
Certainly, a concern for freedom becomes part of a just process when individual and
56 On a more practical level, the importance of constraints in restorative justice processes has been explored
in the restorative justice literature. For instance Braithwaite (2003) lists the following constraining
“values:” Non-domination, empowerment, honoring legally specific limits on sanctions, respectful
listening, equal concern for all stake-holders, accountability, appealability, and respect for fundamental
human rights (p. 8-9). Similarly, Pranis (2007) distills “process values” from the literature and found that
respect is the most often referenced value. Other key themes are maintaining individual dignity, inclusion,
responsibility, humility, mutual care, reparation and non-domination, all which, according to Pranis,
nurture good individual and group relationships (pp. 61-63). As I see it, these lists are confusing because
they do not distinguish values from behaviors or conditions that we value and may wish to bring into being,
nor are they very specific conceptually.
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social brokenness calls for moral actions in situations in which one person has power
over another. In this light, the restoration of the wholeness of some may cause un
freedom for others if left unchecked. Freedom conceptualized as “civic” freedom, then, is
the first constraining principle of justice as wholeness. As such, it concerns individuals,
organizations and institutions. In this light I argue, as Pranis (2007) does, that the
personal self is always also political.
The idea of civic freedom is rooted in the republican notion of freedom as non
domination as Pettit57 (1999) describes. Of equal importance to civic freedom is the
notion of civic participation, the civic republican strand aligned with Aristotle. Together,
they highlight that choices ought not to be limited arbitrarily by the actions of others and
ought to be made based on compassionate participation in one’s own life as well as in the
life of others. Speaking in teleological terms, Braithwaite and Pettit (2000b) defend the
thesis that freedom as non-domination ought to be the theory of value and the ultimate
goal pursued. Promoting this political telos they argue would lead to a restraint of private
power or '‘dominium ’ while also demanding that constitutional and democratic constraints
limit arbitrary interference of govemment-the ‘imperium. ’ In other words, freedom as
non-domination is the republican “ideal” that has the potential shape to private and
institutional arrangements such that they encourage citizenship in a civic republican
sense.
In the previous chapter, I highlighted the impact of liberal notions of freedom and
autonomy on society and illustrated their effects on the institution of medicine. In this
light, I pointed out that liberalism so conceived encourages individualism thus embarking
571 primarily draw on Pettit’s (1999) discourse on republican freedom whose work is foundational and
often discussed in the context of other disciplines, particularly restorative-criminal justice (for example,
Pettit and Braithwaite, 2000a; 2000b).
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on a course to “healing alone.” Taking an alternative route, Pettit (1999) situates
republican liberty in the discussion of Berlin’s conceptions and points towards a third
way to understand freedom. Where freedom as non-domination allows for the presence of
interference and supports autonomy in a positive sense, in other words, one can be
interfered with granted that good policies protect against the arbitrary use of power, or,
one can be in charge of oneself; it specifically rejects private or governmental
domination.
In republican freedom as well as in other notions of civic freedom the concept of
“domination” plays a crucial role. According to Pettit (1999), domination occurs when
the following three aspects are present “(1) someone has the capacity to interfere, (2) on
an arbitrary basis, (3) in certain choices that another is in a position to make” (p. 52).
The first aspect, interference in someone’s life, requires for it to be done intentionally
worsening the situation of the other. Intentional interference can have several forms such
as coercion, manipulation or others. In certain contexts, omission may also be a kind of
intentional interference that may worsen someone’s situation. Pettit gives an example of a
pharmacist who is willing to sell a patient an urgently needed medication after hours but
who charges much more than any other pharmacy would in a similar situation. The
patient, not being able to afford the medication experienced intentional interference as
she has no choice but continue to suffer or die from her medical emergency. In this
particular case, interference is not only intentionally but also arbitrary.
Arbitrary interference, Pettit’s second aspect of domination, means that a person,
group or organization has the power to make choices that are others’ to make. They do
this willingly and knowingly at their discretion without considering what would be just
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according to the judgments of others. In the context of justice as wholeness this means
that arbitrary interference fails to consider the wholeness of others than oneself.
Applying this conception to medical errors, if it is up to one healthcare provider to decide
out of wimp whether or not she ought to disclose a harmful medical mistake to a patient,
and she chooses not to because of her reputation, or even if the reason is to promote
wholeness, the decision would arbitrary. In the absence of hospital regulatory
mechanisms checking her power, arbitrary interference may prevent the patient to make
choices about her future. Those profound decisions are, in most cases, the patient’s to
make.
The final of Pettit’s three aspects of domination concerns the kinds of choices in
which arbitrary interference may become a concern. In this light, he notes rather
ambiguously, that it becomes a concern only in regards to “certain” choices people make,
but not all. Examples are a husband making choices for his wife at home, or an employer
for an employee but without exerting arbitrary interference in all other relationships.
Perhaps one may add rendering medical decisions for patients who are incapable of
making them because of physical or mental incapacitation or who give consent.
Moreover, domination, says Pettit, may occur with more or less “intensity” (p. 58) and
while we have to account for some domination in our lives, it better to be dominated in
less central activities than in those that are determine our life course. The problem with
this last aspect is that certain activities that might be central in one person’s life may only
be tangentially relevant to others who might be tempted to exert power when they should
not. Especially those interferences that decrease our experience of wholeness by reducing
restorative choices ought to be of note, even if they appear to be less “central.” In
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general and from the perspective of justice as wholeness domination is always a
limitation if it reduces a person’s potential to experience wholeness in the long run.
Honoring freedom as non-domination as a principle of justice means to take all actions
into account if they have an effect on personal and relational well-being.
The protection of freedom as a constraint placed on justice holds that the
restoration of one person’s wholeness should be limited or not proceed at all if it limits
choices that are either hers or someone else’s to make. Related to this proposition is the
positive notion implied in civic freedom and the idea that individuals should be free to
participate in determining their own future; with civic concern. Civic participation, or in
tenns of justice as wholeness ‘compassionate engagement,’ is a cornerstone of
Republican political philosophy reaching back to Aristotle. This positive notion of civic
freedom, taking part in each others’ lives and making choices for oneself with the other in
mind, is the kind of freedom that supports wholeness. It does so because it lets unfold and
protect love, friendship, and compassion; those qualities that ought not to be overcome by
the uncertainty that needs non-interference as its defense.
Justice as wholeness develops the notion of civic freedom as a principle of justice
that limits unjust pursuits of wholeness. In contrast to both Pettit’s and Braithwaite’s
suggestion, civic freedom is not an ultimate good that ought to be promoted in a political
or existentialist sense. The telos ought to be a richer conception of life than the condition
that one is not dominated. Even though Pettit (1999) offers convincing examples
illustrating non-domination as something that people value, the ultimate concern of
human kind is wholeness, the experience of which justice ought to restore. Interfering
arbitrarily in peoples’ lives may lead to injustices inhibiting the restorative potential of
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justice. As a constraint, then, civic freedom is one of two principles of justice that guide
the evaluation of those options considered “good” in light of their potential to restore
well-being and which result injustice. The civic republican tradition holds that we are
free only when regulatory governance and good laws protect our security; biblical
theology situates freedom under God’s covenant with his people. A vision of justice as
wholeness leaves room for both, the former protecting the latter in the reality of a broken
world.

Equality
The second constraining principle that limits the pursuit of wholeness is the
notion of equality. From the Christian perspective, equality is deeply rooted in the idea
that God has bestowed on every person intrinsic worth and has gifted all human beings
with an undiminished inherent dignity. A focus in the creation narratives, equality was
also a major concern of the New Testament writers. There, it is inextricably linked to the
idea that each person who accepts God is joined by the Spirit into a community of faith.
The apostle Paul explains to the Corinthians that the manifestation of the Spirit in each
person is for the common good. Although everyone has received spiritual gifts of
different kinds, such as wisdom, knowledge, faith, healing, miraculous powers, prophecy
and others, they are the work of the same God who gives as he determines (ICo 12: 711).
As the body of Christ represents diversity, those members who seem weaker are
indispensable and those who are less honorable or perhaps un-presentable are treated with
special honor and special modesty (ICo 12:22-26). As in the Hebrew Bible, the New
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Testament God reveals himself in the lives of the disadvantaged and expects His people
to promote an undivided community treating everyone with respect and empathy.
But God has combined the members of the body and has given greater honor to the
parts that lacked it, so that there should be no division in the body but that its parts
should have equal concern for each other. (ICo 12:22-26)
It follows that the notion of equal concern is the normative reflection of the fruit of the
spirit, which is love58. However, as the proclamation of the prophets so powerfully make
clear and as fulfilled in the healing ministry of Jesus, equal concern may bear
differentially with preference for the poor, the sick, the broken and disadvantaged.
Concern for all is a priori; its practice preferences those who need it most. As a result,
the Christian perspective of equality combines reason with empathy and compassion with
self-involvement.
In Christian discourses, equality is often associated with the concepts of love and
regard. “Equal regard,” a concept that Outka (1972) first developed in Agape: Christian
ethics, captures the idea that we should not only love God but love our neighbor as
ourselves (see Mt 22: 37-40; Ro 12: 9-10). Contemporary scholars consider equal regard
the dominant theory of agape-\o\Q, applying it to relations concerning the generic
neighbor as well as special relations bound by marriage, family, and friendship (Pope,
1997). Indeed, universal love expresses basic equality in society as equal regard.
Specifically, Outka (1972) describes the concept of “regard” as being committed to
another’s well-being independently without consideration of any external factors, such
personal characteristics, status, or, as I may add, without expecting anything in return.
From this perspective, every person has value in the eyes of all others thus inviting the

58 “But the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and
self-control” (Gal 5:22). Note that love is listed first as the primary fruit of the Spirit.
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kind of empathy and engagement that reflect God’s spirit within. Agape, as the basis of
equal regard, is the permanent underpinning of human relationships in a community of
which it can be said not only that “every body counts” but that we can count on
everybody.
From the notion of intrinsic worth and inherent dignity of the Hebrew scripture as
well as the centrality of agape-love as they basis of equal regard also springs the concept
of “equal consideration.” A theory of justice as wholeness perceives equal consideration
in terms of two normative claims: First, it is a relational concept which requires that we
consider not only what wholeness means for ourselves and how the balance of our own
physical, mental, spiritual and relational elements may best be restored; equal
consideration injustice as wholeness demands putting ourselves into the shoes of the
other to learn what wholeness means to them. In other words, equal consideration as I see
it goes beyond the impartial mediation of conflicting claims elevating “consideration” to
the level of empathic and compassionate engagement. Yet, it takes into consideration the
reality that much of what we do is out of self-interest and self-love.
The effort to substitute the law of love for the spirit of justice instead of
recognizing love as the fulfillment and highest form of the spirit of justice is
derived from the failure to measure the power and persistence of self-interest. It is
because self-interest is not easily overcome in even the life of the “redeemed” that
most of the harmonies of life are not the perfect harmonies of fully coordinated
wills but the tolerable harmonies of balanced interests and mutually recognized
claims. (Niebuhr, 1957, p. 25)
What Niebuhr seems to suggest is that self-interest inhibits the unfolding of the full spirit
of justice and that were Christians may will to forswear acting out of self-interest the
human condition makes it impossible for them to do so. This results into the hopeless
view that all what is left is to navigate through a sea of scattered life goals. Where I agree
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with Niebuhr that self-interest is ubiquitous I do not concur that it necessarily has to
reduce human relationships to a negotiation of conflicting interests in tolerable harmony.
In other words, equal consideration injustice as wholeness defends a more positive view.
In a similar vein, Elshtain (2003) argues that equal consideration is a concept that
is frequently situated in liberal political discourses and is interpreted to imply
impartiality. For instance, I have previously mentioned that the propositions of Mill’s
utilitarianism are rooted in the notion of impartial consideration of predicted outcomes.
Yet, Mill claims that Jesus’ work was rooted in the spirit of utility. I don’t believe that
agape-love constitutes utilitarianism nor do I think that it reflects the kind of impartiality
or disinterestedness often contributed to it. One reason is that loving the neighbor as the
self does not require leaving the self out of the process. Another is that even if one’s own
concerns are secondary to the concerns of others they will always be reshaped in
narrative and interpretation. The only claim on impartiality that can be made is the
objective to consider everybody but at the very moment of engagement we will always
become partial participants.
Most certainly, neither the Hebrew Prophets nor Jesus were unencumbered when
they reflected God’s words and works in their lives. Specifically, Jesus inserted himself
into the community and the realities of everyday life to teach and heal people from his
perspective and with knowledge of his own suffering, ultimately carrying humanity with
him to the cross. Without concern for the self, which includes partiality in regards to what
one needs or what ones’ interests may be, it is impossible to experience wholeness as it
unfolds in all of its personal and social dimensions. In other words, instead of pretending
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to be disinterested we ought to embrace the self as much as we embrace the other while
we engage in each others’ lives with empathy and compassion.
A second normative claim that is implied in the concept of equality as equal
consideration is that we are not only to consider wholeness as it unfolds but to contribute
fairly to rebalancing its constituent elements as the circumstances require. In other words,
it means putting equal regard into practice as justice as action. Justice as wholeness
demands that we make the same relative contribution to the restoration of the experience
of wholeness of ourselves and others. Equality as making the same relative contribution
to some aspect of peoples’ lives is not a new proposal. For instance, Frankena (1973)
develops a theory of obligation in which the concepts of beneficence and equality are
central. In his view, equality is anchored in equalitarian democratic society. Frankena’s
conceptualization of equal treatment is “making the same relative contribution to the
goodness of peoples’ lives” (p. 51). Justice as wholeness differs in that it situates the
concept in a Christian perspective on dignity and equal regard and distinguishes more
specifically the equal consideration of perspectives and making the same efforts at
providing that what is predicted to restore the experience wholeness. By “relative,” then,
I mean attending to need as it emerges in each situation and responding to the unique
needs of persons. By “the same” I mean making an equal effort. As such, making the
same relative contribution implies sensitivity towards the experience of the physical,
mental spiritual or social aspects of wholeness as they unfold in light of personal and
social brokenness.
As constraining principles that limit the pursuit of wholeness to only those
actions, rules and policies that are both, good and just, civic freedom assures non-
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domination and compassionate engagement whereas equality as equal consideration
maintains that we consider the wholeness of others as our own and making the same
relative effort in restoring its constituent aspects. Freedom and equality as defined, both
established principles of justice, let shine human dignity in every person as they calls on
us to support each other in reaching our fullest potential as free participants in a common
effort.

Justice as Wholeness
So far this chapter explored the possibility of a paradigm shift in the theoretical
foundation of justice. Moving away from the political philosophy of contemporary
liberalism and towards a civic republican and biblical conception of justice, it proposed a
normative theory of restorative justice that draws on these cultural traditions.
From the civic republican tradition comes the sense of citizens who agree to be
governed by the laws they themselves give. Equality means counting the same as
deemed by law. A state of wholeness was maintained because citizens assumed a role in
social life for which they were best suited. Especially in the early Roman Empire, a high
value was placed on the notion of un-dominated freedom within the classes, freedom that
was guaranteed to citizens by a stable system of laws. The focus was on citizens, yet not
all members of a city state counted as citizens. Communal life of those who were
included highlighted the practice of the virtues of which justice was the primary one. If
the balance was upset, rules of justice were applied to equalize loss. The ultimate good in
classic Greece and the early Roman Empire towards which all virtuous acts were
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oriented was happiness and living a good, honorable life under the law with active
engagement in civic issues.
From the biblical tradition, specifically from the prophetic imagination comes the
notion that wholeness can only be maintained if all of its dimensions are recognized. In
Christianity, dignity, not law itself but protected by law, is the foundation of justice.
Based on the concept of dignity, equality means that everyone counts and that
everyone’s multidimensionality is valued. Proclaiming a distinct vision of wholeness, the
prophets focused on the margins of society calling for protection of those strapped in
poverty unable to experience wholeness more fully. The wrath of God was revealed
elevating justice from its focus equalizing instances of personal loss to a sweeping
critique of the status quo. With hope for wholeness, justice in the prophets, both
passionate and enduring, is charged with ultimate concern signaling social
transformation while spreading the seeds of righteousness in mankind.
When developing a notion of justice, elements such as individual and social
wholeness, dignity, freedom, and equality, which are those highlighted in these major
traditions, are fundamental. Thus, a culturally rooted model of justice that aims at
restoring the effects of harm would draw on the building blocks of common moral
patterns. One possible result of this inquiry into the notion of justice is the particular
conception of restorative justice as wholeness that this chapter developed. Answering
Plato’s question, then, “what is justice, produces a statement of justice as wholeness that
begins with its underlying assumptions followed by its aim and ending with a more
concrete inquiry into its nature.
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A Statement
Justice as wholeness mitigates the effects of medical errors by restoring, as best as
possible a person’s or an organization’s experience of wholeness. The foundation on
which this proposal is based is the biblical notion of dignity, a multidimensional concept
explicated in the creation narratives. Being created in God’s image means not only
having a claim to intrinsic worth, as all of creation has, but being gifted with an
undiminished, eternal dignity. On a fundamental level intrinsic worth means that all
living creatures ought to be treated lovingly and with due consideration. Inherent dignity,
however, is a concept of higher order; it extends God’s love to every bom, living human
who deserves to be treated equally and with respect to God’s image.
Anchored in this ecologically and spiritually integrated foundation, justice as
wholeness holds the ultimate good of human kind, the non-moral value that ought to be
pursued is wholeness. Where wholeness in-itself is an intrinsic good but non-moral, its
pursuit has moral significance and reflects on a person’s character. Situated in God’s plan
and purpose for creation wholeness has both temporal and spatial dimensions. Relative
wholeness unfolds within the limitations of a broken world and is reflected in a person’s
physical, emotional, spiritual and social experiences as they present themselves in an
instance of time. Perceptions of wholeness and its experience are personal. Yet, they are
relationally shaped and find meaning transcendentally in anticipation of an integrated
future. Vision-wholeness as proclaimed by the prophetic imagination and depicted in the
Book of Revelation exists independent from human perception and experience; it is the
fulfillment of God’s plan and the hope of human kind.
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The goal of justice is wholeness. The function of justice is to restore its
constituent elements which appear to us as windows to a greater reality. Perfect justice, is
transformative justice; it is the result of God’s passion and compassion fulfilling the
prophetic visions by transforming all that is into a perfect state of wholeness. The end
result w justice as wholeness. Imperfect, restorative justice aims at returning to
wholeness within the limitations of a broken world. It is justice as relative wholeness and
represents the best we can do taking into account that human nature, though capable of
good intentions, is essentially selfish. This leads to social and spiritual isolation, the signs
of a Niebuhrian world.
The restoration of relative-wholeness by justice is corrupted in the presence of
domination and inequality, both which are the main contributors to injustice.
Consequently, freedom from arbitrary interference and compassionate engagement in the
making of one’s own choices as well as in that of others are fundamental to the just
restoration of personal and social wholeness. That this is done equally for all who are
affected by harm and making the same effort to healing the multiple dimensions of
wholeness is a similarly principled moral concern of justice. Equality is deeply rooted in
human dignity and extended by agape love to form the obligation of equal consideration.
The restoration of relative wholeness in the absence of freedom and equality, though a
morally admirable intention, is an illusive and impossible goal.
The relationship of perfect and imperfect justice, vision-wholeness and relative
wholeness, respectively, is such that we interpret the restoration of relative-wholeness by
looking at ourselves and our actions in light of a transcendent reality. Within the contours
of this moral space the continuity of wholeness between what is and is about to become
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orients the meaning of life towards hope. Justice as the restoration of wholeness becomes
a moral pursuit that is evaluated by the achievement of its goal but not without judging its
fairness in reference to its principles. In the present human condition, it is only with these
considerations in mind that love for the neighbor can become a possibility.

Propositions
The following propositions capture the content of justice as wholeness organized
into the structure of principled consequentialism. The order in which these propositions
ought to be considered is “lexical” meaning that they are of equal importance yet call for
consideration in the order stated (see Rawls, 1971, pp. 37-39).

Justice as Wholeness
The role of justice is to restore wholeness:
(1) Wholeness is the ultimate value in human life. Vision wholeness represents a perfect
relationship between its physical, mental, spiritual and social dimensions in a
transcendent reality. As such it is God’s purpose and the hope of human kind. Relative
wholeness is the experience of these multi-dimensional aspects in a broken world.
(2) A good option, which can be an action, a specific policy provision, or a rule, is one
that is predicted, in reference to its consequences and from the point of view of the
actor(s), to have the potential to restore the relative experience of wholeness in a specific
situation.
(3) An action, a specific policy provision or a rule is both good and just if it restores the
relative experience of wholeness as defined and honors the following two constraining
principles of justice:
(a) Civic freedom as non-domination and compassionate engagement.
(b) Equality as equal consideration, which means regarding the wholeness of
others as our own, and making the same relative contribution to restoring the
relative experience of wholeness of ourselves and others.
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Conclusion
When considering justice as wholeness as an ethical framework for making just
decisions, we should keep in mind that moral decisions are often made based on intuition,
including those that concern justice. Resolving evaluative conflict is often a matter of gut
feeling, or in light of prophetic justice, that of passion. Wholeness touches all dimensions
of a human being including her heart and soul. In this light, a vision of justice as
wholeness as proposed should not be considered a technical solution applicable to all
situations face value but as a meaningful framework with high potential to guiding moral
reflection. It is fluid and adaptive, appreciating the uniqueness of the moment in which
justice is called on to heal brokenness. Consistent with other models of restorative justice,
justice as wholeness invites participation, thus avoiding the practical dualism of
theoretical approaches that merge justice and moral desert. With its focus on integrity and
concern for freedom and equality, steeped in compassion and love, it provides an impetus
for change.
With its specific biblical and politico-philosophical elements justice as wholeness
does not require us to part from established values to accept new ones. When carried into
practical life as a philosophical foundation for policies in faith-based hospitals it
integrates well with their mission statements and values. Changing the medical culture in
terms of how medical errors are handled and talked about is difficult, but not impossible
as recent examples indicate. Culture change depends on successfully instilling mission
values so that value-based policies are translated into practice. Treating the effects of
harm from a healing perspective rather than a litigation perspective requires a solid
ethical foundation with values that engender trust, transparency, and in the end, courage.
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CHAPTER SIX
HEALING TOGETHER

Introduction
A vision of justice as wholeness may serve as a philosophical foundation for
Christian hospitals that aim at handling medical errors fairly after patients have been
harmed. It provides an ethical framework of values and constraints against which the
content of medical error policies can be measured and revised. Justice as wholeness is a
moral imperative for an organization to accept responsibility for the mistakes it makes
and to reflect its mission and core values when responding to harm fairly. It may also
guide an individual’s moral choices and actions when issues of disclosure call for careful
personal and professional consideration. An organizational culture that draws on justice
as wholeness formally in policies and informally in interpersonal interactions values
freedom and equality, thus engaging the efforts of patients, healthcare staff, and hospital
services in reporting mistakes and restoring wholeness.
This present chapter will explore these claims. The first section offers a transition
from the theoretical discourse to the application of justice as wholeness as a
comprehensive and integrative approach to medical error highlighting major theoretical
and policy implications. The second section is a case example of Loma Linda University
Medical Center, a Seventh-day Adventist hospital and trauma center in California. This
particular medical center shows special concern for incorporating its mission To Make
Man Whole and the mission’s derivative core values into policies and practices. The third
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section develops a policy proposal that situates justice as wholeness into the context of
the hospital’s operational procedures and current state and regulatory requirements. The
fourth section presents a case vignette will (1) test the model of medical error developed
in Chapter Two, (2) illustrate how the conceptual elements of justice as wholeness play
out in a particular case of medical error, and (3) demonstrate that a mistake management
policy based on justice as wholeness supports a healing perspective of wholeness even in
critical cases.

A Comprehensive and Integrative Perspective
Justice as wholeness is macro-theoretical and, as previously indicated, falls
between the levels of principles and worldview. It offers a Christian and civic republican
perspective of restoration in light of human wholeness honoring the principles of civic
freedom and equal consideration. It guides the identification of professional obligations
and responsibilities that specifically emerge in those healthcare settings that embrace a
Christian conceptualization of wholeness. Because of its particular notions of freedom
and equality, justice as wholeness emphasizes that justice can only unfold to its fullest
potential when it is situated in a hospital culture that fosters a climate of un-dominated
and participatory decision-making. This is a culture in which expertise is inextricably
linked to ethical considerations, a culture of transparent autonomy as I have argued, to
which equal consideration of everyone’s well-being is fundamental. As such, justice as
wholeness has organizational as well as interpersonal implications; it offers a framework
that is culturally and relationally significant.
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Justice as wholeness is both comprehensive and integrative. It is comprehensive
in that it is consistent with micro-theoretical approaches developed by restorative justice
scholars, ethicists, and legal professionals concerned with reconciliation. Moreover,
justice as wholeness expands the boundaries of formal rational law59 to include a range of
possibilities that emerge from extra-legal contexts in which medical errors are situated.
Its comprehensiveness is also reflected on the policy level. Justice as wholeness becomes
relevant for mission integration, informs the disclosure of mistakes to patients, and guides
processes of restoration. As an integrative approach to medical errors justice as
wholeness addresses failure from a systems perspective thus calling for policies that
engage actors and departments from multiple specialties and services to respond
collaboratively and compassionately to medical harm.

Theoretical Implications
One of the distinguishing features as a comprehensive approach is that justice as
wholeness is consistent with more specific issues of apologizing, with how to
communicate best with patients, and with broader perspectives such as collaborative
law60, under one condition. This is if they are committed to its bounding principles and
converge on its value-goal, either inferentially or explicitly. Viewing justice this way
takes into account formal approaches to law and also allows enough flexibility to
recognize and appreciate the kind of interpersonal justice that unfolds between doctors
and patients when apologies are extended or mistakes are communicated with
59 Under formal rational law I understand legal case precedent and the legal code as they are rooted in the
ideology of bureaucratic rationalism.
60 Collaborative law is an approach that has become increasingly popular. According to Walther (2004), it
consists of lawyers and their clients who are committed to solving their disputes outside the formal legal
system by arriving at mutually agreed upon settlements.
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compassion. Cahn (1975) suggests this kind of justice to be particularly important,
perhaps more so than that enshrined in formal rational law. Cahn talks about the
delusions men experience from looking for justice in mansions, where it is not to
be found, instead of at [hospital] comers where it makes its appearance. That
justice we know before the occasion, but only the occasion discloses precisely
what it calls on us to do.

Bom in the unique circumstances of medical mistakes is the kind of justice that
this vision of wholeness aims to encourage: justice that is characterized by autonomy and
transparency, allowing healthcare providers to admit, report, and disclose to patients their
failures by giving equal consideration to individuals’ and the organization’s needs for
restoration. Hardly is there only one way to heal the wounds opened by failure. A
comprehensive vision with a focus on wholeness, justice as wholeness supports formal
regulatory processes of a hospital which may intersect with informal practices of
rectification. Although one reason for developing a principled consequentialist decision
making model with an emphasis on wholeness is to encourage an organizational
environment that is well equipped to dealing with the effects of medical errors internally,
it acknowledges that some medical error cases are better handled by seeking external
assistance. This may include the services of the civil legal system, either in the form of
attorney-negotiated settlement or, as a very last resort in the most complex cases.
litigation. These systems are theoretically distinct, yet if justice as wholeness is as
comprehensive as it claims to be, it would accommodate each approach under certain
circumstances.
Writing from a criminal justice perspective, Braithwaite and Pettit (2000a) remind
us that we should pay special attention to the phenomena that arise from the interactions
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between private systems of justice that are based on custom and public systems of justice,
which are based on law. Similarly in medicine, many medical error claims could be
resolved and individuals be restored to wholeness by focusing on the kind of justice that
emerges from compassionate communication while at the same time drawing on the
resources of more formal organizational and legal constituencies . In other words, a
private apology from a healthcare provider to a patient may very well reduce litigation to
settlement if the parties’ and the organization’s experience of wholeness can be restored
as best as possible.
Justice as wholeness generates a comprehensive yet practical systems perspective.
It is integrative regarding the hospital as an integrated system of patients, medical
services, and departments. As indicated in Chapter Two, medicine by its very nature is a
rather fragmented field that consists of many specialties. Many hospital environments
are characterized by a division of labor and separation between departments and services
that nevertheless intersect in the care of one patient. Frequently errors are not made by
one specific doctor or medical service but are the result of a network of antecedent
processes. Thus, each medical error is organizationally and personally unique. Once a
medical error harms a patient, additional actors and departments become involved as the
case is referred consecutively to internal entities such as patient relations, quality
resource management, and risk management. As a result, the process of erring as well as
the process of restoring its effects may often become highly fragmented.
An integrative approach to medical error does not ask how one person, service, or
department can resolve post-medical error issues most effectively but instead how they
can work in concert by drawing on the strengths that bear on their interconnectedness.
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The practical focus of a comprehensive and integrative theory, then, is to provide a
theoretical rationale for cooperation. Patients, individual healthcare providers, medical
services, and departments ought to work in concert to identify the causes of error, to
report potentially harmful and harmful errors, to encourage feedback, and to increase
patient safety. The final goal of this bird’s eye view of justice is to incorporate values into
policies that encourage the restoration of the well-being of patients, medical
professionals, and the organization.

Policy Considerations
Three major policy issues, for which justice as wholeness offers guidance, bear on
theoretical comprehensiveness and integration.
The first policy issue concerns the organizational culture context in which
medical error policies are developed and executed. In order to implement an overarching
theoretical construct as the one proposed, it is imperative to establish a connection
between its concepts and the philosophy that informs a hospital’s mission. The content of
the mission, which is the heart of an organization, is presented in the formal mission
statement. Bart and Tabone (1998) define a mission statement as a “written formal
document that attempts to capture an organization’s unique and enduring purpose and
practices” (p. 55). It tells us who the organization is, why it exists, and what it wants to
achieve. A strong mission statement provides stability in light of rapid change imposed
by state and federal regulation and holds the balance in the currents of a capitalistic
market economy. In contrast, the vision of an organization indicates its goal in the long
run. The core values present a crucial transition from the more abstract statement of
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mission to everyday practices as they translate the deeper meaning of mission into
operational policies. The values of an organization provide a practical understanding of
the organization’s identity, its ethics61, and its purpose.
In Christian hospitals, core values may include notions of dignity, social justice,
compassion, and forgiveness. Taylor (2001) comments that based on her analysis of 25
mission statements of Roma Catholic hospitals, faith-based organizations increasingly
substitute business language for a Christian one. Analyzing the content of 36 mission
statements of Seventh-day Adventist hospitals, Schubert and Gardner (2005) discovered a
similar prevalence of business metaphors although only one of the 36 hospitals missed
mentioning the healing ministry of Jesus. All but l/6th of the hospitals did not allude to
the distinct Adventist emphasis on preventive health education, well being or wholeness.
As a response to the replacement of Christian descriptors of hospital identity with
metaphors of a consumer-driven healthcare market, Taylor (2001) encourages faith-based
hospitals to infuse their mission values with “Jesus language and modeling” (p. 29). This,
she argues, would help to correct injustices in healthcare and help maintain Christian
identity and mission. Mission-oriented values should be made obvious and filtered into
hospital culture and subcultures by the way of education and leadership involvement.
Instilling a sense of mission in everyone regardless of their position and profession is of
fundamental importance for the integrity of an organization. Virtually every employee in
an organization either advances or inhibits an organization’s mission (Boyle, DuBose,
Ellingson, Guinn, & McCurdy, 2001). Thus, integrity ought to be preserved in the
individual as a reflection of a strong organizational moral mission.

61 “Ethics is a systematic reflection on lived experience whereas morality is the lived experience of making
choices” (Boyle et ah, 2001, p. 13).
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As the moral compass of a hospital, a mission statement directs the flow of valuecontent from its philosophical or theological base to its incorporation into policies and
practice as mission-focused actions. A pioneer in the integration of mission values into a
medical error policy, Catholic Healthcare West (CHW) (2003), a network of 41 hospitals
n California, Arizona and Nevada, articulates an ethics of medical error in light of its
unique mission and five core values. The first is dignity. According to CHW’s policy,
dignity demands respect calling for the honest communication of facts about medical
errors. This includes a patient’s right to seek legal assistance, the acceptance of
responsibility, and the provision of an apology. The second value is collaboration. In the
context of medical error, collaboration refers to an atmosphere of trust, honesty, and
transparency in which multiple departments and services look at the problem of medical
error from several angles. The third Justice, implies that responsibility is shared among
healthcare partners and that both patients and employees are treated “fairly and equitably
regardless of rank or status” (p. 2). Justice is also extended to honor larger public systems
and rules for reporting errors in order to protect public safety. Stewardship, the fourth
value, implies that patients harmed by medical errors are compensated fairly, thus
exploring “every avenue for a just settlement” (p. 3). The fifth value is excellence
through admitting that there is always room for improvement. CHW shifts the focus away
from punishment towards collaborative systems improvement.
CHW’s specific value-driven medical error policy was developed to create a
paradigm shift in how medical errors are handled and to cultivate in their hospitals
transparency and cooperation. When considering justice as wholeness as the underlying
foundation of a medical error policy in other faith-based hospitals, we should assure that
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theory’s foundation, principles, and goal-value, which are dignity, civic freedom, equality
as equal consideration, and wholeness, respectively, resonate with a hospital’s philosophy
and mission. Like CHW’s mission statement, these elements ought to be articulated in
light of shared values. Justice as wholeness informs an approach to healing the effects of
medical errors by capitalizing on the interconnectedness and integrity of the hospital
moral community. It is only when justice as wholeness resonates with the philosophy,
mission, and values of a hospital, and if these are internalized by its employees, that the
actions prescribed by a medical error policy are culturally apt.
The second policy issue concerns the starting-point in a cascade of post-medical
error processes. It involves instances of truth-telling and the disclosure of medical error to
patients and their families. A morally and emotionally charged factual issue, the decision
about what kinds of errors should be disclosed to patients is not a simple matter. Chapter
Two developed a conceptual model and definition of medical error: errors which cause
recognizable physical, emotional, spiritual, and social harm should be a concern for
restorative justice and ought to be reported to a patient safety board or the hospital’s
quality improvement committee; near-misses and potentially harmful errors ought to be
reported to and reviewed by these entities to prevent reoccurrences. Where the model is
clear on this distinction, it leaves room for discretion in matters of disclosure. There are
many medical errors that do not cause harm, yet physicians may nevertheless wish to
inform their patients. But there are those that do cause injury, only some of which may
fall under state or federal regulation, and thus requiring disclosure. Others may present
an ethical rather than a legal dilemma. These are errors that would by virtue of justice as
wholeness produce consequences that reduce in a rather significant way the experience of
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wholeness if disclosed to patients. These are boundary or exceptional cases in which a
close evaluation by the theory’s constraining principles is mandatory.
The question then becomes how much discretion should physicians be granted
when deciding about disclosing the facts of boundary cases? In a similar vein, what is the
extent of information they ought to relate to patients and their families? Could it ever be
considered just not to disclose a harmful mistake to a patient and her family or to
withhold either a portion or all of the relevant facts to promote her wholeness?
Truthfulness in communication may mitigate the effects of mistakes, yet in certain
cases it may cause additional strain. On the extreme end of the spectrum is the practice
of deception. Deception is the result of telling a lie to change intentionally somebody’s
belief context. Deceiving a patient always strips her of the freedom to make informed
choices about her life, which, based on justice as wholeness, is categorically unacceptable
even in the most extreme reduction of wholeness. However, if in exceptional
circumstances the omission of telling a patient about an error that harmed her would
maintain or even increase her experience of wholeness, that of others equally considered,
not dominating choices that are by nature hers to make, non-disclosure can be considered
just by virtue of justice as wholeness.
When making choices about restoring the experience of individual and social
wholeness, physicians are called on to reconcile notions of justice with professional
freedom. Injustice as wholeness, civic freedom re-defmes the context of professional
freedom in which these choices are made. Specifically, it dismantles professional
paternalism to put forth an ethic of non-domination and compassionate engagement. It is
at this junction where justice as wholeness calls for a re-conceptualization of professional
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freedom as “transparent autonomy,” thus reconnecting technical expertise with the
healthcare provider’s ethical obligations to the public as partners in healing.
In the wake of failure, the boundaries between the often distant professional self
and the vulnerable compassionate self become blurred as individuals and healthcare
teams experience the ramification of their mistakes. The point of disclosure signals the
beginning of a transformed relationship between patients and those who care for them.
Ideally, disclosure is the entrance to a shared path towards healing; however, due to
personal and organizational barriers, this might not always be the case. How the news
that a mistake has been made in a patient’s care, one that may have caused physical,
emotional, spiritual, or social harm, is communicated, as well as who communicates it, is
of fundamental importance. A comprehensive vision of justice such as the one proposed
bodes for policies that are at once prescriptive and flexible, thus maintaining procedural
regularity of disclosure processes while allowing space for a moral imagination that
arises as the occasion requires.
The third policy issue that draws on justice as wholeness is the resolution of
physical, emotional, spiritual, and social brokenness. Any medical error policy should
guide processes that are in-themselves restorative, individually and relationally. In this
light, policy provisions aid in determining whether responses fit the circumstances.
Restoring the experience of wholeness after harm caused by medical errors
requires compassion, involvement, and sharing of responsibility. Although the experience
of wholeness unfolds in multiple dimensions and brokenness may call for a variety of
interpersonal and organizational responses, at the very minimum, hospitals ought to
establish medical error programs to assist patients, their families, and healthcare
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providers with spiritual, emotional and social coping (NQF, 2007). Among others, these
programs may include chaplains’ services, social work, and an employee assistance
program. For harmed patients and their families, bringing back wholeness may include
increased physician-contact along with an expanded treatment regime or financial
compensation. It may also invoke a range of alternative responses as wholeness is
situation-dependent, always unfolding from the individual actor’s point of view. The
central idea, then, is that subjective concerns for wholeness are addressed openly and in
the context of the relationships that make up a hospital’s moral community. Fairness in
determining need lies in un-dominated choice, compassionate engagement, and the
recognition of equality that is rooted in the inherent dignity and potential for wholeness
of every person.
The application of these concepts to the everyday reality of failure in medicine
raises challenging questions. For example, can the restorativeness of any particular
choice be predicted? Can non-domination be guaranteed in potentially high-conflict
situations between unequals? Moreover, what can be done if the restoration of different
elements of wholeness conflict? These and related questions provide challenges for
hospitals willing to adopt a restorative justice perspective. This dissertation submits to the
policy arena a philosophical background on which to draw and makes available
propositions that guide moral choices in difficult cases. Generally, Justice as wholeness
would support mediation practices specifically when hospitals are called on to determine
compensation and other means of restoration (see Claassen & Reimer, 2004 for a general
mediation model and Liebman & Hyman, 2004 for a mediation model developed
specifically for medical error cases).
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Braithwaite and Pettit (2000a) argue that “the ideal of a comprehensive theory is
obtained when a complete and coherent set of answers is provided to the key questions
under a systemic answering strategy.” A comprehensive and integrative vision of justice
as wholeness is one that offers an overarching theoretical construct that is connected to a
hospital’s mission and values. It highlights the nature of the hospital as an interrelated
system and as such supports the development of integrative policies. If hospitals accept
justice as wholeness as their philosophy of error management, they should be prepared to
support professional freedom and grant physicians discretion, guided by the constraining
principles of justice as wholeness, when making choices about disclose in boundary
cases. For healthcare providers, accepting a conception of justice as wholeness also
means making a commitment to citizenship, accepting responsibility when due, and
giving equal consideration to oneself and others in the wake of failure.

Loma Linda University Medical Center
What follows is a case study of Loma Linda University Medical Center62
(LLUMC). This chapter makes use of information gathered as part of a larger, descriptive
research endeavor that is not yet completed. Additionally, it draws on excerpts of a
summary report on the disclosure of errors which was submitted to the hospital’s
leadership (Schubert, 2007). This case study investigated how medical errors are handled
at LLUMC, formally and informally. Taking a natural systems approach to organizational
research (see Boyle et al., 2001) and following Yin’s (2003) case study method, the
hospital’s medical error- related documents such as handbooks, policies, and reports were
analyzed to understand the formal aspects of managing mistakes while field observations
62 The study was IRB approved 10/17/05, OSR#55170.
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and interview data captured the infonnal aspects that arise from what Yanow (2002) calls
“communities of meaning.”
Thirty-four semi-structured interviews (for example Weiss, 1994) with
physicians, residents, third-and fourth-year medical students, nurses, councilors,
chaplains, administrators of various departments and services, legal counsel, risk
management, chaplains and ethicists provide insights into the morality of hospital culture.
These interviewees were professionals who served the organization from six months to
36 years (Mdn = 16 years); eighteen were males and 16 were females. The selection of
the participants who are experts was “purpose-driven” or “theory-driven” (Miles &
Huberman, 1994, p. 27). Compensation was not offered. The interviews lasted from 40
minutes to five hours. These “guided conversations” (Yin, 2003, p. 89) followed an
interview outline consisting of topic questions in four major sections: demographic
information, medical error background such as definitions and processes, perceptions
about justice, and perceptions about mission integration, and linking organizational
values to the formal and informal handling of medical errors. The interviews were voicerecoded subject to permission of the participants. The transcribed data were then coded
descriptively into major themes and analyzed interpretively within the major theme
categories (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 57). While this dissertation frequently draws on
the interview data and the hospital’s documents, a comprehensive report of the case study
results will be published elsewhere.
Located in the beautiful hills of Loma Linda just 60 miles east of Los Angeles,
LLUMC, a church operated Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) organization, first opened its
doors in 1905 when it began to admit patients as Loma Linda Sanatorium. In its first year,
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the Christian facility developed its focus not only in the area of caring and healing in the
traditional sense but educated its patients in making healthy lifestyle choices in order to
prevent illness. From the very beginning, training programs in nursing and evangelism
reflected the institution’s strong sense of Christian mission which continued to shape the
organization as it became LLUMC 62 years later. The hospital’s focus on healing the
whole person remains the driving force behind patient care, medical education, and
research today. When walking through the halls of the hospital, one encounters paintings
of biblical themes depicting Jesus as the Great Healer, bringing its special mission to
mmediate attention (for a comprehensive history of Loma Linda University and Loma
Linda University Medical Center see Cheatham et ah, 2005).
Today, LLUMC is the largest hospital in the mountainous region. Together with
its constituent hospitals and clinics, it operates an over 800-bed facility and attends to
more than 60,000 visits annually. The Medical Center is the only tertiary care facility and
Level 1 trauma center covering a large geographic area, responding to trauma cases in
three counties. As such, it provides the highest level of care for one-fourth of the state of
California. Approximately half a million outpatients from local and distant communities
are treated at the medical center each year (LLUMC CAPE Application, July 2007).
In addition to providing local routine healthcare and emergency services, LLUMC
is World renowned in many regards. It offers 46 accredited residency programs, some of
which are the largest in the United States. Moreover, LLUMC is taking the lead in infant
heart transplantation as well as proton cancer treatment and is committed to local
community and Global outreach. Members of the medical staff, nursing, and other
specialties frequently travel to its associated clinics in countries including Afghanistan,
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Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Africa, and Mexico to perform medical procedures and train
healthcare providers. Besides excellence in scientific research and clinical education,
LLUMC highlights the importance of patient satisfaction and promotes a culture of
patient safety. It encourages blame and punishment-free error reporting by staff through a
number of methods and engages senior leaders in efforts to improve quality. LLUMC
aims high in trying to assure that its organizational structure, leadership styles, policies,
and everyday practices reflect its mission and core values, keeping Christ at the center
(see LLUMC, CAPE Application, July 2007).

Philosophy and Mission
The mission of Loma Linda University Medical Center is to continue the healing
ministry of Jesus Christ, to make man whole, in a setting of advanced medical
science and to provide a stimulating clinical and research environment for the
education of physicians, nurses, and other healthcare professionals. (Mission
Statement, LLUMC, 2007)

In the Adventist world view, healing the sick affirms the biblical emphasis on
wholeness. It represents a strong commitment to participate in God’s plan for restoration.
To Make Man Whole furthers the mission of the Seventh-day Adventist Church63 and
captures the philosophy of LLUMC that underlies the hospital’s mission statement. As
noted in the medical center’s operating policy (LLUMC, Operating Policy A, 2003, p. 1),
this philosophy is based on two premises. The first is that God created human beings to
enjoy wholeness of body and spirit, and to depend on him for life and well-being. The

^ “The mission of the Seventh-day Adventist Church is to communicate to all peoples the everlasting
gospel of God’s love in the context of the three angles’ messages of revelation 14: 6-12, and as revealed in
the life, death, resurrection, and high priestly ministry of Jesus Christ, leading them to accept Jess as
personal Savior and Lord and to unite with His remnant church; and to nurture believers as disciples in
preparation for His soon return” (General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 2005).
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second premise holds that human wholeness was broken by the human family’s
separation from God. As the body is considered God’s temple, the restoration of
wholeness in the individual is warranted, yet the hospital’s healing ministry extends to
patients and their loved ones, employees, students, and the community (LLUMC,
Operating Policy A, 2003, p. 1). With its mission steeped in Christian theology, then.
LLUMC is consistent with the Seventh-day Adventist focus on whole person care and
combines high quality medical care, scientific excellence, and integrative medical
education with the centrality of Christ. A leader in modem medicine, the medical center
represents the “innovation of excellence in Christ-centered health care.”
Integrating the mission into its culture the medical center states four intrinsic
values and one extrinsic value (Mission Statement, LLUMC, 2007). Recall that the
former are values that do not depend on external justification for being valued whereas
the latter are goods that are means to produce something else considered good (see
Frankena, 1973; Harold, 2005). Both intrinsic and extrinsic values reflect the hospital’s
philosophy and mission. In the ideal case, they guide the medical center’s policies and
practices which then contribute to shaping organizational ethics and culture. The
following are LLUMC’s values, slightly rephrased.
Compassion is the first organizational value. It is an intrinsic good that reflects
God’s love through caring, respect, and empathy. According the LLUMC’s value
statement, compassionate care depends on the general attitude of attentiveness and
making an effort to know others. This includes active listening, treating others with
kindness, and anticipating and responding to need in a timely manner. The second
intrinsic value is the assurance that the hospital’s actions are consistent with its values. It
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concerns organizational integrity. Integrity calls for the respect of dignity, for building
and honoring trustful relationships in which commitments and promises are kept, for
accepting responsibility, and for holding oneself and others accountable. Third,
excellence is an intrinsic good that is reflected in the safety of the medical center’s
patients, organizational reliability, efficiency, and the provision of patient centered care.
The achievement of excellence includes the medical center’s partnering with physicians
and care givers to ensure accurate, honest communication with patients and family
members. The medical center’s fifth stated core value is teamwork, which involves
collaboration of health care team members in achieving a common purpose. It is an
extrinsic value because teamwork is in itself not a good, but is valued because it aims at
certain goals, such as patient safety, under specific circumstances. The values statement
of LLUMC illustrates that good teamwork means sharing information to build
knowledge, celebrating successes, encouraging differing opinions and breaking down
barriers by communicating ideas clearly in order to promote a safe and patient-centered
care. The fifth and final intrinsic value is wholeness, the integration of mind, body, and
spirit in a balanced life. Wholeness in the values statement concerns supporting the
spiritual mission of a faith based organization, and providing a positive, peaceful, and
hopeful environment of compassionate healing for patients, their families, and caregivers
(Mission Statement, LLUMC, 2007).
LLUMC has a comprehensive Christian mission. The question arises, however,
in how far this mission and its resultant values are reflected in the organization’s culture
when medical error disrupts the intricate web of relationships between patients and
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members of the hospital community. In other words, does the distinctly Adventist
emphasis on wholeness make a difference in how medical errors are treated?
When members of the hospital community were asked about the intersection of
the hospital’s mission To Make Man Whole and the treatment of medical errors, many
individuals’ initial surprise was followed by genuine interest in the question and
enthusiasm about finding a suitable response. A little hesitant at first, a Family Medicine
physician explains that
the Adventist ethic makes a little difference because we have such a heritage in
talking about wholeness and a whole person approach to things that hopefully it
would make us a little more cognizant of the fact that people have emotional,
social, relational and psychological and spiritual lives. All of these are important
to their health and well-being. So this knowledge serves to put our ethic in a little
richer context. I don’t know that the ethic is different [than that of other
Christians], but it’s just that the knowledge of the context and world view in
which we put this should help to reinforce our trying to bring wholeness to this
situation [of medical error].

A risk manager defends the view that LLUMC’s mission and core values are particularly
important in regards to patient safety and “serving people in a way that is safe and
affordable and effective.” He thinks that “to be careless or to be unprofessional is clearly
inconsistent with Christian principles.” There is a moral obligation to deliver quality care
that “transcends the regulatory obligation and transcends the financial consequences.” A
more specific view of how the hospital’s emphasis on wholeness should influence how
patients and healthcare providers ought to be treated following medical error is provided
by a senior medical student who argues that
we need to keep wholeness in mind, along with the best interest of the patient.
The patient knows! Wholeness is one more reason why we need to tell them what
happened. One should attend to all aspects that are affected. Chaplains could get
involved, that adds to wholeness. Social workers and psychologists are important.

264

But involvement should always depend on need and depend on the kind of error
that happened.
Moreover, she specifically emphasizes that doctors also have a need for wholeness after
they make a mistake: “I would feel terrible!” In her opinion, this would make counseling
an important tool in restoring the effect of medical errors.
While LLUMC’s Christian mission places high demands on the organization to
attend to patient’s concerns with empathy and compassion, a central theme in the
interviews is the treatment of physicians or other healthcare staff who make mistakes and
whose well-being is often severely compromised when patients are harmed. Similar to
the medical student, a family physician explains that
it takes confession, it takes apology, it takes forgiveness, it takes restitution,
where appropriate. If we have harmed another, how do you restore relationships
to wholeness? There’s a very definite Christian system for that. As Christ said,
leave your gift by the altar and go and make it right with the person and then
come back and give your gift. So I think openness, honesty, apology where
appropriate, caring, both for those who committed the error and having respect for
the people that work here. And their needs for wholeness is the often an
overlooked piece of this when we talk about should patients be giving restitution
or should they be apologized to and so forth.
A wholistic perspective of medical error is one that situates failure in the context of the
whole situation, looking at the past while acknowledging the unfolding events of the
present to consider future possibilities. Thinking about mission implementation in
medical error cases, a Patient Relations representative emphasizes the importance of
being honest, admitting error, and showing compassion while also emphasizing that the
experience of failure is not one-sided, but emerges from the specific context of a doctor
patient-relationship that develops over time. While physicians often say that they are
sorry for what happened, yet not specifically asking the patient to forgive them, restoring
wholeness is always a relational issue that is shaped by previous experience.
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I would hope that both sides could look at their work and say “this is one incident,
this does not represent everything that occurred in caring for a patient.” In other
words, putting that into context where a patient or family would say Dr. So and
So has taken care of my father for years, we have trusted him, he or she has been
kind, we have had prayer, we trust the hospital. This is something that occurred
and we will forgive it, we have grace.
In light of the hospital’s mission, physicians are expected to be honest and empathetic
and patients are expected to forgive gracefully. From this perspective, the hospital’s
mission is intertwined with the actions of a hospital moral community that includes
patients, healthcare staff, administrators, and others.
When considering the impact of the healing ministry of Christ on employees who
are involved in medical error cases, a nurse executive shows particular concern for
disciplinary actions against those who make harmful medical mistakes. In her opinion,
attempts should be made to capitalize on the potential of employees who make errors
unintentionally, providing them with resources so that they can improve and be
successful. If mistakes are major or repeatedly made even after additional education and
job reassignments, liability may prompt termination. However, based on LLUMC’s
Christian philosophy and special mission, the employee’s well-being, and dignity should
always be respected:
In this context, there’s no doubt to me that it [the mission of LLUMC] has to do
with grace and forgiveness. When I think of medical error and healing ministry, I
think of the restoration of an individual to a meaningful life again. So for the
person who performed the error, it would be the grace and restoration of that
individual. And even if they didn’t stay in employment here in the way that they
were dealt with, they would still be able to maintain their dignity and personhood.
If somebody had a major error for liability purposes they really shouldn’t be able
to stay. I would hope that the institution would be able to treat them with respect
and help them to get a job some place else and not to dispose of them as trash.
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The theory that this dissertation proposes develops the idea that the function of
justice is to restore wholeness and suggests that two constraining principles of justice
limit its pursuit for the sake of non-domination and fairness. When initially asked about
their understanding of justice in case of medical error, participants generally tend to
articulate justice in terms of rightness, doing what is “right” for the patient. Many find
that the right thing to do is to be honest and to apologize. Frequently, the concept of
justice is conceptualized terms of what it is not: punishing those who make unintentional
mistakes. When asked to describe what he means by justice and how the concept may
relate to the organizations mission, one of the hospital’s chaplains points at honesty and
justice as principles that are at the core of the mission. Specifically, he relates these
principles to integrity and trustworthiness:
The Bible is pretty clear; He wants us to do justly, to do our work with integrity. I
think we have a divine command in our mission statement in that whole concept
of wholeness. It’s not just touchy, warm-feeling stuff making you feel good; it has
the core root and principles of honesty and justice so that people can trust us and
know we’re going to do the right thing. Not because some corpse hauling us into
court or whatever but because we’re doing it out of our natural being where it
becomes the core: we’re going to treat people justly.
What is particularly interesting in the chaplain’s perception is that justice is dynamic and
sensitive to the emotional needs of the patient. In other words, justice is sensitive to the
individual situation and strongly depends on the root concept of trust:
And when it comes to emotional needs people have in the hospital, you know, we
find that basically there are two types of patients. When it comes to the
emotional, one patient is very cognitive, they want to know all the facts and have
an idea of what’s going on so that they can understand it and feel okay about it.
So with these patients, the doctor is always telling them everything they are
doing. You have other patients who don’t want to know all this information; they
just want to know they can trust the doctor and they just put their life into their
hands. And I think the concept of justice comes in there too that this person
[physician] is going to treat me justly and even though I don’t know the details, I
trust them. So, I think justice is seen all the way through this thing. You can’t
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come to somebody with spiritual emphasis and not be trustworthy and not treat
people justly and do what’s right. And I think the Bible talks about being just, it
means doing what is right based on solid values! So I think whole person care, the
whole foundation is based on that.

The integration of the medical center’s mission into the context of post-medical
error resolution comes as a surprise for some, yet they soon responded with great
enthusiasm. Others are more hesitant. Putting a “Jesus ethic” into practice in an
increasingly secularized American culture and with the eminent threat of medical
malpractice lawsuits may not always be easy. Aside from cultural and legal constraints
and focusing on the difficulties associated with working in a high-intensity emergency
department, an ED physician is entirely discouraged, noting the mission to be in the
minds of upper level administrators, unrealistic for those who try to manage the ever
increasing loads of malpractice-oriented patients. Interestingly, three individuals—a
medical student, a resident and an ER doctor—did not see a connection between the
organization’s mission and values and how medical errors ought to be handled in a
Christian healthcare institution that emphasizes whole-person care. A “professional
matter” rather than one of relationship, the onus is on the patient to make the leap to
regain trust, the ER doc notes, “restoration” in a broader sense than the physical, not
being of much relevance. Yet the three physicians were generally supportive of
LLUMC’s mission.
Further research needs to be conducted to describe in more detail the gap
between enthusiasm and practice. However, there are two factors that stand out and
which deserve mention. One, as previously noted, is the fear of legal repercussions.
Another is the difficulty of putting the oftentimes idealistic set of mission values into
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practice. Medical errors are largely a systems problem. As such, organizational values
must be coherent and strong in order to define the moral boundaries of complex systems.
LLUMC is perceived to be extremely fragmented, making quality improvement and
interdepartmental peer-review processes difficult. Reflecting the core idea of Holsinger’s
and Beaton’s (2006) hospital “fiefdoms,” an Internal Medicine physician notes that in
order both to improve communication and to increase the level of restorativeness in the
organization’s culture, “one thing that would be helpful, if there wasn’t such a rivalry,
were if we look at ourselves taking care of the person instead of little silos, going up to
the patient’s bedside in our own little kingdoms.”
The incorporation of mission values into the daily operating procedures of the
hospital is a challenge, particularly on the systems level. Where the quest for personal
and relational wholeness may inform the individual doctor-patient relationship and
extend to patient-nurse relationships on the level of units, as patients move through the
hospital system, their experience of a values-oriented organization as LLUMC may not
always be one in which its philosophy makes a profound difference in their care:
I think we badly miss the boat here on wholeness. Because we have dwelt on the
spiritual side of things and that is fine, but it is piece, you know. If I come into
this hospital and I have a hard time getting registered, I have to wait in the ED for
eleven hours, I have to go register here, then over there, then over here; I have to
register three times in one visit and then I go home I get a bill from five different
places and I don’t know what the heck is going on! That is a bad process and that
makes people mad! And that is not healthy. It is not good for us because people
hate us; but it is also not healthy for the patient it is stressful, it stresses the
patient. And I would say that part of wholeness is making as stress free an
environment operationally as we possible can. We have paid no attention to that
for decades in this place. They are now because they have to. We are being forced
to and we have leadership now that is really starting to pay attention to it. But for
a long time they didn’t. And I would say that a lot of the patient safety issues out
there are a part of wholeness. (Administrator, Quality Resource Management)
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Immediately qualifying his perspective on the difficulties in the overall system, the
administrator corroborates the notions of many study participants who have the mission
at their heart: “There is no question that the whole person care mission glues people
together here and that people by and large really buy into it.” He explains that Joint
Commission inspectors report after their site visits that “everybody knows your mission
right down to the janitor.” The mission of the medical center is the reason why “people
here are work for less money or working in stupid systems that drive them nuts; they
believe in what we are trying to do.”
Medical errors are the ultimate challenge to mission implementation. Healing
their effects from the perspective of a Christian worldview demands that processes such
as disclosure and restoration clearly reflect an organization’s core values. A missionoriented approach to resolving the effects of harm guided by a vision of justice as
wholeness, if implemented, would extend values across systems by capitalizing on the
interconnectedness of hospital community, thus highlighting collaboration and teamwork.
The role of formal policies is to outline and clarify individual and systems processes in a
way that is consistent with the hospital’s overall philosophy and mission. Moreover,
policies should emphasize a common purpose, giving employees the freedom and
security to act accordingly.

Current Policies
Formally, the handling of medical errors is regulated by a clinical management
policy, M-34 Events Involving Patients (Appendix A, Events Involving Patients, 2005)
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herein called by its code name “M-3464.” A number of related documents, polices, and
procedures provide additional guidance in medical error related issues, yet except for T57 Sentinel Events, M-55 Medication Administration and Errors, and M-104 Pediatric
Patient Safety Precautions and Event Reporting, these documents are not specific to
medical mistakes (see Table 1, p. 274). For the purpose of developing a medical error
policy, they contribute to the establishment of a formal organizational ethic as a context
for specific moral issues that arise in cases of failure. These additional policies also give
insight about the kinds of services that are available at LLUMC and which may be
included in a medical error policy proposal, particularly in regards to identifying ways to
restore wholeness.
Similar to other related policy documents, there is no explicit linkage between M34 and the mission and values statement of the medical center. The policy begins with a
definition of an “event.” While M-34 does not specifically define the term “medical
error” it describes this broader category. Accordingly, an event is “an out of the ordinary
or unexpected occurrence which is not consistent with the routine care and treatment
related to the patient’s admitting or working diagnosis.” The policy states that the
reporting of events shall follow the policy’s administrative procedures.
Where M-34 does not include specific provisions in regards to modes and
elements of medical error disclosure, the policy outlines in broad strokes the
communication of mistakes with patients and their families. The document indicates that
communication about medical mistakes ought to be done through the attending physician

64 At the time of this writing, Loma Linda University Medical Center leadership is considering revising
their medical error policy to comply with the suggested disclosure standards of the National Quality Forum
(2007) as well as with the requirements of the reporting requirements of the California Department of
Health and Human Services (2007).
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(M-104 refers to “medical staff’). The attending physician shall be informed when a
“medical/healthcare error” or “adverse event” occurs. Here, the policy specifically refers
to medical or healthcare error and adverse events without defining the terms elsewhere.
When this error or event is the cause of inconvenience to the patient or her family, results
in discomfort/pain, involves an injury, leads to an unplanned or consequential outcome,
the attending physician is required to inform the patient. The disclosure of any other
medical or healthcare error than those of the four categories is at the discretion of the
“primary attending physician,” who is responsible for the patient’s care and the sole
decision-maker in regards to disclosing these outcomes.
The remainder of the policy alludes to confidentiality of medical error
information, information management and internal reporting procedures. Documentation
of the event consists only of its factual description and the date and time the physician
was notified of the event. This information is to be placed into the patient’s medical
record without a mention of that an Event Reporting form had been filed. The Event
Report form itself only goes to the Department of Risk Management. The final section of
M-34 concerns equipment failures and their internal and external reporting mechanisms.
A subsequent part of the policy, M-34A, outlines the step by step process of handling
both kinds of patient events, those that are due to equipment failure and those that are not.
Several observations about M-34 can be made. First, it lacks clear definitions of
medical errors and adverse events and how they ought to be distinguished from “events”
other than in reference to the four stated outcome categories. This is difficult for
employees who are not familiar with the language of medical error to follow. Second, as
the policy that I will propose, M-34 is outcome-oriented. Third, the policy grants doctors
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discretion but does not leave room for other healthcare providers than attending
physicians to play a role in making decisions about medical errors or participating in any
way the disclosure process. In this same vein, M-34 does not make provisions for a
formal consulting or advisory service for physicians and healthcare staff faced with
conflict or ethical dilemmas. Due to the complexity of medical error cases and the threat
of litigation, the establishment of a multidisciplinary consulting service would certainly
be advisable.
A fourth observation is that M-34 does not include elements of disclosure or other
kinds of communicative expressions of empathy such as the provision of an apology.
Especially in the current litigation environment, healthcare providers are hesitant to admit
failure and even if they wish to communicate with patients and families about mistakes,
they do not know how to this “safely.” A comprehensive medical error policy would
include more specific detail about the kinds of information to be disclosed and how.
Interpersonal expressions of apology can hardly be required, although according to the
NQF (2007) standards they are.
Fifth, M-34 has no provisions for healing or coping after hearing or giving bad
news. In this light, a more inclusive policy would outline the availability of support
structures for the spiritual, emotional and social coping of patients as well as healthcare
providers. Many hospitals have already put these into place, yet they neither address
medical errors more specifically not do they have a referral system for individuals who
are involved specifically with medical mistakes. As previous noted and a finding that the
interviews in this study confirm, the lack of formal emotional support for physicians is
particularly under-addressed.
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A sixth and final observation of M-34 is that it does not outline a process for
compensatory or other kinds of restoration. In other words, there is no safe space in
which group conversations can occur. A comprehensive medical error policy would link
disclosure, coping, and restoration.
Overall, M-34 Events Involving Patients is vague in its definitions and although
clear on the attending physician’s responsibilities, the policy provides limited guidance in
how disclosure ought to take place and what the roles of other healthcare staff are in the
disclosure process. M-34 does a weak job of incorporating mission values into a process
that would restore the experience of wholeness. Not surprisingly, only six out of 22
individuals with whom I talked about a formal policy are vaguely familiar with M-34, M104 medical errors in pediatric patients, or T57, which is the hospital’s sentinel event
policy. This includes senior administrators. Even fewer interviewees recall more specific
content. While there may be a culture that supports the virtue of truth-telling, apology
and restoration its members do not seem to draw on formal documents.

Table 1
Documents, Policies, and Procedures
Code

A
A-37

Documents

Organizational Philosophy and Mission
Mission, vision and values statement
Philosophy
Organizational ethics
Organization
Strategic plan
Employee handbook
Medical staff bylaws
Medical center plan for providing patient care
Corporate compliance plan
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Date

9/2007
8/2003
5/2006

D-12
M-34
M-34.A
M-55
M-104
S-5
T-57

T-58

A-6
D-4
Ml
1-65
M-4
M-113
P-1
P-2
P-8
P-9
P-10
P-12
P-13

Medical Error Policies
Correction of mistaken entries and omission in the medical record
Events involving patients
Administrative procedure
Medication administration and errors
Pediatric patient safety precautions and event reporting
Illness/injury involving visitors on medical center and university property
Sentinel events
Reporting of quality concerns
Documentation, Conflict and Patients Rights
Conflict/Duality of interests
Medical records, composition, management and access
Grievance and arbitration
Ethical conflicts regarding patient care issues
Chain of command for differences in professional opinion
Communication w/ patients who have limited English proficiency and/or are
hearing, speech or vision impaired
Patient’s rights and responsibilities
Patient consent
Consent for emergency treatment
Rights and/or responsibilities pf pediatric patients, parents/ guardians
Patients’ rights regarding advance directives and acceptance/refusal of medical care
Conflict resolution regarding patient care
Patient complaints and grievances

M-29
M-107

Support Services
Employee assistance program (EAP)
Loma Linda EAP, Your Pathway to Wholeness, brochure
Peer support program debriefings
Employee Spiritual Care, website http://wisdom.mc.lIumc/persupport/
Spiritual and emotional care provided by chaplains
Interdisciplinary assessment and reassessment of patients

A-53
Q-l

Remediation
LEU AH SC Professional and General Liability Trust “Claims Management
Policy”
Litigation management
Professional liability insurance-medical staff

1-55

1-81

9/2005
9/2005
2/2007
12/2006
5/2004

5/2006
2/2006

8/2003
2/2006
6/2006
8/2005
10/2005
12/2006
5/2007
5/2007
5/2006
5/2007
10/2006
2/2006
5/2007

12/2001
No date
2/2007
6/2007
3/2004
5/2004

10/2005
6/2004
6/2003

Disclosure
Since the Institution of Medicine’s report (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999),
the issue of disclosing medical errors to patients has gained considerable interest. Many
hospitals now draw on the guidance of the National Quality Forum (2007) standards of
disclosure to develop patient-centered policies. While policy work is developing in this
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area and we are witnessing the merging contours of an institutional paradigm shift, for
those hospitals that have not yet changed their infrastructure, informal disclosure
processes are influenced by a wealth of uncertainties and lack consistency. Other
hospitals may not have a detailed policy but do a relatively good job of incorporating
their values into their communication with patients while navigating through the
complexities of a fragmented system. It follows that truth-telling practices may vary
substantially from hospital to hospital.
Reflecting on the issue of disclosure at LLUMC, a risk manager notes that
You know, philosophically we may not have done as good of a job as we could in
articulating this in a policy. But I think that the philosophy in Loma Linda, as long as
I have been here, has been for the attendings to be honest with patients. You know,
honesty is always the best policy. And my experience with the physicians is that they
are very good about being open with patients and if something goes wrong,
communicate that with the patients.

Despite the residual fear of “retribution” as well as the fear of legal repercussions,
hospital culture is generally perceived as becoming more open in regards to disclosure,
particularly in the past five years. Nearly all participants indicate that disclosure would be
the responsibility of the attending physician. In a few instances, experienced residents are
trusted to disclose, yet several attending physicians indicated they would go with their
residents to communicate with the patient as a team. Interns are unlikely to be involved in
disclosure and I assume that medical students rarely seem to witness it in practice.
In general, the LLUMC community supports openness. More than a few study
participants indicated they would encourage disclosure of errors to patients if these
mistakes caused harm; many find this to be their “ethical duty” or note that “the patient
has a right to know what happened.” There are qualifications, however. These include the
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requirement for injury to be “above minimal harm” or “significant” harm. Nevertheless,
even in the presence of these errors, transparency is not unconditional as several
participants followed their statements with exceptions to the routine practice of truth
telling. These include instances in which disclosure “would make this situation worse,”
the patient was “too old to understand what is going on” and it would confuse them more,
or if “the patient was dying of cancer and it was an inconsequential error.”
A pathologist is particularly critical of ethicists who advocate that disclosure is
always the right thing to do. He regards members of this profession to be removed from
the complexities of the clinical world, lamenting the “narrow-mindedness” of the current
discussion on medical error. There are circumstances in which patients should not be told
about mistakes, he argues, and there should be legal protection in situations when
information is legitimately withheld:
The admission of a medical error to a patient can be very significantly damaging
that patient’s wholeness. It is very easy for ethicists who don’t actually deal with
patients to sit there and say “[disclosing] is obviously the right thing to do.” I
don’t know that there is any simple way of doing it. I think that probably there
should be a place in the hospital with a kind of consulting service for physicians
who have legitimate concerns as to whether or not they should tell the patient that
a medical error has occurred. And it should be obviously decided by the
physicians themselves, but there should be other people looking over it. There
should be some legal protection if they go to this group and the group says “we
think that you best not say anything to the patient under certain circumstances.”
Then, if later on it turns out that the patient is informed and the patient sues,
somehow some legal protection should be given to the doctor because they didn’t
actually hide it; they talked it over with a committee of knowledgeable people and
then made a conscious decision that the patient would best be served by not
knowing.

Examples of the circumstances in which withholding information would be advisable
according to the pathologist include critically ill patients, minors, or emotionally
disturbed patients in which case one could “deal with the family, the care giver or the
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people who are responsible.” Debating about cases in which non-disclosure could be
considered he offered an example of an incorrect diagnosis of a critically ill patient who
died. The autopsy of the diseased revealed the actual cause of illness as Kreuzfeld-Jacob
disease, a deadly genetic condition. The disclosure of the error to the family led to life
long uncertainty and emotional suffering of the patient’s daughters who may or may not
have inherited the condition. In retrospective, he debates whether or not their wholeness
would have been maintained if he had not told them about the missed diagnosis and the
post-mortem discovery of their mother’s Kreuzfeld-Jacob’s disease.
Similarly, another physician uses a balance approach to weigh the risks and
benefits of disclosure, evaluating truth-telling in reference to its outcome. Although
leaving space for out-of-the-ordinary instances of medical error, a senior administrator
captures the overall sensitivity by noting that he could not think of “many times were it is
not in everybody’s best interest that information be told.”
The issue of “in the best interest” is loaded with complexity—in the best interest
of whom? This question comes alive in the narrative of the pathologist who describes a
situation of non-disclosure in a case in which a patient was nearly killed by a repeated
medication error but then recovered without ever knowing about nature of the incident:
Two weeks ago, the attending physician gave a medication to which the patient
responded very negatively. It was a patient who was being operated on for heart
disease. They had to back up with the patient, back on the pump, and had to do a
whole series of things. When they got the patient stabilized again they thought,
“ok, we have to give this drug otherwise the patient is going to bleed so we will
give it very carefully and we will give it a different route; the same problem won’t
recur.” They did and five minutes later the patient crashed, the blood pressure
disappeared bleeding massively, then back up. And of course this is not good for
the patient so eventually, the patient bleeding massively, was sent up to the ward
because they tried to stop the bleeding. Essentially giving 30% of the blood
volume every hour for the next 10 hours. There is no way to keep up with this
kind of massive bleeding. They just took the blood that came out of the chest and
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filtered it and put it back into the vein. This normally would kill a patient. They
called me the next morning, so I went up to see the patient. As luck would have it,
the patient had not suffered from this because they had a large enough dose of
anticoagulation. This blood was not clotting but started when I was up there. I
said stop, stop, don’t give her anymore of her own blood back. Go to the blood
bank, take her back to surgery, open her up because she is starting to clot now,
and if you keep this up you are going to kill her. And it worked, she stopped
bleeding and she left the hospital a week later. I would not have believed it. Is this
a medical error? I mean they knew. They did not know the first time so they can’t
be accused of a medical error because she was allergic to this drug which is
normally used in these patients. But the second time? In retrospective it clearly
was a medical error. If they had not done it the second time we would not have
gotten into this bind! Do you tell the patient “we did not learn our lesson the first
time and you almost died?” The patient, of course unconscious, has no idea how
close they came. Everything just sort of fell in place and she walked out of the
hospital a while later with a repaired heart and no further problems.
I asked the pathologist if someone had told the patient or her family after she recovered,
and he responded that he seriously doubted that she was told about the mistake.
I think they told her that she had a very rocky operative course. But, how do you
explain to a patient, I mean, this is a very complicated process! I doubt that the
patient was told anything other than that she bled massively following the
surgery. Those are the kinds of situations I get involved in all the time. Are they
medical errors, I don’t know. Do you tell the patient? Well, after 35 years or 40
years of trying to figure this out I still don’t know what the answer is.
In this case, it remains ambiguous in whose interest it truly was not to tell the patient
about the medical mistake.
Even in cases in which harm was caused, disclosure is not always a
straightforward matter. Many errors are made that do not cause harm but have the
potential to. A few participants noted that they would inform patients about mistakes they
made that were potentially harmful. The majority of participants stated that they would
not disclose near-misses or errors that reached the patient but were highly unlikely to
cause harm, such as giving a Tylenol at the wrong time. For instance, an intern learned
that
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if there was no bad outcome from that error, you might not have to disclose
anything. If there was, they suggest that you should disclose to the patient what
happened and not try to assume responsibility either or put blame on yourself. But
to disclose all facts and if you need to apologize, you should apologize too.
When talking with participants about transparency, there was reluctance not so much in
regards to disclosing errors to the patients themselves, but in being open with family
members. For instance, an attending physician in Internal Medicine describes that he
would prefer to talk to patients in a “one-to-one conversation” and give the patient “a
chance to get mad.” From his experience, 98% “are fine with it.” However, patients are
more likely to be fine with a mistake than are family members. A Risk Manager warned
that disclosing an error to family members could communicate a complicating underlying
disease, such as HIV, and would conflict with confidentiality requirements. An attending
physician reported hat he was advised by attorneys that discussions with family members
“just flares up everything; they start believing the incident.” Two participants questioned
whether family members should be informed about an error in two situations: first, if a
seriously ill patient died from a medical error, yet would have most likely expired from
her illness anyway, failing to administer antibiotics would have not mattered, and second,
if the error was discovered only several months later. Both of these examples raise
pertinent questions about the restoration of wholeness, as well as the principles of justice
as civic freedom and equal consideration.

Restoration
In order to restore the experience of wholeness of patients, families, healthcare
providers, and the organization, it is not only important to increase professional
transparency and nurture compassion in healing, but to make available support services
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that are equipped to address the multi-dimensional coping needs of all individuals
involved in medical errors. As a Christian healthcare institution with a focus on
wholeness, LLUMC has rich resources that have the potential to fulfill these intersecting
physical, emotional, spiritual and social needs. As such, Employee Spiritual Care &
Wholeness offers of a range of support mechanisms that are available to all employees
who are concerned about their personal and relational wholeness. The department
promotes a “Christ-centered environment by nurturing spirituality and encouraging
wholeness in LLU Medical Center employees and supports them as they care for others.”
At the time of this study, the first formal support structure that becomes crucial in
regards to medical error is the Department of Chaplains Services commissioned to
provide spiritual and emotional care for patients and families as well as for health care
staff and other employees of the medical center65. Visits to patients are provided on a
daily, around the clock basis. Chaplains provide counseling, offer special prayers, support
patients who suffer from catastrophic illnesses or who are dying, and engage in a range of
other activities that unfold within the context of chaplain-patient relationships. For its
employees, LLUMC Chaplains provide spiritual care and guidance, and aid with coping
when patients die.
A second formal support program is the Employee Assistance Program66. It is a
voluntary program that is made available to all employees and their family members who,
according to the policy, “have personal and/or work related problems” (1-55, Employee
Assistance program, 2001). As the first nationally accredited EAP in the state of
California, the program opened its doors in 1990. Licensed mental health professionals

65 Regulated by M-29, Spiritual and Emotional Care Provided by Chaplains.
66 Regulated by 1-55 Employee Assistance Program (EAP).
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provide confidential short-term counseling for depression, anxiety stress, post-traumatic
stress, psychological distress, grief, life transitions, work-related issues, and other areas
of treatment. They also offer referral services in cases of extended counseling needs.
Treatment sessions are either initiated by the employee or a supervisor who recognizes an
employee’s need for assistance (EAP, Your Pathway to Wholeness, no date).
Third, the Employee Spiritual Care program provides employee-initiated
assistance with spiritual concerns. The program also trains peer counselors who are staff
members nominated based on their demonstrated interpersonal skills and trustworthiness
and deemed fit to serve in a Peer Support Program. Approximately 120 individuals are
currently functioning as peer counselors who support other staff members dealing with
grief, work conflict, family problems, and health concerns. Moreover, they are trained to
make referrals to other entities including the EAP, a spiritual counselor or even an
attorney. Employee Spiritual Care also provides critical incident stress management and
critical incident debriefing following traumatic events67. Only those events that do not
bear on potential legal issues are attended to; incidents in which legal or risk management
concerns arise are referred to the EAP where licensing protects client confidentiality.
The department of Chaplains Services, the Employee Assistance Program, and
Employee Spiritual Care aim at promoting the wholeness of patients and employees
particularly when emotional and spiritual concerns affect their well-being. However, the
programs are not specific to trauma caused by medical errors. Moreover, chaplains and
counselors of the Employee Spiritual Care Program are not protected by 1157 provisions,

67 Peer Support Program, http://wisdom.mc.llumc.edu/peersupport/ downloaded 6/30/08. According to a
senior administrator of LLUAHSC, the program has been discontinued based on the results of recent
studies indicating that early debriefing with a group of colleagues led by a trained person does not ease
stress or trauma (personal conversation, July 7th, 2008).
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thus opening themselves up to litigation. Narratives of participants allude to some related
difficulties. In order to supplement what may formally be available to them, they also
describe several more department specific or even more informal ways of coping with
error.

Patients
In general, chaplains68 respond to patients’ spiritual and emotional needs, which
are certainly present in case of medical error. According to one of the chaplains, they
frequently become intermediaries between the patient, her family, and the doctors
because when a mistake was made, family members are in such an “emotional high state”
that they don’t hear everything as well as misunderstand. While chaplains’ involvement
on this level may prove beneficial at first for those patients who may trust the chaplain
more that the doctor, the problem with merging the boundaries between physical and
spiritual care is one of competency. A chaplain may be utterly familiar with the illnesses
on his assigned unit; nevertheless, she is not trained in the medical sciences, at least in
most cases.
The problem is, and this has not happened here, but in some hospitals, and I know
of one in particular where the chaplain has worked on that unit so long that he
gained knowledge of working cardiac patients. The temptation is for the chaplain
to try to answer the medical questions instead of letting the doctor do it. Then you
get into ethics about who should be answering. So, when mistakes have been
made in particular, we intentionally don’t get into the explanations or defending
the doctor or taking stands one way or the other. We are here for the family.
(Hospital chaplain)
Being aware of the possibility of fuzzy engagement, the Legal Department cautions in
regards to chaplains’ involvement in medical error cases, although chaplains are highly
68

Regulated by M-29 Spiritual and Emotional Care Provided by Chaplains, section 1.
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trusted at LLUMC, and their work is central to the mission of the organization. Chaplains
themselves say that sometimes refer patients to Patient Relations if these patients or their
families think there was a medical error or have a more specific complaint.
Particularly in light of LLUMC’s mission To Make Man Whole, it ought to be
noted that sometimes healthcare providers themselves offer emotional and spiritual
support. For instance, a resident and a physician stated that they have prayed with
patients after giving them bad news; other physicians and nurses who felt responsible for
mistakes stayed with their patients at their bedside even in their time off. However,
conceding the difficulties that are associated with communicating with harmed patients
about medical errors and working with these patients, a risk manager explains that “a lot
of times people are afraid of being sued and they are afraid of being blamed.” Thus, they
move away from the patient, which makes the situation worse as patients feel neglected
and become angry.

Healthcare Providers
Consensus exists about the devastating impact of harmful medical errors on
healthcare providers. Many participants, including those in practice and those in
administration, noted that there is little emotional support given to individuals who made
medical errors and seriously harmed patients. Several participants were unaware of
specific support services or don’t make an effort to seek assistance. A chaplain describes
his experience with a physician he encountered in the parking lot who was unable to cope
after the unexpected death of his patient:
This happened when I first arrived here in 1997.1 got to know some of the
doctors and I went out to the parking lot. A young man, he was just walking
around in the parking lot. He wasn’t even looking for a car. He was just kind of
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walking around there and I went up to him and said “isn’t it time to go home?”
And he turned to me and said “that patient should not have died!” And the guilt
was eating him up because he just came from telling the family member. They
were in shock because it was supposed to be a simple surgery. I think we have a
responsibility to help those who are actually doing the surgeries and making the
medical situations; we need to minister to them, too.

Most study participants agree that improvements need to be made to restore the
wholeness of healthcare professionals traumatized by adverse events.
There’s nothing more damaging to a physician than to be in a malpractice setting.
It just really kind of destroys you when you get challenged. And I’m not sure we
do as well on that. We do some, but there needs to be kind of a support group for
those who have made a medical error. And I don’t think we have much of that
that goes on. (LLUAHSC, physician-administrator)
It’s a traumatic event for the person who made the error and the way when the
lawsuits are filed, they make it sound like you got up in the morning determined
to do in this patient and make their life miserable whereas in fact nobody went to
medical or nursing school to harm patients. And when that happens, people feel
terrible. They feel really awful! And another thing we don’t have in this
inequity, and I think this is really unconscionable, is how there is so little support
given to help decompress and rehabilitate emotionally the people, the nurses, and
the doctors and other healthcare professionals who commit medical errors that
cause harm to patients. (Attending physician, Family Medicine)
Overall, physicians are reluctant to seek assistance with coping and don’t perceive
that chaplains or other services apply to them. They either suffer in silence trying to cope
internally or speak with very close colleagues; they are “closing the ranks and try to
support each other on an emotional level,” as one participant noted. In this light, there is a
small, close-knit group of hospitalists who meet once per week to talk about their
successes as well as their challenges. Being a little more inclusive in regards to sharing
experiences from difficult situations with each other, the Department of Family Medicine
conducts “love rounds” every Thursday.
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We have mental health professionals and Phil Alexis, the whole person care
person, round with us. My wife also rounds with this group. She is a behaviorist
and the focus of it is usually on the psychological-spiritual problems of patients
who are on that unit. But if there has been a traumatic death, unexpected death, or
medical error, or just something missed that has traumatized the doctors or
residents, they do take some time to debrief them. And that is really crucial. I
think it is probably more traumatic for the team than it is for the patient, of course
unless the patient suffers serious harm. (Attending Physician, Family Medicine)
Generally, LLUMC nurses are more inclined to seek help with their emotional
and spiritual needs although they do experience more difficulties taking time out of their
work schedule. An attending physician in Internal Medicine explains that “for staff,
wholeness is important, too.” LLUMC has an LAP but generally, “people do not want to
take time out. But we need to do a better job in supporting people who made a mistake.
The surgeon is just yelling and screaming at the nurse and that does not work out.” He
feels that “the only thing the nurse can do is find another nurse to talk to.” Residents
often talk with their attendings, who “can be very understanding,” they discuss patients
among themselves, and sometimes though not often, go to LAP.
In the experience of a counselor of Employee Spiritual Care, individuals are more
than willing to participate in group counseling, especially in the more traumatic instances
of death. For instance,
Whenever there’s a bad outcome, the employees anticipate medical error or they
fear medical error. For instance, we got called to the NICU several years ago and
they had a baby who had been there for six months and was ready for discharge
within the next couple days. They were just trying to get some social support and
medical support for the baby at home. And the baby died. She just turned blue
one morning and was gone. They coded her for a long, long time. So the staff
was very, very upset because many of them had come to know the baby and the
family. S they asked us to come in and run a group. We had the physicians, we
had nurses, we had respiratory therapists and they were all sitting around the room
just sobbing. You know, and everybody was second-guessing themselves and they
were saying “I should have done this and maybe we should have seen this” and
everybody was taking blame for it. Well it turned out in retrospect that after they
did the autopsy there was nothing anybody could have done, there was no medical
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error. But the thing that struck me about it was how quickly everybody was
willing to go there. They all felt horrible.
However, due to the high potential for litigation, the Legal Department cautions in cases
in which a medical error is suspected. In these cases, critical incident debriefing is limited
to individual stress management initiated by the employees. Overall, not many cases of
medical error are reported to her, perhaps a couple of cases per year, the Employee
Spiritual care counselor notes. She thinks this is because people may not be aware that
Spiritual Care would be a resource for them when they need assistance with coping after
being involved in an error. In her opinion, the EAP may be a more formal approach to
dealing with the effects of medical error. Interestingly, an EAP counselor made it clear
that they only encounter about four to five cases of medical error per year.
With its promotion of wholeness, LLUMC offers opportunities to restore personal
and relational aspects of wholeness. Yet, the support services that are in place for patients
and healthcare providers are neither set up to respond to the more specific demands of
individuals who suffer from the effects of medical errors nor are the services formally
advertised as potential resources. As a result, the effects of medical errors are handled in
the framework of routine assessments and counseling for patients or remain unaddressed,
as in many cases of healthcare providers who suffer emotionally from the consequences
of having erred.

Claims Management
One of the most important reactions to harmful medical error is the restoration of
patients, either in form of compensation, or any other means of restoring the experience
of patients’ wholeness. In other words, restoration means not only repairing a patient’s
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physical damages caused by mistakes or providing counseling for spiritual or emotional
pains but, as Berlinger puts it, “giving the pen back” in more imaginative ways. Many
hospitals do not even offer compensation, and the patient’s last resort to restoration is the
legal system. As noted previously, some hospitals such as CHW and the insurance
company COPIC offer compensation to patients once a medical error is the established
cause of a patient’s injury. The LLUMC Risk Management Philosophy69 is such that
settlement is offered in cases in which harm is the result of errors. This firm offer is based
on what the case would be valued in court. Tim’s case, the injured medical student, is an
example of an immediate settlement offered by the Department of Risk Management in
addition to the provision of spiritual and emotional care and paid time off.
If we know that we did something wrong, if we look into a particular event and we
realize that we made a mistake that ultimately led to damages, then I think we have
both a legal obligation because they can take us to court and if that’s true we have to
pay them and compensate them. But beyond that, doing the right thing is not forcing
somebody to take you there. The right thing to do is to step forward and to offer them
a settlement that we think is a fair representation of how that case would be valued in
court. (Risk Manager)
On the other hand, in the absence of a mistake, settlement is not offered, even if the
patient insists on the claim, seeks legal assistance, or goes to court. According to the risk
manager, this occurs rather frequently. In these cases, LLUMC takes the defense all the
way through trial.
The long-run of the philosophy of this stuff is that if we really did something
wrong, we own it. If somebody’s questioning the outcome and it was simply a
matter of medical judgment, we defend it to the hilt, we don’t settle; we don’t do
anything. (Attorney, Legal Department)
69

LLUAHSC Professional and General Liability Trust “Claims Management Policy” (2005) states that
“...if it is determined that the LLUAHSC related entity of employee was not negligent, or below the
standard of medical care, the Trust will provide a vigorous defense to the claim. Alternatively, if it is
established that there is a significant probability of liability or negligence, the Trust will make every
reasonable effort to negotiate an appropriate settlement of the damages caused by such negligence.”
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An interesting side note in this regard is that several participants, including an employee
from Patient Relations as well as an administrator/physician, criticized Risk Management
for their “reactive” standpoint. In other words, they do not approach a patient who has
been harmed by error unless a complaint is filed in form of a written letter by the patient.
To a certain extent, addressing harm after medical error at LLUMC is inspired by
its comprehensive mission To Make Man Whole. The Christian concept of wholeness is
in the hearts and minds of its employees. However, as an intrinsic value and a goal that
ought to be promoted, particularly after the occurrence of medical error, the restoration of
wholeness is constrained externally and internally by organizational fragmentation.
Nevertheless, as medical errors have become a national concern, there is increasing
support for hospitals to develop more restorative policies with elements of disclosure and
restoration. A policy on medical error ought to serve as both a normative representation
of values and a process guide.

Policy Proposal
A vision of justice as wholeness provides a philosophy for a medical error policy
that resonates with LLMUC’s values. Some sections of M-34 are strengthened, other are
added to reflect the new policy’s underlying principled consequentialist theory of justice
as wholeness. In addition to rooting the policy in normative theory, the responses of the
hospital’s community members guides more explicitly the development of a policy that
aims at the restoration of the experience of wholeness (Table 2, p. 291). Themes of the
participants include the integration of mission values into the structure of the policy, the
inclusion of guiding principles of communication and disclosure, a clarification of legal
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concerns (for instance, the protection of individuals who withhold information
legitimately), and built-in principles of fairness in the restoration of both patients and
health care staff.
The title of the proposed policy is “M-34rev Communication ofMedical Errors
and Adverse Events to patients and/or Families ” (Appendix C). The choice of the term
“communication” rather than “disclosure” or “restoration” highlights the policy’s
comprehensiveness and its focus on integrating patients into a hospital moral community
that values dialog and citizenship. Compassionate and reflective communication is
central to medical error and ought to be weaved into each step.
The first section of the policy is an abbreviated statement of the mission and
underlying philosophy of the organization, followed by an ethic of medical error that is
informed by a vision of justice as wholeness. The ethical aspects of medical errors are
then situated into the context of the hospital’s five mission values. Each value—
compassion, integrity, excellence, teamwork, and wholeness—informs a specific aspect
of how medical errors ought to be handled, while honoring the principles of freedom and
equality injustice as wholeness and fulfilling its unique vision. In order to close the gap
between the medical community’s enthusiasm about LLUMC’s mission To Make Man
Whole and its practice of handling medical errors, procedural issues are responsive to the
problems of internal systems fragmentation and external legal constraints while being
grounded in a framework of values unique to the organization.
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Table 2
Participants ’ Suggestions for Policy Themes

Themes of a medical error policy
Mission Integration
LLUMC’s mission “To Make Man Whole” needs to be in the policy in every detail
Reflect the Christian perspective stating concepts of equity and fairness
Process Concerns
A procedure in place
Improved definition of medical error to improve reporting processes
A designated person in place to give you [residents] advice
A point-person and a captain to coordinate communication
A consultation service for physicians
Provision for the team meeting prior to disclosure, team approach to disclosure.
Statement about importance of communication
Provision that the patient’s family can be involved
Provision that a psychologist can get involved
A focus on transparency, honesty, accountability; inclusion of a Bible verse, and
statement that errors are handled justly in a prompt and efficient manner.
Provision for the freedom to self-report and report the errors of others without penalty
A statement of honesty indicating that “we ultimately never lie”
Provisions for better training how to handle medical errors
Legal Concerns
Legal protection for honesty
Legal protection for physicians in cases of legitimate non-disclosure
Parallel systems approach
Restoration
Address patients’ wholeness and healthcare providers’ wholeness
Fairness for both those who suffered errors and those who perpetrated them
Address those who make false claims about medical errors
Leave room for reconciliation, creating an atmosphere of forgiveness.
Provision for pro-active settlement
Use restoration language, restoring wholeness to the extent possible.
Outline of how to go about restoring wholeness
Provision that individuals who make errors are being followed up in regards to coping
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The policy’s second section is a statement of its purpose followed by the third
section which outlines the policy’s content, references to ethical and legislative codes,
and a list of integrated hospital polices. Section four contains the policy’s definitions. The
terminology of the document that is currently used in the Medical Center (M-34 09/2005)
is enhanced with a definition and model of medical error that is outcome-oriented. The
model divides medical errors into those that cause recognizable harm to patients’
physical, mental, spiritual, and social wholeness and are a concern of both restorative
justice processes and patient safety, and those which fall short of causing harm and need
to be reported as patient safety concerns. This particular model of medical error also
includes a peer review standard by which adverse events are determined to be errors. An
event, according to M-34, is any outcome that was out of the ordinary and not expected
and which deviates from the patient’s treatment plan. In this light, a medical error is an
unexpected outcome; it may or may not be a reportable adverse event as legally defined
(California Department of Health and Human Services, 2007), a sentinel event (NQF,
2007) or any other event. The key point is that a medical error under M-34rev is
unintentional and deemed by peers to be a mistake that should not have occurred.
The fifth section of the policy concerns the specific post-medical error
procedures, which are divided into (A) communication with patients and/or families,
concerning the disclosure of medical errors, (B) support structures for patients and/or
families, (C) support for healthcare providers, and (D) the restoration of wholeness in
form of a restorative justice conference.
Communication with patients and/or their families is required as indicated in the
list of outcomes that arise from the impact of medical errors. Also included in the criteria
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are emotional and spiritual harms. However, in accordance with a vision of justice as
wholeness, the restoration of wholeness may demand some information to be withheld or,
in very rare cases as demonstrated in the case vignette at the end of this chapter, it may
legitimate non-disclosure. Non-disclosure is legitimate only if the principles of civic
freedom and equal consideration are honored. In other words, choices that are the
patient’s to make and which she is actually able to make ought not to be made by others
arbitrarily when putting themselves in the patient’s shoes. Moreover, while
compassionately engaging in finding a solution, healthcare providers and the organization
ought to consider their own claims to wholeness just as they consider the patients’ and
family’s. In this light, a consultation with the Disclosure Advisory Team (DAT), a
multidisciplinary group of specifically trained individuals capable of applying these
principles to difficult cases, is required; and non-disclosure is dependent on the members’
approval. However, in nearly all cases, medical errors are disclosed to patients.
Similar to M-34, the actual disclosure is the responsibility of the attending
physician regardless of whether the error is a systems error, an error committed by
another healthcare provider, or if its source is difficult to determine. There are several
reasons for focusing responsibility. The first is that patients will have their physician as
overall contact person. Second, all facts relevant to the medical error, even if it occurs in
the context of nursing or other professional practice, are considered and subsequent care
is coordinated by the attending physician who is held accountable not for the error, unless
she committed it, but for coordinating all follow-up responses. Third, streamlining
disclosure increases investigative efforts across disciplines, thus encouraging
collaboration and teamwork.
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According to M-34rev it is desirable that disclosure is approached as a team of
those individuals who care for the patient, and unless it is a systems error, ought to
include the person responsible for the error. More specific elements of disclosure are
outlined according to the NQF standards of disclosure (2007) and the guidelines of the
American Association of Healthcare Risk Managers (ASHRAM, 2006).
According to Section B1, a Patient Relations Counselor who is trained in the
management of medical errors, who is familiar with organizational and state reporting
requirements, and who knows the resources available in the medical center, coordinates
the support of harmed patients. The assignment of a Patient Relations point-person
minimizes confusion for the patient after a medical error occurred and increases
efficiency in answering questions and directing patients and families to relevant support
programs. Subsequently, injured patients and their families have two key people with
whom they communicate: the attending physician and someone from Patient Relations.
The support of healthcare providers is coordinated by the DAT. With the explicit
provision and coordination of emotional and spiritual support services in the medical
error policy, the rich resources of LLUMC convergence on the multi-dimensional
restoration of wholeness of patients, their families, and healthcare providers.
One of the most important aspects of post-medical error procedures is the
restoration of the experience of personal and relational wholeness of all members of a
hospital community impacted by medical errors. Specifically, the policy makes
provisions for a restorative justice conference in which the stakeholders in a medical
error event meet to determine needs and obligations to restore wholeness. It is at this
point that a representative of Risk Management will be involved for the first time.
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According to ASHRAM (2006), the involvement of risk managers at initial disclosure
meetings may convey to patients and families the wrong message about the purpose of
the discussion. Consequently, financial issues ought to be addressed once the patient is
aware of an unexpected outcome and that a medical error is its cause. However, other
individuals participate who are selected by the patient and her family as well as the
organization.
Following the wisdom of long-established traditions in restorative justice, familygroup-conferencing, and mediation (for example, Claassen & Reimer, 2004; see also
Liebman & Hyman, 2004 for a mediation model in medical error cases), the meeting
ought to be conducted by a trained individual familiar with mediation principles.
Specifically in medical error cases that threaten to involve litigation, individuals defend
strong feelings about being wronged not so much by the person who committed the
medical error but by the process of handling the error. Following restorative justice in
general and justice as wholeness in particular, the goal of an extra-legal mediation
meeting is to restore the relative experience of wholeness of those individuals who have
been physically, emotionally, spiritually, or socially harmed by serious medical mistakes.
Wholeness, as it unfolds in the experience of each person considered from his or her
unique point of view, is the ultimate goal according to which each considered need and
each obligation is evaluated in light of the whole situation. Solutions that are potentially
restorative are chosen based on the prediction of the goodness of their consequences. In
order to promote an outcome that is both good and just, participants ought to respect each
others’ freedom of making decisions about their lives. Moreover, participation in the
restoration of each others’ wholeness is with the compassion, responsibility, and the
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kindness of a free citizen who respects the fundamental nature of human dignity. Each
person’s personal and social experience of wholeness ought to be valued equally as
participants put themselves into the shoes of the other, making the same relative
contribution to the wholeness of others as to their own. Justice after medical error is
shaped by principles of freedom and equality as wholeness is restored on the personal,
relational, and organizational levels.
The overall aim of a comprehensive medical error policy that draws on a vision of
justice as wholeness, such as the one proposed, is to promote and guide a healing
approach to medical errors; it achieves this goal by situating elements such as disclosure
and restoration in a conceptual framework that resonates with the values of civicallyoriented Christian hospitals. The final two sections of M-34rev promote these ideas
through an educational component and by requiring an annual review of the policy to
assure the alignment of its provisions and their practice.
The following case vignette illustrates how the policy can be applied and how
justice as wholeness may guide decisions when ethical dilemmas arise from particular
circumstances that may complicate the disclosure of errors to patients. Maintaining
wholeness in a cancer patient who experienced a medical error at the very end of her life
is an extraordinarily challenging task. In this particular case, which is a rare case, the
concern for the patient’s wholeness is so great that, in combination with her limited
choices and the healthcare teams’ compassionate considerations, the decision not to
disclose the mistake to the patient can be justified on grounds of justice as wholeness.

296

Error at the End of Life
Ms. Simmons is a 58-year old woman with recurrent multiple myeloma who was
admitted for chemotherapy and radiation of a plasmacytoma in her spine70. She was
administered most of the available chemotherapy regimes, but because they proved to be
either ineffective or produced intolerable side effects treatment was discontinued. During
rounds, a team of physicians pulled up a chest CT scan from an admission several months
earlier that was performed for an unrelated illness. The team noticed the plasmacytoma in
the thoracic spine, but nothing about the spine or the cancer was in the official report.
Neither was there a mention of her cancer. Discussing their discovery, the team noted that
this seemed like an easy mistake to make. The radiologist must have focused on the
patient’s lungs rather than the spine. Yet the mass was rather obvious on the CT images.
Due to fact that her multiple myeloma reoccurred a second time, Ms. Simmons had a
poor prognosis. In the past weeks her health declined rapidly and she became exceedingly
fragile, physically and emotionally. The team thought that the plasmacytoma “did not
really change the overall picture.” They agreed that their treatment would not have been
any different if the plasmacytoma had been reported sooner. It was also clear to the team
that even if their patient had received radiation to the spine at that earlier time, radiation
therapy would not have improved her overall chances for survival.
The members of the team debated whether or not they should disclose the mistake
to the patient. They decided not to tell her because there was no difference in outcome
and, considering her declining emotional condition, they did not “need to burden her with
this news.” One of the team members found it inappropriate to disclose to a patient an

70 Courtesy of Valarie Sheppard, a third-year medical student. The patient’s name, demographics, and some
circumstances of the case are fictitious in order to protect patient confidentiality.
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error of another physician. The team was unclear whether or not they ought to contact the
radiologist about the mistake so that residents and attending physicians could learn from
this oversight.
The first question that needs to be addressed in post-medical error processes is
one of definition. Is the unexpected outcome an adverse event as defined by regulatory
bodies and does it add elements of liability falling into the narrow category of medical
error? In light of the medical error model proposed in M-34rev, the crucial distinction
between errors that cause recognizable harm to the patient’s physical, emotional, spiritual
or social well-being, and those cause potential harm or no harm to a patient’s wholeness,
needs to be clarified. In this particular case, the radiologist’s failure to report the
plasmacytoma of the patient’s spine is a medical error, although without further
investigation into the case it is unclear whether she did not see the tumor or omit
reporting it because the order for the x-ray was directed towards the lungs. Whatever the
case, the tumor should have been noted but was not. Did this cause recognizable harm to
the patient?
According to the medical error model and in light of the more specific outline of
medical errors in M-34;^v section V.A.l, the missed plasmacytoma is a recognizable
harm that causes physical injury and, although we do not know from the case narrative,
may necessitate a prolonged hospital stay if the patient had not fallen ill to another
condition. Missing the opportunity to remove a growing tumor causes injury to the
patient. If she would not have had multiple myeloma, the plasmacytoma would have been
treated timely if it would have been reported. The classification of an event as a medical
error ought to be conducted independent of other circumstances. Only the error and its
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effects are relevant. In other words, the definition of harm in this case can not depend on
the draw of bad luck that another illness masks the harm caused by the actual mistake. In
this light, the unanticipated outcome in the case of Ms. Simmons classifies as
recognizable harm according to M-34rev and is subject to reporting to patient safety and
a quality improvement committee. Additionally, the nature of the mistake invokes
concern for the patient’s wholeness and requires reflection about restorative justice.
The next consideration is about informing the patient. M-34rev mandates
disclosure regardless of who committed the mistake or whether it is due to a systems
error. The policy assigns responsibility for disclosure to the attending physician. If,
however, there are legitimate concerns brought forth by any team member in terms of
providing the patient information about a medical mistake, such as disclosing the
overlooked tumor to a dying patient such as Ms. Simmons, M-34 directs the team
member and the attending physician to seek counsel and approval of the Disclosure
Advisory Team (DAT). Subsequently, the attending physician, the nurse, and the
radiologist who was informed through the reporting process, meet with members of DAT
who are trained in considering medical events in light of justice as wholeness. They
discuss Ms. Simmon’s case and, applying the principles of justice as wholeness, address
the following issues.
The first concerns whether or not disclosing the missed tumor or providing partial
information would increase or decrease her experience of physical, emotional, spiritual
and social wholeness. Although the group cannot know for sure, as a team of concerned
and competent healthcare providers and administrators they conclude, based on their
prediction of the anticipated consequences of disclosing the information to Ms. Simmons,
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that her experience of wholeness would be unnecessarily and unreasonably comprised in
her last weeks of her life. The option of non-disclosure and the objective to making her
life as comfortable as possible—physically, emotionally, spiritual, and socially without
causing additional strain—promotes her experience of wholeness. From the perspective
of the group and in light of its predicted consequences, non-disclosure is a good option
but is it also justl
This question invokes a second concern which is whether non-disclosure violates
the principles of civic freedom and equality as equal consideration as stated by justice as
wholeness. The principle of civic freedom as defined requires non-domination of choice
and compassionate participation in the lives of everyone involved. In this case, freedom
as a principle of justice is maintained as Ms. Simmons’ choices about her life are not
compromised by not knowing about the plasmacytoma. Here, the team’s first justification
for non-disclosure comes into play. In contrast to the classification of the mistake
according to the medial error model, issues of disclosure take into account all factors, not
just the error itself and its effects. In her condition, Ms. Simmons has no choice other
than to enjoy as much as possible the final weeks of her life. The healthcare team and the
DAT team consider carefully her well-being, increasing her experience of wholeness
during this time. Moreover, the team is careful to maintain equality, as equal
consideration is not violated unless perhaps the radiologist or any other member of the
team or DAT seeks not to disclosure the error to the patient only for the sake of their own
or the organization wholeness without balancing all facts.
The two-step application of the provisions put forth by M-34rev and the
consideration of its theoretical base support the team’s decision that Ms. Simmons would
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be better of in the last days of her life not having to deal with the additional trauma
brought about by news of a medical error. There are several additional factors to keep in
mind especially in oncology where adverse events and medical errors may have
additional dimensions specific to the specialty (Surbone, Rowe, & Gallagher, 2007).
Surbone et ah, (2007) point out that due to the complexities inherent in cancer treatment,
the involvement of multi-disciplinary teams and the frequent enrollment of cancer
patients in clinical trials increases the odds of adverse events and medical errors.
Additionally, multiple interacting factors may lead to unexpected outcomes making it
difficult to distinguish and classify medical error. Disclosure becomes extremely
challenging for oncologists because of their emotional challenges and high-rates of
burnout from working under conditions of uncertainty with patients who are very ill or
dying. Such stress, the authors note, often minimizes the importance of medical error and
increases feelings of responsibility for reducing patients’ suffering. However, while the
authors contend that disclosure is highly problematic in cases similar to that of Ms.
Simmons, they argue that ethics requires giving patients at least some information in a
way that is healing for patients, families, and healthcare professionals.
Defending the view that information is not always healing, justice as wholeness
moves the boundaries by permitting non-disclosure in very rare cases under defined
conditions. These include the careful evaluation of the facts in each case and the
consensus of a multi-disciplinary team of individuals with specific training as to the
possibility that non-disclosure would promote a patient’s wholeness while not violating
the principles of justice, freedom, and equality.
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Conclusion
Perfection is an illusion. It is impossible to achieve in the complexities and
uncertainties inherent in the historic, modem, and post-modem realities of medical care.
As we will hardly succeed in fully preventing mistakes, we have to deal with their
consequences in a compassionate and restorative way. Embracing wholeness as an
ultimate value-goal means attenuating professional egoism and moving towards each
other with mutual acceptance of our vulnerability. It also means accepting responsibility
and honoring one’s own values while navigating through the pressures imposed by
organizational fragmentation and the eminent threat of litigation. In the broader scheme
of life, we are all interconnected, striving towards a common purpose whether we are
physicians, nurses, medical technologists, administrators, or individuals with no defined
social or professional roles.
While medical errors tear the social fabric and mpture the fragile bonds of trust
that hold together already unequal relationships, we should not forget that the beauty of
life on earth is the interconnectedness of all living things. While tmst is fragile, God’s
grace sustains relationships through troubled times. And even if we fail utterly in our
plans and actions, His healing love binds us in forgiveness. Confined by the chaos of the
present, it is with hope that we look forward to the end of times and a reality of perfect
beauty and integrity. This vision of wholeness is the ultimate fulfillment of justice. It is
God’s purpose and the hope of human kind.
The great controversy is ended. Sin and sinners are no more. The entire universe
is clean. One pulse of harmony and gladness beats through the vast creation. From
Him who created all, flow life and light and gladness, throughout the realms of
illimitable space. From the minutest atom to the greatest World, all things,
animate and inanimate, in their unshadowed beauty and perfect joy, declare that
God is love. (White, p. 678)
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Loma Linda University Medical Center
and Children’s Hospital

|

OPERATING POLICY
CATEGORY:

CLINICAL MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT:

EVENTS INVOLVING PATIENTS

CODE:
EFFECTIVE:
REPLACES:
PAGE:

M-34
09/2005
03/2002
1 of 3

Definition: Event is an out of the ordinary or unexpected occurrence which is not consistent with the
routine care and treatment related to the patient's admitting or working diagnosis. (Reference Policy
T-57, “Sentinel Events.”)
1.

Events involving patients shall be reported on the official Event Reporting form in the manner
specified in Administrative Procedure M-34.A.

2.

Confidentiality shall be maintained for all events.
2.1

All communication with the patient and family members shall be done through the
attending physician. Patients and/or families shall be informed when a medical/healthcare
error or adverse event occurs when it results in any of the following
a.
b.
c.
d.
NOTE:

2.2

Disclosure of any other medical/healthcare error will be at the discretion of
the primary attending physician.

No information shall be conveyed to anyone other than involved employee(s) and
designated supervisory personnel regarding:
a.
b.
c.

3.

inconvenience to patient and/or family
discomfort/pain
injury
unplanned or consequential outcome.

Intent to complete Event Reporting form
Having completed Event Reporting form
Content of Event Reporting form

2.3

No copies shall be made of the Event Reporting form.

2.4

Reports shall be hand carried to supervisory personnel per department procedure, then
mailed to Risk Management Department in the special envelope provided.

All such forms shall be sent to the Risk Management Department within seven working days, if
feasible, following occurrence of event or notice of an untoward effect.
NOTE: The forms shall not be placed in patients’ medical records.

•I. I.U-. I .*•.

319
httpV/wax.mc.llumc.edu/pp/Pol Displaylmage Ipl.pol

Page 2 of 6

CATEGORY:

PATIENT CARE

CODE:

M-34

SUBJECT:

EVENTS INVOLVING PATIENTS

PAGE:

2 of 3

4.

Documentation in the patient’s medical record shall consist of a complete and factual description
of the event only. No mention shall be made of the Event Reporting form. Use of the Event
Reporting form shall not substitute for documentation in the medical record.

5.

Events involving possible medical device equipment defects or failures shall be further reported,
using Administrative Procedure M-34.A.
5.1

6.

When there is a probability that a medical device/equipment has caused or contributed to:
a.

the serious illness or serious injury of a patient, the manufacturer is notified by
Risk Management. If the manufacturer is unknown, the FDA is notified by Risk
Management.

b.

the death of a patient, the FDA and the manufacturer of the device, if known, are
notified by Risk Management.

5.2

All reports shall be made to the FDA and/or manufacturer within ten (10) working days
following discovery and identification of the failure or defect.

5.3

The report shall include specific information, such as the manufacturer's name, the product
name, the model number, lot number, etc. Refererence Administrative Procedure M-34.A
for product identification and impounding protocol.

5.4

A summary of all serious injury/illness and death reports that have been submitted during
the previous six months shall be submitted by Risk Management to the FDA each January
and July.

Events that potentially meet criteria for a sentinel event shall be referred to Quality Resource
Management.

20-1235 (1/25)
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APPROVED:

£

—5^

President, Medical Staff

Date

Vice President for Medical Administration

S-jilL&C
Date

Chief Executive Officer

Date

<xz^iuLQ
Coiporate Secretary
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Loma Linda University Medical Center
and Children’s Hospital
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

CATEGORY:

CLINICAL MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT:

EVENTS INVOLVING PATIENTS

CODE:
EFFECTIVE:
REPLACES:
PAGE:

M-34.A
09/2005
03/2002
1 of 3

APPROVING COMMITTEE: ADMINISTRATORS COMMITTEE

ACTION

INITIATOR OF ACTION
A.

REPORTING OF PATIENT EVENTS

Employee/Authorized Personnel

1.

Witnesses or becomes aware of unexpected or out of the
ordinary occurrence involving a patient.

2.

Evaluates patient condition and responds by providing care.

3.

Contacts physician. If physician is a resident, makes
arrangement with him/her regarding who will notify
attending physician.

4.

Completes Event Reporting form (RM203-01)

5,

Physician

4.1.

Places form in sealed envelope for purposes of
confidentiality.

4.2

Carries report to supervisory personnel as per
department protocol.

Records in patient's medical record ONLY the following:
5.1

Description of occurrence, date and time (no
mention of Event Report form.)

5.2

Physician notification, date and time.

6.

Examines patient, if indicated; describes finding in Progress
Notes.

7.

Writes orders for follow-up care, if indicated.

8.

Informs patient/family of event.

•<« iMni
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CATEGORY:

CLINICAL MANAGEMENT

CODE:

M-34.A

SUBJECT:

EVENTS INVOLVING PATIENTS

PAGE:

2 of 3

ACTION
Reviews report, follows up with staff as indicated, and
forwards to Risk Management within seven working days,.

INITIATOR OF ACTION
Department Head/ Supervisor

9.

Risk Management Department

10.

Contacts Quality Resource
indicated.

Department Head/Director QRM

11.

Reviews information for purpose of:

B.

Management

(QRM)

if

11.1

noting implications for delivery of quality patient
care.

11.2

identifying trends and finding alternatives to
decrease number of events.

IF EVENT INVOLVES PRODUCT OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE THAT RESULTS IN
PATIENT INJURY/ILLNESS/DEATH
Notifies department supervisor/designee.

Employee/Authorized Personnel

Supervisory Personnel/'Designee

2.

Disconnects device, when indicated, and retains device or
product, including disposable and/or wrapping materials,
medications at site of event.

3.

Labels equipment appropriately to protect against disposal
and to identify equipment in question.

4.

Follows Steps 2-5 as outlined in Section A above.

5.

Arranges for transport to Clinical Engineering for
preliminary assessment.

6.

Contacts the following within one working day:

7.

6.1

Clinical Risk Manager

6.2

Clinical Engineering, if indicated

Ensures that Event Reporting form has been completed and
that it includes descriptive numbers (lot, serial, Clinical
Engineering or Central Supply number) from equipment.

80-1035 (1/85)
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CLINICAL MANAGEMENT

CODE:

M-34.A

SUBJECT:
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PAGE:
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INITIATOR OF ACTION
Clinical Engineering/ Other
Designated Department

Clinical Risk Manager

NOTE:

8.

ACTION
Investigates incident (in cooperation with appropriate
department[s] involved) to determine cause of defect and
reports findings to Clinical Risk Manager.

9.

Determines if impounding is warranted.

10.

Impounds device per Clinical Engineering Department
policy.

11.

Notifies other departments as required, e.g., Environmental
Health and Safety, Materials Management.

12.

Determines if further investigation by independent
examination is to be done.

13.

Completes Safe Medical Devices Act report in accordance
with requirements (FDA and manufacturer).

14.

Sends semi-annual summary of all deaths, serious injuries
and serious illnesses to FDA.

15.

Provides semi-annual summary to Safety Committee.

If there is suspected or recognized equipment/product failure, BUT NO PATIENT
INJURY HAS RESULTED, reference Policy T-23, “Product/Device Hazard Notification
Program,” that defines the existing program for reporting of product failures.
If incident involves radiation-emitting equipment, reference Radiation Safety Manual.
If event potentially meets the criteria for a sentinel event, reference Policy T-57, “Sentinel
Events,” which defines actions to be taken.

20-1235 (1/95)
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^MERSITV-A/^.

Jjmia oQnda University <U)(Cedical (Renter
? Presidentfor Mission & Culture

Coleman Pavilion, Suite 11121
Loma Linda, California 92354
(909) 558-7786
Fax: (909) 558-7988

August 7, 2008

To: Chris Schubert
Re: Use of LLUMC Policy M-34 in Ph.D. Dissertation
Dear Ms. Schubert:
This letter is to confirm the approval of LLUMC for your use of our policy, M-34,
in your Ph.D. dissertation.
We wish you all the best success in your scholarship.
Sincerely,
/

/

to

G
inslow,
Vice President for Mission and Culture
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COMMUNICATION OF MEDICAL ERRORS
TO PATIENTS AND/OR FAMILIES
____________January, 2008________

'

I. PHILOSOPHY
The mission of Loma Linda University Medical Center is to continue the healing ministry of Jesus
Christ To Make Man Whole. Upholding the values of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Loma
Linda University Medical Center believes that humans are created in God’s image to enjoy
wholeness of body, mind and spirit. When medical errors occur, they may compromise the
physical, mental, spiritual and social well-being of patients and their families as well as healthcare
providers. To restore the experience of wholeness and to maintain healing relationships, Loma
Linda University Medical Center intensifies the care for those who have been harmed. It employs
a team approach that draws on the expertise and resources of multiple departments and services
to meet the intersecting needs of all stakeholders and to improve patient safety. Loma Linda
University Medical Center takes pride in handling medical errors fairly and in a way that is
consistent with the organization’s mission values, thus embracing God’s healing grace with faith,
love, and hope.

Mission Values
Compassion. Respecting the love of God through caring, respect and empathy. As a
Christian hospital it is our goal to provide a caring environment in which God’s love is
experienced by those who make errors and those who are harmed by them. Talking with patients
and their families about mistakes requires attentiveness, calmness, and confidence in one’s
ability to effectively communicate facts while showing respect and empathy. We are committed to
structure our conversations according to Christian principles of conciliation with a balanced
approach and active listening. Compassion means treating colleagues who have erred with
respect and kindness exploring pathways that lead to forgiveness, reconciliation, and healing.
Integrity. Ensuring that our actions are consistent with our values. We carry a strong
commitment to an organizational moral life in which the handling of medical errors reflects
honesty, authenticity, and trustworthiness. We nurture an organizational culture that embraces
the freedom of responsible medical staff to make decisions about how to address medical errors
with patients and to accept responsibility when due so that trustful relationships are sustained.
Excellence. Providing care that is safe, reliable, efficient and patient centered. We strive to
integrate and improve quality control mechanisms and patient safety by applying up-to-date
knowledge and technological advancements, focusing both on the prevention of systems errors
and individual errors. In the unfortunate event that harmful errors occur we are committed to their
timely investigation and, when appropriate, to partnering with patients in order to prevent
reoccurrence.
Teamwork. Collaborating to achieve a shared purpose. It is our obligation to adhere to the
highest standards of patient care and as such work collaboratively on reporting, analyzing and
preventing medical errors to the fullest extend possible. We share information and promote an
environment of learning in which critical peer review and civic responsibilities are strengthened in
the context of a transparent moral culture. Rather than seeking blame and punishing individuals,
we focus on systems improvement and, when appropriate, provide training in order to enhance
the cognitive and practical skills of our weaker team members.
Wholeness. Embracing a balanced life that integrates mind, body and spirit. We regard the
restoration of wholeness after medical error as our highest goal. Justice requires that patients and
families who have been harmed unintentionally are treated with respect of their dignity and that
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their physical, emotional, spiritual, and social aspects of wholeness be restored while honoring
the principles of freedom and equality. We recognize that errors also diminish the individual and
social well-being of healthcare staff and thus give equal consideration to the multidimensional
needs of all stakeholders.
II.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is (1) to provide a structure for communicating medical errors to
patients and /or their families, (2) to establish a Disclosure Advisory Team (DAT) to assist in
these processes and (3) to outline a system that aims at healing the effects of medical errors in
such that individual and social wholeness will be restored to the fullest extent possible.

III. POLICY
It shall be the policy of Loma Linda University Medical Center that patients and /or their families
are to receive timely, clear, and transparent communication about recognized harmful
unexpected outcomes due to medical errors; may they be caused by individuals or are the result
of system failures. Physicians carry responsibility for the disclosure process. Physicians and other
healthcare providers shall have continuous access to a competent team of individuals trained to
advise and make decisions on all matters pertaining to disclosure. Social, spiritual, and emotional
support shall be made available to patients and/or their families as well as to all healthcare
providers who are involved in the event. There shall be an avenue for discussing compensation
and other means of restoration with patients and/ or their families with a particular emphasis on
restoring relationships and trust. A learning pathway shall be developed to implement the
principles contained in the policy.
This policy is in compliance with the Joint Commission standard of disclosure Rl.2.90.
Communication of medical errors to patients and/or families follows the Code of Medical Ethics of
the American Medical Association and the Ethics Manual of the American College of Physicians.
The policy incorporates the disclosure standards published in the 2007 Consensus Report of the
National Quality Forum.
Related Policies:
M-34 Events Involving Patients] M-55 Medication Administration and Errors] M-104 Pediatric
Patient Safety Precautions and Event Reporting] M-57 Sentinel Events] M-113 Communication
with Patients Who Have Limited English Proficiency and/or are Hearing, Speech or Vision
Impaired] P-1 Patient’s Rights and Responsibilities] P-12 Conflict Resolution Regarding Patient
Care] M-13 Patient Complaints and Grievances] I-55 Employee Assistance Program (EAP)] 1-81
Peer Support Program Debriefings] M-29 Spiritual and Emotional Care Provided by Chaplains]
and M-107 Interdisciplinary Assessment and Reassessment of Patients.

IV. DEFINITIONS
Adverse event
According to the California Health and Safety Code, Section 1279.1, an adverse event is
reportable to the State Department of Health Services (DHS).
Disclosure
Communication to patients and/or families of information regarding the results of diagnostic tests
and medical and surgical treatment procedures and outcomes.
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Medical error
An error occurred when organizational, human, technical, or environmental factors lead to an
unintentional failure of an intended practical action or cognitive process which results in
recognizable physical, mental, spiritual, or social harm to a patient. The standard that determines
whether harm was caused by an error is the consensus of a competent, multidisciplinary group of
healthcare providers whose practice is concerned with treating a condition similar to the patient’s
and who, if they had the same information at the time the error unfolded, also think that it would
have come about but should not have.
Unanticipated Outcome
A result or consequence during the course of a patient’s treatment that deviates from the plan
and was not expected. Unanticipated outcomes may or may not be due to medical errors.

V. PROCEDURES
A. Communication with patients and/or their families
1.

Medical errors shall be communicated to patients and/or families when they are associated
with one or more of the following unanticipated outcomes
a. the provision of additional care such as prolonged hospital stay, additional
diagnostic tests, and/or additional medical or surgical procedures
b. physical discomfort or pain
c. physical injury
d. substantial emotional, spiritual and/or social traumata
NOTE:
Disclosure of medical errors other than specified will be at the discretion of the
relevant healthcare provider. In the rare case that the communication of a medical
error (except reportable adverse events as defined) will negatively impact the patient
to an extent that it is unreasonable and unnecessary for the patient’s particular
condition, the attending physician may, in consultation with and approval of DAT, limit
or, in extraordinary circumstances, omit the discussion with the patient and/or the
family.

2.

The attending physician carries the ultimate responsibility for the disclosure process. All
communication with the patient and/or family members shall be overseen by the patient’s
attending physician, who shall be present at the time of disclosure and all follow-up
conversations. It is encouraged that additional members of the healthcare team participate in
the disclosure process. If the patient’s attending physician is unavailable, the Vice President
for Quality Resource Management shall assume this responsibility.

3.

A Disclosure Advisory Team (DAT) shall be on call 24/7 to assist healthcare staff and
hospital administrators with the planning of disclosure, to provide “just-in-time coaching,” to
facilitate conflict resolution, and to give advice about resources for emotional coping. The
team shall be composed of a:
a. clinical risk manager
b. designated member of the ethics committee
c. trained physician who chairs a Ql Committee
d. trained nurse executive
e. patient relations/mediator/communications specialist
f. legal counsel

4.

Initial patient communication should take place as soon as possible after allowing sufficient
time for the healthcare team to discuss the event and/or to seek advice from DAT. Adverse
events shall be disclosed prior to reporting them to DHS.
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5.

Communication shall take place in a private, quiet area in which confidentiality is maintained.
An interpreter is available for patient and/or families who have specific language, hearing or
vision needs. For patients and/or their families who are no longer in the hospital, a time and
location convenient for all parties shall be mutually determined.

6.

Components of the initial communication shall include:
a. a clear explanation that a medical error occurred, an explanation of the patient’s
current condition and possible changes in treatment plan along with an objective,
factual assessment of the implications of the unanticipated outcome for the
patient’s future health, to the extent that they are known.
b. assurance that an investigation will take place, that the patient and/or family will
be provided additional information as it becomes known, and that steps will be
taken to prevent re-occurrence.
c. an honest expression of regret; for instance “I am sorry that this happened.”
d. the provision of ample time for patients and/or families to express emotions and
to answer any questions they may have.
e. a discussion of resources to assist with social, emotional, and spiritual needs.
f. the identification of when and with whom follow-up conversations will be
scheduled to review the results of the investigation and to provide continuing
care.
g. full apology accepting personal or organizational responsibility shall be offered
only
i. when all facts are known and responsibility is confirmed
ii. by the attending physician and, if appropriate, the person making the error
h. Prayer may be offered as appropriate for the circumstance.
NOTE: Components of disclosure shall not assign blame to individuals, services or
departments or criticize the decisions or actions of any person, service or
department.

7.

The attending physician shall record in the progress notes of the medical record a summary
of the medical facts and that disclosure had occurred. On a separate document not to be
included in the medical record, the attending physician shall outline the details of disclosure
communication. Copies shall be sent to the department of Risk Management. Documentation
shall be concise and factual and include:
a. the time, date and place of the discussion(s) and a brief description of who was
present, including interpreters and/or other staff
b. the content of the discussion and, if applicable, a detailed statement why some or
all of the information pertaining to the medical error or unanticipated outcome
was withheld. A copy of approval signed by the DAT shall be attached.
f. the patient’s level of understanding and reactions to the information
g. questions asked by the patient and/or family and answers given
h. plans for support and follow-up conversations
NOTE: Documentation shall not include opinions, predictions or indications of blame
or fault.

B. Support for patients and/or families
1.

Support for patients and/or their families shall be coordinated by a trained representative of
Patient Relations other than the person serving on the DAT shall be assigned to the patient’s
case. In consultation with the attending physician, this individual shall assist the patient
and/or family with communication, documentation and the coordination of the following
services:
a. Department of Chaplains Services
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b.

Social Work
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C. Support for healthcare providers
1.

Social and emotional support is available to healthcare providers and shall be arranged by
the DAT. These include special trained individuals selected from the following services:
a. Employee Assistance Program
b. Employee Spiritual Care
c. Peer Counseling
d. Department of Chaplains Services

D. Restoration
1. A Restorative Justice Conference will be arranged by the assigned Patient Relations
Representative to discuss the compensation of short term and-out-of-pocket
expenses and other means of restoration. The participants are selected by the patient and/or
family and by organizational leadership, but shall include the attending physician. Unless it is
a systems error, the person responsible for the error is requested to participate. Each case
will be mediated by an individual with adequate preparation in mediation.
VI. EDUCATION
1.

To promote systems transparency and to encourage a culture of leaning, education and
training shall be offered in various departments and settings:
a. Physician education is to take place through the medical student
curriculum, the Graduate Medical Education Core Curriculum program, and
through training sessions in coordination with individual department chairs.
b. Nurse managers coordinate the training of nursing staff.
c. Other Departments and Services shall conduct training sessions according to
their specific involvement in disclosure processes.
b. Staff development

VII. REVIEW
1. The policy shall be reviewed annually by the following individuals:
a. Vice President, Mission and Culture
b. Vice President, Quality Resource Management
c. Vice President, Risk Management
d. Chief of Medical Staff
e. Legal Department
f. Chair, Ethics Committee
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